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ABSTRACT 
 
LESLIE DAVISON: A Case for Modernism:  Tracing Freud in Bloomsbury 
(Under the direction of Drs. Erin G. Carlston and Gregory M. Flaxman) 
 
 This project traces Freud’s impact on four members of the Bloomsbury group:  
Virginia Woolf, E. M. Forster, Katherine Mansfield, and Dorothy Sayers. I contend that a 
Freudian influence is evident in the authors’ concern with the ethical problems of 
attempting to perceive or embody absolute “truth” in language. All of the authors in this 
study suggest the existence of an inaccessible, unknowable core at the heart of psychic 
experience that seems comparable to the Freudian unconscious.  This core produces 
“meanings” rather than “truths,” and thus must be interpreted rather than investigated.  
These authors point to the need for an “ethics of interpretation” that can successfully 
“read” these meanings where a more forensic, reductionist, investigatory brand of 
psychology would fall short (or, worse, harm the subject of investigation).  Though 
authors like Woolf and Forster were openly hostile to Freudian thought at times and 
neither Mansfield nor Sayers openly affirmed Freud’s influence, this study will 
demonstrate a Freudian lineage behind this “ethics of interpretation,” illustrating how 
Freud’s “unconscious” wove its way into that of Bloomsbury.   
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Introduction 
Quentin Bell, nephew of Virginia Woolf, begins his 1974 study of the 
Bloomsbury group, Bloomsbury, by noting how difficult it is to determine precisely when 
the group came into being.  For the purposes of this study, I will pinpoint Bloomsbury’s 
inception roughly in the late 19th century and very early 20th century, when many of the 
men who were undeniably at Bloomsbury’s core, including Thoby Stephen (Virginia 
Woolf’s brother), Clive Bell, Bertrand Russell, James and Lytton Strachey, Leonard 
Woolf, E. M. Forster, and John Maynard Keynes, formed a community at Cambridge in 
the “conversazione” society the Apostles.  This community ultimately relocated to 
London, where Virginia and her sister, Vanessa, were living, and the era of artistic 
production and collaboration for which the group is most famous began.    
Because of the group’s early origins in the halls of Cambridge, philosopher G. E. 
Moore, with whom many of Bloomsbury’s men studied as members of the Apostles, is 
often identified as Bloomsbury’s greatest non-artistic influence. According to Bell, 
Moore’s emphasis on the necessity and power of rationality seemed to condition among 
his former students the attitude that one could solve the world’s greatest problems 
(including fascism) by turning always, ultimately, to cool reason, as opposed to 
superstition, nationalism, chauvinism, tradition, or even instinct or emotion (77).  Indeed, 
Moore’s influence is evident in Bloomsbury’s opposition to Victorian and imperialist 
ideals.  However, this project works against the grain of scholarship that identifies Moore 
as the group’s most fundamental philosophical influence.  In my explorations of
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Bloomsbury writers Virginia Woolf, E. M. Forster, Katherine Mansfield, and Dorothy 
Sayers, I discern the powerful influence of another figure who, like Moore, also made 
disciples of several Bloomsbury members:  Sigmund Freud. 
The Bloomsbury group’s relationship to Freud is, appropriately enough, one 
fraught with ambivalence.   Many of Bloomsbury’s “members” were attracted to Freud’s 
ideas and early advocates of his work in England, while others were more resistant to and 
suspicious of his brand of psychology.  Yet Freud’s influence is apparent in the work of 
Bloomsbury authors who span both of these categories.  This fact is somewhat 
unsurprising, given that one could argue that both Freud and Bloomsbury started their 
careers “in earnest” in the same year.  Freud’s first published case studies appeared in 
The Interpretation of Dreams in 1899, the very year that Lytton Strachey and Leonard 
Woolf entered Cambridge (Bloomsbury/Freud 4). Of course, it would be several years 
before Bloomsbury became aware of Freud.  Although Brill’s English translations of 
Studies on Hysteria and Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality appeared in 1909 and 
1910, respectively, it was only in 1913, with the translation of The Interpretation of 
Dreams, that Freud became renowned in English literary circles.  Freud became an 
important influence and discussion point in Bloomsbury when Leonard Woolf read The 
Interpretation of Dreams in 1914 in anticipation of reviewing The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life for The New Weekly in that same year.  Then in 19201, when Alix and 
James Strachey first traveled to Vienna to study with Freud, Jones convinced Adrian and 
Karen Stephen, Virginia Woolf’s brother and sister-in-law, to pursue medical training in 
                                                
1 Elizabeth Abel identifies 1920 as a watershed year for Freud’s influence on the London literati; in fact, in 
her view, Freud served as the emblem of post-World War I literary London (Abel 17)1. 
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order to become psychoanalysts.  As a result of their trip to see Freud, Alix and James 
were enlisted as the English translators of Freud’s Collected Papers, which would 
ultimately be released on the same day that Woolf released Mrs. Dalloway.   
In this study, I explore the ways in which a Freudian influence becomes evident in 
the authors’ concern with the ethics of pursuing “truth,” specifically with respect to 
human relations and discourse. All of the authors I discuss present a tension between the 
desire to “know” about others (or, sometimes, oneself) and the ethical and practical 
pitfalls that this effort often entails.  When their characters pursue a kind of absolute or 
complete knowledge about others, they discover that it is ultimately unattainable—and, 
too, that there are ethical dangers inherent in the effort to delve too deeply into the secrets 
of the human mind.  Moreover, these authors imply, any attempt to mine human behavior 
for a person’s true thoughts and feelings is antithetical to forging actual sympathy, 
connection, or understanding. They all suggest that such an effort is necessary and 
illustrate the dangers of attempting to “opt out” of communication, but insist on a kind of 
“ethics of interpretation” to which one must adhere in asking questions about the human 
psyche. 
These authors’ concern with what Woolf terms the “privacy of the soul,” which 
must be approached but not violated, echoes Freud’s own theories of human 
consciousness and the unconscious.  In his Interpretation of Dreams, Freud arrives at a 
theory of the unconscious whereby the raw “truths” of psychic experience lie buried 
beneath the surface, only apparent to the conscious mind in the form of symptoms or 
dream work—that is, in forms that must be interpreted; if presented otherwise, this 
content could be extremely traumatic for the subject.  Freud’s work suggests the 
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usefulness and even necessity of attempting to interpret these representations, but also 
emphasizes the fact that the “truth” of this content, in its full and complete form, remains 
irrevocably inaccessible.  Thus, Freud, like the authors in my study, distinguishes 
between “meaning” and truth,” suggesting that the former is what must be pursued in 
human relationships through an interpretive (as opposed to investigative) mode of 
inquiry.  The kind of “resolution” that investigation produces is entirely distinct from the 
endpoint of Freudian analysis; as Michael Roth puts it, “the task of psycho-analysis is 
precisely to examine the scars of the spirit--and not to remove them, but to apprehend 
their meaning.  Conflicts are laid bare by psycho-analysis, not resolved” (Psycho-
Analysis as History 132). 
The irony of this commonality between Bloomsbury and Freud is that authors like 
Woolf and Forster spent years resisting his ideas and denying his influence, precisely 
because they perceived him as an authoritarian scientist who pried mercilessly into the 
minds of his patients.  Freud’s biography reveals that his early training and research 
interests were indeed rooted in a more reductionist, forensic approach to the human mind.  
As a young psychologist, he was more the scientific investigator than the interpreter, 
fascinated by the attempt to deduce the physiological origins of human behavior.  As 
Angela Richards writes, Freud initially thought it might be possible to “disregard the 
conscious mental events and construct a purely physical chain, without any breaks in it, 
which would cover all the facts of observation.  To Freud, whose early scientific career 
had been entirely concerned with physiology, this second possibility was at first 
irresistibly attractive.”  Indeed, he “became intellectually fascinated by the possibility of 
constructing a ‘psychology’ out of purely neurological ingredients, and devoted many 
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months in the year 1895 to accomplishing the feat” (Richards, “Introduction to The 
Unconscious,”162-163).  Freud wrote to his friend and correspondent Wilhelm Fleiss 
during this time, telling him that he was working on something initially called the 
“Psychology for Neurologists,” which became “Project for a Scientific Psychology.”    
This work remained unfinished, however, due to a profound shift in Freud’s 
thinking.  This profound change in course stemmed from Freud’s realization that “even 
the elaborate machinery of the neuronal systems was far too cumbersome and coarse to 
deal with the subtleties which were being brought to light by ‘psychological analysis’ and 
which could only be accounted for in the language of mental processes” (Richards, 
“Introduction to The Unconscious,” 163-164).  Richards notes that while one can see 
early indicators of this transition in Studies on Hysteria (1895), it crystallizes only in The 
Interpretation of Dreams, in which “the neurological account of psychology [had] 
completely disappeared” and “much of what Freud had written in the ‘Project’ in terms of 
the nervous system now turned out to be valid and far more intelligible when translated 
into mental terms” (“Introduction to The Unconscious,” 164).  Freud’s method here is 
entirely distinct from that of the earlier “Project.”  Freud says as much himself in The 
Interpretation of Dreams, announcing:  “I shall entirely disregard the fact that the mental 
apparatus with which we are here concerned is also known to us in the form of an 
anatomical preparation . . . and I shall carefully avoid the temptation to determine 
physical locality in any anatomical fashion.  I shall remain upon psychological ground” 
(574).  It is in the seventh and last chapter of this work that Freud most clearly signals 
this new direction.  As Richards writes,  
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Here one gets to the core of the Freudian system of investigation.  The 
psycho-analytic interpretation of dreams discovers the wish that is 
represented in the dream, but does not proceed beyond this discovery to 
discuss the physiological basis for the wish itself.  To be sure, Freud enters 
into a complex metapsychological inquiry in the last chapter of The 
Interpretation of Dreams, but this is an investigation of the “frontier 
between the mental and the physical,” not of the realm of the biologists (or 
even the neurologists).  In this chapter Freud moves beyond the mental 
only inasmuch as he investigates laws that govern its operations and 
“systems” that operate according to these laws.  (Richards, On 
Metapsychology, 40) 
Later, in 1915’s “The Unconscious,” Freud writes that the attempt to localize mental 
experience to nerve-cells and excitations has “miscarried completely” (176-177) and 
notes that “Our psychical topography has for the present nothing to do with anatomy; it 
has reference not to anatomical localities, but to regions in the mental apparatus, 
wherever they may be situated in the body” (177). 
 In this shift toward the study of mental events and away from an examination of 
the physiological, Freud truly made the “Copernican” move of which he was so proud—
that is, he “prove[ed] to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must 
content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind” 
(Introductory Lectures 353).  In so doing, he decenters the subject; instead of being 
entirely free to pursue and obtain the “truth” about himself or others through forensic 
science or other forms of empirical investigation, the subject is at the mercy of this truth, 
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which, in turn, inevitably eludes him.  Freud’s theory of the unconscious is the product of 
his realization that there are always gaps in what can be seen and therefore explained 
within consciousness; the unconscious is what inhabits those gaps (Richards 168).  
The transition in Freud’s career that I have described above illustrates the divide 
between an “ethics of investigation” that drives the search for physical, measurable, and 
tangible truths behind human behavior and psychoanalysis, which understands the 
unconscious as something whose truths are essentially untouchable.  In rejecting this 
ethics of investigation—which, as I will demonstrate below, is not purely the province of 
the scientist—Freud aligns himself with the authors in this study, who also critique and 
resist it.  Although Freud’s views often placed him at odds with artists (both within 
Bloomsbury and beyond), his approach to exploring the unconscious—particularly in 
terms of dreams—is distinctly literary.  This quality of his work is evident in The 
Interpretation of Dreams, in which he contends that the dream is the “royal road to the 
unconscious.” Although he insisted on the scientific nature of psychoanalysis, Freud also 
recognized where his approach was different from other branches of science: 
My presumption that dreams can be interpreted at once puts me in 
opposition to the ruling theory of dreams and in fact to every theory of 
dreams with the single exception of Scherner’s . . . for ‘interpreting’ a 
dream implies assigning a ‘meaning’ to it—that is, replacing it by 
something which fits into the chain of our mental acts as a link having a 
validity and importance equal to the rest.  As we have seen, the scientific 
theories of dreams leave no room for any problem of interpreting them, 
since in their view a dream is not a mental act at all, but a somatic process 
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signalizing its occurrence by indications registered in the mental 
apparatus. (128) 
Here Freud exhibits the same confidence in psychoanalysis’s ability to assign or perceive 
unitary meaning behind/within mental phenomena that Woolf finds completely odious, as 
I will discuss at greater length in Chapter 1.  However, he also clearly places his theory in 
opposition to a totalizing science that insists that the reality behind dreams is chemical 
and electrical and, thus, entirely reducible to observable, quantifiable, explainable 
phenomena.2  As Lacan puts it, the Freudian unconscious is like a language; it “speaks,” 
presenting signifiers that should be interpreted and “read” in order to perceive and create 
meanings, rather than dissected with an eye toward discovering the entire architecture of 
the “reality” behind human behavior and mental activity. Indeed, Freud asserts that, when 
analyzing dreams, the restoration of the connections that are masked by the unconscious 
“has to be performed by the interpretive process” (The Interpretation of Dreams 347). In 
The Interpretation of Dreams, a work that we know Leonard Woolf read—and can 
reasonably assume Virginia was aware of—Freud presents a model of interpretation that, 
like Woolf’s, is connective and associative rather than investigatory.  
 Yet, as already noted, Virginia Woolf mistakenly attributed the ethos of the 
reductionist scientific investigator to Freud long after he had abandoned the “Project.”  
Chapter 1 outlines the origins of Woolf’s suspicion of Freud, which, until 1939, led her to 
claim proudly that she had never “sat down” to read him.   Woolf, who was disdainful of 
                                                
2Of course, Freud nonetheless insists on his status as a scientist; after noting how more ancient forms of 
dream interpretation differ from most of the contemporary scientific accounts of dream phenomena, he 
says, “I have been driven to realize that here once more we have one of those not infrequent cases in which 
an ancient and jealously held popular belief seems to be nearer the truth than the judgment of the prevalent 
science of today.  I must affirm that dreams really have a meaning and that a scientific procedure for 
interpreting them is possible” (32). 
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therapists in general largely due to her own experiences with mental health professionals 
(both as a patient and through her social circle), associated Freudian psychoanalysis with 
precisely the kind of science that attempts to probe too far into what in Mrs. Dalloway 
she terms “the privacy of the soul.”  That novel obsessively meditates upon the tension 
between the human imperative to communicate and the irrevocable truth that one can 
never actually know (or communicate) one’s meaning entirely.  As the novel weaves 
seamlessly in and out of its characters’ minds, its omniscience underscores how 
benighted the characters are.  Ultimately, however, this hopeless condition creates the 
potential for the miraculous, Woolf suggests.  The attempt to communicate and 
understand, once the hope for “knowing about” others absolutely has been abandoned, 
offers true hope for insight and connection for Woolf’s characters at the end of Mrs. 
Dalloway.    
However, Woolf’s novel also presents characters who persist in rooting out the 
“truth” of the mind at any cost—and the ones most guilty of this activity are 
psychologists.    Drs. Holmes and Bradshaw, the novel’s most sinister figures, insist upon 
treating mental health care as a science of the quantifiable and measurable—in short, of 
what is knowable empirically.  Though Woolf did not seem to draw a distinction between 
different kinds of psychologists, this psychological science is quite distinct from the 
brand Freud inaugurated with The Interpretation of Dreams.  Whereas Freud’s 
therapeutic methodologies privilege the “talking cure,” Holmes and Bradshaw silence the 
hysteria of their patients, seeking instead to be “always scientific.”  Through their 
“therapies,” they effectively destroy World War I veteran Septimus Warren Smith, who 
suffers from what we might now call post-traumatic stress disorder.  Though he wants 
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desperately to communicate, Holmes and Bradshaw together largely prevent him from 
doing so; as a result, the traumas the war inflicted upon Septimus deepen rather than 
improve. 
 Woolf initially identified Freud as this kind of psychologist based on the little she 
knew of his methodologies.  As I will discuss further in the chapter, she seemed initially 
to perceive in him the same kind of authoritarian, absolutist strain that she lampoons in 
the psychologist figures in Mrs. Dalloway.  Yet, toward the end of her life, she became 
increasingly hospitable to Freud’s ideas, and finally “sat down” to read him in 1939.  Her 
final novel, Between the Acts, is heavily influenced by her reading of Civilization and its 
Discontents and Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.  Though still in tension 
with Freud, Woolf’s last novel demonstrates a deep and often sympathetic engagement 
with his theories.  Ultimately, Woolf seems to agree with Freud regarding the nature of 
the problems and dangers he perceived in European societies and their communities 
leading up to World War II.  However, she appears more optimistic than Freud that such 
ills could be ameliorated; at the end of Between the Acts, as in Dalloway, she affirms the 
power of “ethical” communication—and here, even more pointedly, of creativity—to 
create meaningful connection when logic and “truth” fail or, worse, do harm. 
E.M. Forster is preoccupied with similar concerns in A Passage to India.  Like 
Woolf, he critiques an “ethics of investigation” that attempts to root out absolute truths 
behind human behavior—an ethics which, in this novel, is the province largely of the 
British occupants of the fictional Indian town Chandrapore.  Forster’s novel portrays a 
community in which characters consistently try—and fail—to master the slipperiness of 
language.  Moreover, the more these characters attempt to use language as a vehicle for 
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absolute truth, the more language escapes them, conveying unexpected and often illegible 
meanings. This slippage creates numerous communicative difficulties and forces the 
characters (and, by extension, the reader) to accept and even embrace language as an 
endless chase whose object—that is, the ability to relay one’s meaning in its entirety—
remains hopelessly out of reach.  In his treatment of language, Forster aligns himself with 
the Freudian-Lacanian theory of discourse, which theorizes that there is always a surplus 
of meaning—the objet petit a—which the speaker pursues but is never able to encompass 
in his or her speech.  The stakes of recognizing this aspect of language are high in the 
novel, as it becomes the only means of resisting what Lacan would describe as a “master” 
discourse, associated with the Anglo-Indians, which consolidates power by claiming to 
bear the absolute  “truth” about the world of Chandrapore.  
 Unlike Woolf and Forster, Katherine Mansfield was not resistant to 
psychoanalytic thought (although she criticized authors like D. H. Lawrence who she 
thought overused psychoanalytic imagery in their works).   Like A Passage to India, 
Katherine Mansfield’s “Psychology” (1920) and “Je ne parle pas francais” (1920) seem 
to engage with Freudian ideas regarding the relationship between language and “truth.”  
In “Je ne parle pas francais,” Raoul Duquette claims an almost preternatural ability to 
know about himself and others and convey what he has perceived via his “art.”  He 
attempts to make his language “at one” with the “truths” he describes, thus aligning his 
language with the Lacanian “master discourse.”   In “Psychology,” the two unnamed 
main characters also seem to marshal the discourse of the master, claiming that they are 
able to communicate perfectly, embodying their exact intended meanings in language.    
As Lacan notes, however, the master occupies an unsustainable position, which one can 
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only attempt to retain through silence; as long as the subject is “in” language, she pursues 
the fragment of meaning—the objet petit a—that will always elude her and which her 
discourse will never be able to represent.  Thus, in talking, she reinforces her own status 
as “divided.”  Because language is the motor of desire, according to Lacan, a subject’s 
attempt to remove herself from language also effects a denial of desire—and the end 
result of such a denial is death.  Such is the case in “Psychology,” in which the 
characters’ attempts to retain absolute control over themselves and their speech result in 
the end of their relationship and, ultimately, their embrace of a kind of living death.   
The final chapter will examine a figure who resides on the periphery of 
Bloomsbury, Dorothy L. Sayers.  As a detective novelist, Sayers would at first glance 
appear to be an unlikely proponent of the kind of “ethics of interpretation” that I have 
argued threads through these works by Woolf, Forster, and Mansfield.  She writes in a 
genre that depends on the pleasures of full discovery and explanation, presenting an 
audience reeling from the impact of World War I with soothing fictions of death in which 
fault and the motives for violence are clearly assigned and explained.  According to the 
conventions of the genre, the truth behind character motivations and events, insofar as 
they relate to the murder plot, must always be revealed in their entirety to the reader.  
Sayers indeed adhered to such conventions, which would seem to place her work in 
opposition to the novels and stories of Woolf, Forster, and Mansfield. Yet two of 
Sayers’s works, Whose Body? and The Unpleasantness at the Bellona Club, illustrate the 
ways in which she, too, suggests the inadequacy and danger of the investigatory ethos; in 
fact, the murderers in both books are scientists whose crimes stem from a desire to 
contribute to knowledge of human motivations.  Moreover, like Woolf, Forster, and 
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Mansfield, Sayers foregrounds the aspects of psychic experience that must remain 
shadowed.  Like Dalloway’s Septimus Warren Smith, Sayers’s detective Lord Peter 
Wimsey suffers from shell-shock, the result of his experiences in World War I.  The 
approach to the end of a case triggers his symptoms, which manifest as nightmares about 
his war experiences.  In drawing this clear link between the detectable and discoverable 
parameters of the novels’ crime puzzles and the hazy contours of Wimsey’s war 
memories, Sayers’s work points to the presence of a deeper mystery behind the novel and 
beside/underneath its puzzles, one that requires a different mode of inquiry.  Moreover, it 
ultimately draws attention to the traumatic implications of war, rather than declawing the 
specters of violence and mortality through scenes of solvable, fully explainable, 
motivated death.  While Wimsey participates in the classical mode of amateur detection 
that results in a fully transparent solution to the central crime, he also becomes the means 
by which Sayers’s novels highlight the inadequacy of this mode to solve or untangle the 
obscurities of the human mind.  Thus, in Sayers we see the same traces of at least an 
intuitive sympathy with Freudian theory and method.3  
I contend that all of the authors in this study engage with Freudian thought in 
interesting and unexpected ways, deploying an “ethics of interpretation” underpinned by 
a belief in an inaccessible, unknowable core at the heart of psychic experience that seems 
comparable to the Freudian unconscious.  At a minimum, these authors suggest, such an 
ethics is more humane than the “ethics of investigation.”  At its best, however, it creates 
the potential for greater empathy, creativity, and understanding, and represents a 
                                                
3And here perhaps the influence goes both ways, as we know Freud admired Sayers’ work (Gay 166). 
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powerful means of resistance to forms of control and mastery that draw their strength 
from claiming to possess or access the absolute “truth” about human beings.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Virginia Woolf and The Privacy of the Soul:  The Ethics of Interpretation in Mrs. 
Dalloway and Between the Acts 
Virginia Woolf’s relationship to Freud can best be described as one of 
ambivalence.  The use of the word “ambivalence” to begin such a discussion is 
appropriate, since Freud’s theory of ambivalence ultimately conditioned her reflections, 
in late 1939, about patriarchy and fascism.4  Woolf’s engagement with Freud in particular 
and psychoanalysis in general is central to her critique of the social and political ills 
portrayed in two of her novels, Mrs. Dalloway (1925) and Between the Acts (1941).  Yet, 
until 1939, Woolf claimed not to have read Freud and was explicitly hostile to 
psychoanalysis in her conversations and letters to friends in the 1920s, when Freud was 
becoming increasingly popular in English literary circles.   However, Freud’s influence is 
evident in Mrs. Dalloway in Woolf’s suggestion that a kind of mystery, or what she terms 
“the privacy of the soul,” lies at the heart of mental life.  Woolf suggests that this 
“mystery” must be protected and preserved, rather than mined for its solution or “truth.” I 
contend that Woolf’s notion of human “mystery” is easily translated into Freudian 
terminology as the opacity of the unconscious.  Indeed, Freud, too, envisioned the 
unconscious as a kind of necessary mystery at the center of psychic experience; the 
subject is unaware of—and, in fact, must be protected from—its truths.  Of course, the 
great irony of this consonance between Woolf and Freud here is that, even as she was 
implementing a model of human “mystery” that seems profoundly psychoanalytic, Woolf
                                                
4This discussion appears in Moments of Being in “A Sketch of the Past.” 
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appeared to lump Freud in with the forces of patriarchy, fascism, imperialism and 
proselytism that she viewed as threatening this “privacy.” 
  This chapter begins by exploring the complicated history of Woolf’s encounters 
with Freud in order to demonstrate the psychoanalytic lineage of the “ethics of 
interpretation” that Woolf offers in Mrs. Dalloway.5   Thereafter, it moves into a 
discussion of Between the Acts, which picks up Mrs. Dalloway’s concerns while dealing 
more consciously and explicitly with psychoanalytic concepts.  While Woolf’s newly 
deepened understanding of psychoanalysis certainly contributed to the novel’s somewhat 
pessimistic view regarding the future of human political and social relations, Woolf’s last 
novel continues to advance an interpretive ethics that, as she suggests, resists the 
destructive and disintegrating forces that Freud perceives at the heart of the human 
psyche. Thus, in relation to this novel, I argue that Woolf turns to Freud in order to 
illustrate both the problem and its solution.  She essentially uses Freud against himself, 
suggesting that the power of art and human expression, when engaged “ethically” 
through an interpretive mode that resembles psychoanalysis, can successfully counter the 
destructive impulses that Freud portrays as virtually unstoppable.  
 
English Reception of Freud:  Bloomsbury and Beyond 
 Despite the fact that the Woolfs’ Hogarth Press served as Freud’s English 
publisher starting in 1924, Virginia Woolf remained staunchly hostile to Freudian thought 
for much of her life and, in her diaries, claimed never to have sat down to read him until 
1939. While her husband and many of her closest friends, including Lytton Strachey, 
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were touting Freud in British artistic/literary circles, Woolf aligned herself with Clive 
Bell and Roger Fry to form an anti-Freudian segment of Bloomsbury (Abel 17). The 
reasons behind Woolf’s resistance to Freud are complex and can by no means be 
definitively located and summarized.6  That said, some of the sources of her objections 
become clear in her comments on Freud’s “The Sense of Symptoms,” Lecture 17 of 
Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, the only piece of Freud’s Woolf admitted to 
having seen (while in the process of printing the Collected Papers) prior to 1939.  In a 
1924 letter to Molly McCarthy, Woolf lampoons Freud’s case study of a woman afflicted 
with obsessional neurosis who was compelled to perform a particular ritual several times 
a day.  Freud describes his patient’s affliction as follows: “She ran from her room into 
another neighbouring one, took up a particular position there beside a table that stood in 
the middle, rang the bell for her housemaid, sent her on some indifferent errand or let her 
go without one, and then ran back into her own room” (323).  He ultimately “solves” the 
case by linking the obsessional act to the patient’s failed wedding night, which had 
occurred ten years prior.  On that night, her husband (who was many years her senior) 
was impotent and, after rushing to and from his wife’s room several times to try 
(unsuccessfully) to consummate the marriage, he splashed red ink on the wife’s sheets to 
simulate consummation so he would not “feel ashamed in front of the housemaid when 
she [made] the bed” (324). However, he did not throw the ink in the place where such a 
stain would normally occur, and thus compounded the cause of his shame. 
                                                
6Merry Pawlowski and Vara Neverow, among others, have discussed Woolf’s aversion to Freud at length.  
Unsurprisingly, Woolf’s objections seem to have stemmed primarily from Freud’s theories of sexuality, 
which were normatively heterosexual. 
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 Freud educes the link between this obsessional act and this chronologically 
distant event of the wedding night when the patient shows him the table next to which she 
always stands after summoning the housemaid, whose tablecloth has a visible stain upon 
it.  From these clues, Freud concludes that his patient was re-enacting and revising the 
moment of her husband’s shame by denying his impotence and even fixing the “mistake” 
of where he threw the ink on the bed:  
It already seems proved that the obsessional action had a sense; it appears 
to have been a representation, a repetition, of the significant scene . . . If 
we examine the relation between the two more closely, we shall probably 
obtain information about something that goes further—about the intention 
of the obsessional action.  Its kernel was obviously the summoning of the 
housemaid, before whose eyes the patient displayed the stain, in contrast 
to her husband’s remark that he would feel ashamed in front of the maid.  
Thus he, whose part she was playing, did not feel ashamed in front of the 
maid; accordingly the stain was in the right place. We see, therefore, that 
she was not simply repeating the scene, she was continuing and at the 
same time correcting it; she was putting it right.  But by this she was also 
correcting the other thing, which had been so distressing that night and 
had made the expedient with the red ink necessary—his impotence.  So 
the obsessional action was saying:  ‘No, it’s not true. He had no need to 
feel ashamed in front of the housemaid; he was not impotent.’ (325) 
Freud cleanly explains the impetus behind his patient’s strange symptoms, connecting 
chronologically distant events to arrive at a surprisingly tidy picture of the underlying 
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cause of his patient’s distress.  In the letter to McCarthy, Woolf ridicules Freud’s 
explanation, and in so doing, sheds light on the specific reasons for her aversion to 
Freudian theory:  “I glance at the proof and read how Mr. A. B. threw a bottle of red ink 
on to the sheets of his marriage bed to excuse his impotence to the housemaid, but threw 
it in the wrong place, which unhinged his wife’s mind,--and to this day she pours claret 
on the dinner table.  We could all go on like that for hours; and yet these Germans think it 
proves something—besides their own gull-like imbecility” (qtd. in Abel 18).  Woolf’s 
hostility here likely stems in part from Freud’s fixation on salacious private details and 
unquestioning faith in the centrality of heterosexual practices and concerns in defining 
healthy and “sick” psychical states.7 She may also have been turned off by the triumphant 
and definitive manner (or what Abel calls the “sense of conquest”) with which he 
presents his findings to his audience (Abel 18).   
Moreover, Woolf may have found evidence of psychoanalysis’ patriarchal and 
oppressive leanings in what she probably perceived as a simplistic and reductive account 
of illness.  Indeed, Woolf’s retelling of Freud’s case implicitly links its patriarchal, 
rationalizing, and totalizing tendencies to a problematic epistemological method that one 
could describe, to use the words of Woolf’s character Septimus Warren Smith, as “above 
all, scientific” (Mrs. Dalloway 22; 168; 144).   Her revision of Freud’s case is extremely 
interesting and potentially instructive in unpacking (and complicating) Woolf’s supposed 
resistance to psychoanalysis.  As Abel notes, Woolf converts the wife’s obsessional 
behavior from what Freud perceives as a highly motivated act into a (once again) illegible 
symptom, the compulsion to dump wine on the dining room table (18).  Here, by making 
                                                
7Elizabeth Abel, too, suggests that these might represent Woolf’s primary objections (18).  
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the object of Freud’s explanation not merely illegible but also absurd, Woolf goes beyond 
simply rejecting his account to condemn his very methodology as ridiculous; she converts 
his attempt to reveal the “sense” behind his patient’s symptoms into nonsense.  She does 
not deny that the symptoms of mental illness have meaning, but she may have taken issue 
with the ways in which Freud forces his way to a definitive explanation and imposes it as 
the unilateral meaning behind the compulsive behavior. 
 Woolf’s encounter with this work points to what appears to have been one of her 
primary concerns about psychoanalysis: its potential to ignore human complexity and 
thereby devalue human individuality and creativity.  Woolf’s general aversion to 
psychological medicine is well-documented and is perhaps most pointedly clear in her 
portrayal of Sir William Bradshaw and Dr. Holmes, the two “villains” of Mrs. Dalloway.  
As Douglass W. Orr has noted, however, her suspicion of psychoanalysis may have had 
more to do with personal encounters with psychotherapists and their patients than 
particular objections to psychoanalytic theory.8 “She knew intellectually that the practice 
of psychoanalysis would be quite different from that which she had encountered on 
Harley Street,” Orr writes, but she gave the analysts she knew personally—i.e. the 
Stephenses and the Stracheys—“little credit for sensitivity” (4).  In his letters to his wife, 
Alix, during her analysis in Vienna, James Strachey said that Virginia seemed to 
differentiate between psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts, reserving her vitriol for the 
latter.  
                                                
8In her diary, Woolf noted the negative effects of psychoanalysis she perceived in those around her; in a 
May 1924 entry, she describes her brother Adrian as “altogether broken up by psychoanalysis” (qtd. In Orr 
4), and in 1925 notes, when Alix and James return from 10 months of analysis for a vacation, that the pair 
look “gaunt” and “languid,” respectively (Orr 3).  
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Woolf’s mistrust of psychoanalysis may have stemmed in part from a perception 
that its aim was to colonize, label, and otherwise claim ownership over the aspects of 
human experience that it is the author’s task to illuminate.  Woolf’s March 25, 1920 
review of J. D. Beresford’s An Imperfect Mother in the Times Literary Supplement indeed 
suggests that Woolf viewed Freudian psychology and literature as necessarily separate 
domains—and that she resented attempts (or, at least, ham-fisted ones) to blend the two.  
Entitled “Freudian Fiction,” the review takes Beresford to task for shunning creativity 
and characterization in favor of presenting a scientific case study of a family’s Oedipal 
dynamics.   She notes that An Imperfect Mother’s approach is 
strictly in accordance with the new psychology, which in the sphere of 
medicine claims to have achieved positive results of great beneficence.  A 
patient who has never heard a canary sing without falling down in a fit can 
now walk through an avenue of cages without a twinge of emotion since 
he has faced the fact that his mother kissed him in his cradle.  The 
triumphs of science are beautifully positive.  But for novelists the matter is 
much more complex; and should they, like Mr. Beresford, possess a 
conscience, the question how far they should allow themselves to be 
influenced by the discoveries of the psychologists is by no means simple 
(199).    
As in her analysis of Freud’s case study of the woman suffering from obsessional 
neurosis, Woolf presents Freudian logic as absurd, a mode of inquiry and inference more 
rich in triumphant certainty (with results that are “beautifully positive”) than actual 
insight.  Moreover, Woolf contends that Beresford’s psychological approach robs his 
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characters of individual complexity and richness. In her critique, Woolf distinguishes 
between the scientific part of the mind that might find Beresford’s novel interesting, and 
the creative one that necessarily finds that the book is “dull” and “has no human 
significance whatever.”  She finds that the narration positions the reader as a kind of 
therapist to its characters, lamenting, “We cannot help adopting the professional manner 
of a doctor intent upon his diagnosis.”  Given her professed aversion to psychoanalysis, 
Woolf surely resented this forced identification with the aggressive scientist “intent” on 
laying the truths of the mind bare.  While Woolf admits that psychology and the notion of 
the unconscious could theoretically warrant the attention of the novelist, she deplores the 
fact that Beresford’s use of “morbid psychology” drains humanity from his characters 
and ostensibly attempts to make Freudian theory the “patent key” that “opens every 
door.”  This key, she claims, 
simplifies rather than complicates, detracts rather than enriches.  The door 
swings open briskly enough, but the apartment to which we are admitted is 
a bare little room with no outlook whatever.  Partly, no doubt, this is to be 
attributed to the difficulty of adapting ourselves to any new interpretation 
of human character; but partly, we think, to the fact that, in the ardours of 
discovery, Mr. Beresford has unduly stinted his people of flesh and blood.  
In becoming cases they have ceased to be individuals. (199) 
Thus, Woolf’s problem with psychoanalysis, I would argue, is twofold:  it 
represents a threat to her own artistic ethos and threatens, in its “ardour” for discovery, to 
probe the human unconscious with an instrument that is, at best, ill-suited for the job and, 
at worst, potentially (and perhaps catastrophically) invasive and injurious to the recipient 
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of its ministrations. Put slightly differently, Woolf confronts psychoanalysis with an eye 
to protecting what Abel has described as the artist’s “discursive primacy” (14), but more 
generally because she believes that literary interpretation and creation (which she 
opposes to psychoanalytic “science” in her letter) provide the ideal means of rendering 
and appreciating human complexity.  Alix Strachey seems to perceive the stakes of 
accepting or rejecting psychoanalysis for Woolf when she discusses why Woolf was 
never analyzed:  
James often wondered why Leonard did not persuade Virginia to 
see a psychoanalyst about her mental breakdowns...I did not agree with 
James that it would be of help to Virginia. Leonard, I think, might well 
have considered the proposition and decided not to let her be 
psychoanalyzed . . . 
Virginia’s imagination, apart from her artistic creativeness, was so 
interwoven with her fantasies—and indeed with her madness—that if you 
had stopped the madness you might have stopped the creativeness too. It 
seemed to me quite a reasonable judgment for Leonard to have made then, 
if he did so. It may be preferable to be mad and be creative than to be 
treated by analysis and become ordinary. (Qtd. in Orr, 11) 
Notwithstanding their mean-spiritedness,9 Strachey’s thoughts shed some light on the ways in 
which Freud might have been perceived (by Woolf as well as others) as the representative of 
a normative and normalizing psychology whose “cure” could violate the artist’s sacred 
spaces of creativity and inspiration. For Woolf, these potential downsides may have far 
                                                
9Alix and Virginia were not the greatest of friends. 
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outweighed any potential therapeutic benefits of psychoanalysis, which, as noted above, she 
viewed as dubious.  
 
Freud the Scientist, Freud the Author 
The preceding discussion points to a tension in the discourse about Freud in 
Britain in the mid-1920s that underpins Woolf’s initial suspicion towards Freudian 
psychoanalysis—that is, the tension between the dual claims of the literary and the 
scientific in Freud’s thought, which I have already begun to discuss above.  In 1914, 
several years before Freud was properly “discovered” by the London literary community, 
Leonard Woolf highlighted the literary aspects of Freudian “science” in his review of The 
Psychopathology of Everyday Life in The New Weekly:   “Whether one believes in 
[Freud’s] theories or not, one is forced to admit that he writes with great subtlety of mind, 
a broad and sweeping imagination more characteristic of the poet than the scientist or 
medical practitioner . . . [H]is works are often a series of brilliant and suggestive hints” 
(qtd. in Abel 15).  Although Freud and his supporters (including Ernest Jones) were often 
vehement in their claims that psychoanalysis was science as opposed to a philosophy 
(Bloomsbury/Freud 316), the 1920s in England marked a watershed moment in the 
literary establishment’s attempts to appropriate Freud as a literary thinker.   
The debate that ensued among critics and other reviewers when the Hogarth 
edition of the first two volumes of his Collected Papers were published in 1925 (on the 
same day that Mrs. Dalloway appeared) suggests that literary London eagerly claimed 
Freud as its own.  As Abel notes:  
This characterization of psychoanalysis as a literary rather than a scientific 
discourse became a leitmotiv in England; radically divided between 
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medical and humanist sectors in their evaluation of Freudian theory, 
British reviewers reached consensus on the imaginative status of the 
Freudian text.  ‘Imagination’ is the recurrent term in the fierce debate that 
the publication of the Collected Papers provoked in the letters section of 
the Nation and Athenaeum (of which Leonard Woolf was literary editor) 
from June 1925 until October 1925, when an exasperated editor decreed, 
‘This correspondence must now cease.’  Unsympathetic correspondents 
decried the high ratio of psychoanalytic theory to evidence, the reliance on 
analogy rather than induction, the lack of controlled tests or verifiable 
data, in short, ‘the flagrant and persistent disregard of scientific method.’ 
(15) 
We have already noted, however, that at the same time writers such as Leonard Woolf 
were rescuing Freud from the critiques of science by resituating him in the literary 
sphere, even those who were literarily inclined (including Woolf) resisted his 
infringement upon their turf; as Abel puts it, “Paradoxically, Bloomsbury contributed to 
constructing a singularly literary version of psychoanalytic discourse, which intensified 
both its appeal and its potential threat to writers of imaginative texts” (15).    
In addition, Freud’s views on art, as he expressed them in “Creative Writers and 
Daydreaming” (1907), would have been very unpalatable to Woolf, if she was aware of 
them; at best, they indicate Freud’s ignorance of the creative process and, at worst, his 
hostility toward the creative writer.  Indeed, Freud’s comments in this essay smack of 
condescension and run almost directly counter to Woolf’s own vision of the artist’s role. 
According to Freud, “the creative writer acts no differently from the child at play:  he 
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creates a fantasy world, which he takes very seriously; that is to say, he invests large 
amounts of emotion in it, while marking it off sharply from reality” (26).  In this 
formulation, art provides a space in which artists can rediscover the pleasures of childish 
play, where even the portrayal of things that are unpleasant in real life can inspire 
pleasure for the reader.10  In short, he likens artistic vision to daydreams and fantasies, 
which in turn are mere conduits for gratifying hidden psychical desires. Even if Woolf 
did not read the piece, we know that she wrote Roger Fry in September 1924 to praise his 
defensive response to Freud’s essay in The Artist and Psychoanalysis; the letter was sent 
directly before she wrote Molly McCarthy excoriating Freud’s “red ink” case study (Abel 
18).11  
 
Woolf, Truth, and the Unconscious 
 Yet, contrary to Woolf’s sense that her ethics and concerns ran directly counter to 
Freud’s, one finds that both authors shared something very profound and fundamental:  a 
belief that a necessary mystery resides at the heart of human psychic experience.  At the 
center of Freud’s formulation of the unconscious is the sense that its “truth” is always 
deferred, something one can circumnavigate but never directly access.  As Lacan says, 
“The end that Freud’s discovery proposes for man was defined by him at the apex of his 
                                                
10Of course, Freud is somewhat careful to distinguish between high art and popular art in his analysis, 
claiming that the latter is his real target in analyzing the creative imagination.  Nonetheless, he makes such 
sweeping statements about art, myth, and even the modern novel (including the work of Zola) that it seems 
reasonable that Woolf and other high Modernists/”Bloomsberries” would have perceived his comments as 
references to their kind of work. 
 
11And, indeed, it isn’t hard to imagine that Woolf, whose work consistently denies the reader easy meaning 
or gratification, would be particularly bothered by Freud’s argument about literature’s role as pure pleasure.  
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thought in these moving terms: Wo es war, soll Ich werden.12 I must come to the place 
where that was” (Écrits 171).  This formulation highlights the centrality of this notion of 
absence, of a gap where “that was,” to Freud’s thinking about the unconscious; the 
meanings of the unconscious are always elsewhere, but one can and must approach them 
by circling the absences they have left behind.  Meaning is always deferred, yet must be 
pursued.  The unconscious resists attempts to be read, but yet the attempt must be made. 
 Such an assertion resonates with Woolf’s own meditations on the problems 
inherent in attempting to know or communicate with others.  Within her novels, meaning 
in both interpersonal communication and art is elusive and, if attained, grasped only 
fleetingly.  Both Mrs. Dalloway and Between the Acts suggest the tragic implications of 
this reality in a myriad of failed romances, conversational disconnects, and artistic 
failures.  Yet Woolf insists on the importance of making the effort to communicate, with 
the caveat that these attempts must not involve the violation of what she terms “the 
privacy of the soul.” The trick, she suggests, lies in persisting in the attempt to connect 
despite these necessary gaps in understanding or “truth.”  One finds, then, that there are 
similarities between Freud’s notion of the absence at the heart of the unconscious—an 
absence where meaning once was—that creates the need for psychoanalytic 
interpretation, and Woolf’s vision of a “centre” of experience whose meaning can (and 
must) be circumnavigated, but never fully explored or known. 
Thus, while Woolf envisioned her artistic ethos in opposition to a Freudian 
methodology that is authoritative, totalizing, scientific, and patriarchal, I contend that the 
two fundamentally share an “ethics of interpretation.”  For both authors, this ethics 
                                                
12Literally translated, “Where it was, there I will be.” This could also be translated as "Where the id was, 
there the ego shall be.” 
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entails a rigorous reading of signs and symbols that is always conducted with an 
awareness of the limits of this inquiry.  Freud undoubtedly attempts to align himself with 
other scientists, who, in Woolf’s formulation, offer the antithesis of such an ethics; yet, 
sometimes in the moments when he most forcibly asserts the scientific nature of his 
efforts, he ends up foregrounding a more literary-interpretive mode in his thinking that 
resonates with Woolf’s distinctly anti-scientific ethos.  The essays adjacent to “The Sense 
of Symptoms”—essays that Woolf may have also read as she was preparing the proofs 
for The Collected Papers—foreground this duality in his work.  They highlight the 
reasons for Woolf’s mistrust of psychoanalysis but also, somewhat paradoxically, 
foreground her similarity to Freud.  Freud’s “Fixation to Traumas—The Unconscious,” 
lecture 18 of the Introductory Lectures, provides a particularly interesting point of 
departure in discussing Woolf’s convergences with and divergences from Freud, since its 
study very directly and powerfully illustrates the existence of a tension between the 
imperative “to know” about oneself and others and the dangers, pain, and even 
impossibility inherent in such a project.   
 “The Sense of Symptoms” (lecture 17) implements a language of discovery, 
explanation, and “probing” that, in contrast to the more gently exploratory methods of 
literature and art, may have struck Woolf as invasive and, above all, useless in its 
attempts to dig toward the “sense” or truth behind human “symptoms” or behaviors.  Yet 
in the next lecture, “Fixation to Traumas—The Unconscious,” Freud complicates and 
elaborates this discussion of psychoanalytic epistemologies.  In so doing, he very clearly 
couples psychoanalytic methods with a literary mode of interpretation and, at certain 
points, implicitly places these methods in opposition to positivist science or what Lacan 
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might term the “heresy” of “the search [for] the meaning of meaning” (Écrits 150).  
Noting that the end of psychoanalytic therapy is to make unconscious processes 
conscious in order to alleviate symptoms (346), Freud unpacks this notion of what 
“knowledge” is within a psychoanalytic framework, beginning by tackling an obvious 
question:  Shouldn’t a patient be cured if and when his therapist has discerned and 
communicated to the patient the problems underlying his symptom? 
From what I have so far said a neurosis would seem to be the result of a 
kind of ignorance—a not knowing about mental events that one ought to 
know of.  [ . . .] Now it would as a rule be very easy for a doctor 
experienced in analysis to guess what mental impulses had remained 
unconscious in a particular patient.  So it ought not to be very difficult, 
either, for him to restore the patient by communicating his knowledge to 
him and so remedying his ignorance.  One part at least of the symptom’s 
unconscious sense could be easily dealt with in this way, though it is true 
that the doctor cannot guess much about the other part—the connections 
between the symptoms and the patient’s experiences--, since he himself 
does not know those experiences but must wait till the patient remembers 
them and tells them to him. But even a substitute can in some instances be 
found.  One can make enquiries about these experiences from the patient’s 
relatives . . . Thus, by combining these two methods, we should have a 
prospect of relieving the patient of his pathogenic ignorance with little 
expense of time or trouble. (347 – 348) 
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As Freud goes on to note, however, this kind of happy resolution is actually impossible—
and the moment in which this impossibility becomes apparent occurs when Freud 
suggests that methods by which psychoanalysis points to “knowledge” actually run 
counter to positivist epistemological models that pursue knowable/testable truths: 
If only that was how things happened!  We came upon discoveries in this 
connection for which we were at first unprepared.  Knowledge is not 
always the same as knowledge:  there are different sorts of knowledge, 
which are far from equivalent psychologically . . .The doctor’s knowledge 
is not the same as the patient’s and cannot produce the same effects.  If the 
doctor transfers his knowledge to the patient as a piece of information, it 
has no result.13 [ . . .] The patient knows after this what he did not know 
before—the sense of his symptoms; yet he knows it just as little as he did.  
Thus we learn that there is more than one kind of ignorance. (348)14 
We also learn that there is more than one “truth” at play here—and that the truth of a 
patient’s symptoms in psychoanalysis, far from residing in what Woolf perceived as the 
clear but ludicrously simplistic and far-fetched explanations of the lascivious 
psychotherapist, is personal and defies any attempt to quantify or investigate it in full.  As 
Lacan puts it, the symptom is a metaphor (Écrits 166-167), and must be approached as 
one.  Interpretation, rather than investigation, is necessary to discern meaning within 
psychic phenomena.  Indeed, Freud argues that the very fact that symptoms only acquire 
“sense” via interpretation (as opposed to any other remedy) proves the existence of the 
                                                
13That is, other than setting the analysis in motion. 
 
14This is a lesson he learned firsthand in his analysis of Dora, which I will discuss in Chapter 3.   
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unconscious:  “To say it for our ends once again:  the possibility of giving a sense to 
neurotic symptoms by analytic interpretation is an unshakeable proof of the existence 
of—or, if you prefer it, of the necessity for the hypothesis—of unconscious mental 
processes” (345 – 346).  That is, the fact that interpretation proves to be an effective 
method for dealing with symptoms indicates that the object of study is something other 
than a “truth” that can be readily known or accessed in consciousness.  In short, while 
Freud tries to leave room for science in his use of scientific terminology (e.g., 
“hypothesis”), he associates psychoanalysis with an interpretive, or literary mode 
appropriate to the unconscious.  
 There are some other moments in these lectures in which Freud distances 
psychoanalysis from scientific inquiry, insofar as the latter attempts to know and thereby 
conquer the terrain of the human mind.  He compares psychoanalysis to two previous 
revolutions in thought:  the Copernican view of the universe and Darwin’s theory of 
evolution.  Freud claims that psychoanalysis promises to be equally damaging to the 
existing scientific and philosophical establishment:  “. . . [H]uman megalomania will 
have suffered its third and most wounding blow from the psychological research of the 
present time which seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, 
but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its 
mind” (353).  Here, Freud goes beyond challenging a science that attempts to know and 
act upon the human mind; in fact, he entirely decenters the subject who attempts to know 
anything—even about himself.15 Freud’s formulation “Wo es war, soll Ich werden” 
                                                
15One could argue that Freud sets up the analyst as someone who “knows” about the unconscious in a way 
the average person can’t and is, as a result, immune from such decentering.  Indeed, as I will note in 
chapter 3, Freud did attempt to become, to use Paul Verhaeghe’s terminology, “Freud-who-knew,” in his 
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embodies this decentering, for it indicates that the knowing subject has been displaced 
from its central vantage point, now forced to pursue meaning within the gaps where “it” 
once was. 
 It is serendipitous for my project that Freud’s comments on the unconscious, in a 
chapter adjacent to one we know Woolf definitely read, are offered in relation to his 
discussion of trauma.16 Indeed, trauma is deeply imbricated in Woolf’s indictment of a 
patriarchal English society in Mrs. Dalloway and her formulation of a mode of resistance 
to it.  The story of war veteran Septimus Warren Smith is central to the novel not only 
because of its position as the correlate of Clarissa’s domestic experience of the “trauma” 
of marriage and sexuality, but also because it foregrounds two issues that are strangely 
related in the novel:  epistemology and communication/expression.  Through Septimus, 
the novel suggests the violence of certain scientific modes of inquiry and investigation 
that Woolf associates with the authority of the British state, and proposes that the efforts 
associated with genuine interpersonal connection via expression, communication, and 
creativity—in all their inexactness and imperfection—are the necessary salve to the 
wounds inflicted by such an invasive epistemology.  Woolf’s linking of trauma to 
epistemological concerns resonates with Freud’s discussion of “different” kinds of 
knowledge and the unconscious in the introductory lectures and his more elaborated 
treatment of trauma in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), where he suggests that 
                                                
treatment of his famous patient “Dora,” ascertaining the “truth” about Dora’s condition and then attempting 
to share it with her.  This methodology backfired, however, and as a result, Freud realized the futility and 
danger of such an approach.  
16It should be noted, however, that he does not very clearly define or explain the uniqueness of traumatic 
neuroses – that would come later, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 
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traumatic knowledge is a brand of psychic content that is entirely and uniquely 
unconscious, having bypassed consciousness entirely.17 
 While Septimus desperately seems to need something like the talking cure, he 
receives the ministrations of arch-scientists and patriarchs Drs. Holmes and Bradshaw, 
whose science ignores the kinds of messages or knowledge embodied in Septimus’ 
memories of his traumatic wartime experience.  Instead, they privilege the visible, 
knowable, and measurable truths of empirical science.18  Suffering from post-traumatic 
stress disorder, Septimus spends the early part of the novel desperately trying to 
communicate “a message” to those around him, only to find himself feeling irrevocably 
separated from everyone, including his wife, and silenced by them.  Those charged with 
the task of helping him are the most brutal in their dismissal of the importance of 
Septimus’ attempt to communicate; immediately after Bradshaw has cut off Septimus in 
the latter’s attempts to “confess” his guilt (as their session was almost over), Woolf 
                                                
17It is significant that the novel suggests the central import of the unconscious and its movements through 
its very structure; the stream of consciousness narrative that allows Woolf to oppose the “time of the mind” 
to the time of the clock (represented in the repeated soundings of Big Ben) contains the suggestion of the 
unconscious’s importance and, at the same time, inherently ties this foregrounding of the unconscious to 
the very act of free expression in the novel’s prose.  The importance of expression—artistic and 
otherwise—is central to Woolf’s treatment of this “mystery” that I am arguing is analogous to Freud’s 
notion of the unconscious. 
 
18There is a vast body of Woolf criticism that has linked these scientists to British society and the British 
imperial state, as well as patriarchy more generally. As representatives of science, which Beverly Schlack 
identifies as one of society’s “infected fathers” (61), Drs. Holmes and Bradshaw represent the assimilating, 
conversionary impulses of the “establishment” (Zwerdling 130 – 131).   Lisa Low perceives a link here 
between the British state, as embodied in Bradshaw, and the fascist one, writing that Bradshaw has in fact 
become the latter (98).  Like war, these doctors become a means by which the state continues to terrorize 
and violate Septimus, who suffers from shell-shock and is thus haunted by memories of war.   Dr. Holmes 
practices a brand of psychological medicine whose faulty paradigms do not even recognize Septimus’ 
problems as illness.  Holmes’ rough diagnostic (or interpretive) tools prevent him from providing his 
patients with a means, through an articulation of mental experience, of gaining the power to communicate 
with others and thereby become “well”; indeed reason, rather than expression, is the balm Holmes 
advocates.  His valorization of science is presumably the inspiration for Septimus’ frequent sarcastic 
assertions regarding the need to be scientific, “above all scientific” (22; 168; 144).   
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demonstrates how Bradshaw’s scientific method directly opposes attempts at 
communication and connection and even artistic appreciation:   
To his patients he gave three-quarters of an hour; and if in this exacting 
science which has to do with what, after all, we know nothing about—the 
nervous system, the human brain—a doctor loses his sense of proportion, 
as a doctor he fails.  Health we must have; and health is proportion; so that 
when a man comes into your room and says he is Christ (a common 
delusion), and has a message, as they mostly have, and threatens, as they 
often do, to kill himself, you invoke proportion; order rest in bed; rest in 
solitude; silence and rest; rest without friends, without books, without 
messages; six months’ rest; until a man who went in weighing seven stone 
six comes out weighing twelve. (99)   
One could argue that this notion of “proportion,” which Alex Zwerdling defines as 
atrophy of the heart and the repression of instinct or emotion (124), represents the same 
patriarchal and imperial philosophies that underpinned the war and, thereby, caused 
Septimus’ illness.  Indeed, Septimus clearly associates the successful repression of 
emotion with his attainment of more “masculine” attributes during his military service in 
the First World War.19 This proportion stifles not only emotion and personal expression, 
but artistic and literary expression as well:  
He went to France to save an England which consisted almost entirely of 
Shakespeare’s plays and Miss Isabel Pole in a green dress walking in a 
square.  There in the trenches the change which Mr. Brewer desired when 
                                                
19The irony is, of course, that he achieves this “success” in terms of a normative heterosexual definition of 
masculinity while, at the same time, achieving intimacy of an unspecified nature/level with Evans. 
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he advised football was produced instantly; he developed manliness; he 
was promoted; he drew the attention, indeed the affection of his officer, 
Evans by name. [ . . . ] But when Evans . . . was killed, just before the 
Armistice, in Italy, Septimus, far from showing any emotion or 
recognising that here was the end of a friendship, congratulated himself 
upon feeling very little and very reasonably. (86; emphasis mine.)  
Indeed, Septimus’ appreciation of literature is one of the more significant 
casualties of the war in the novel.  By placing literature at odds with this hyper-rational 
notion of “proportion” and the machinations of the British state, Woolf emphasizes the 
power of expression and art to resist certain explanatory models, normative systems, and 
social/state structures. Woolf implies that expressivity can constitute a powerful form of 
resistance to the patriarchal British state because its inexactness naturally resists the cold 
hyper-rationalism of a “proportion” that destroys interpersonal connections. Tammy 
Clewell argues that Septimus’ tendency toward hyper-expressivity and his inability to 
escape traumatic memories of the war represent his immersion in a form of “Woolfian” 
mourning process that precludes both nostalgia and amnesia, both of which serve to 
reinstate the prewar status quo.  Clewell’s points here are heavily influenced by Freud, 
who, in "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death," warned against mourning practices 
aimed at restoring lost cultural values; only recognition of these old values as irrevocably 
lost in the wake of the war, he argues, would enable civilization to rebuild and continue 
(203).20   According to Clewell, Woolf’s fiction revises Victorian mourning practices 
                                                
20Some explanation of Freud’s theory of mourning vs. nostalgia might be useful here. For Freud, mourning 
is the process by which a loss preoccupies the mourner (in thoughts and expression) until the lost object can 
be relinquished; in his formulation, Freud is very careful to distinguish “mourning,” which involves 
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directed toward forgetting the dead and salving emotional wounds, implementing instead 
an ongoing form of mourning that keeps the trauma fresh insofar as it maintains an 
awareness of and connection to the past (198).   Moreover, Woolf’s  “anti-consolatory” 
brand of mourning rejects the gender divide that structured Victorian mourning; 
Woolfian mourning is not feminine, but something members of both sexes can and 
should perform by openly expressing (rather than suppressing) grief (198 - 199).  
Septimus engages in this brand of mourning, railing against human nature’s ability to 
“recover from every wound.”21  He refuses to forget the war, and thus wears insanity like 
“a badge of honor” (Zwerdling 131).22  Septimus himself seems to understand the 
importance of reclaiming his ability to achieve and appreciate expression and emotion, 
muttering aloud to himself, “Communication is health; communication is happiness . . .” 
(93) and insisting throughout the novel on his need to communicate an unspecified 
“message” to those around him. Septimus’s situation highlights the tremendous 
difficulty—in fact, the near impossibility—of communication and connection while also 
suggesting their necessity. 
 
Communication and Aesthetics as Resistance 
 In light of expression’s central place in the novel, the Septimus-Clarissa doubling 
appears to have a somewhat unexpected purpose.  While widely read as evidence of 
                                                
meditation upon the lost object, from “nostalgia,” which marks a failure to recognize the object as lost, an 
effort to ignore the psychic wounds left behind in order to move ahead. 
21Virginia Woolf, notebook dated Nov. 9, 1922 – Aug. 2, 1923, 12, Berg Collection, New York Public 
Library. 
 
22As part of this discussion, Clewell convincingly links consolatory practices, with their emphasis on 
forgetting and promotion of a masculine resolve to avoid emotionality and persevere, to the “symbolic 
resources” that “led to the outbreak and legitimation of the Great War” (202).   
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Woolf’s attempt to link the atrocities of war to the violence that heterosexual norms and 
marriage inflicted on women in postwar British society, this doubling also foregrounds 
the high stakes that attend communicative and interpretive efforts for Mrs. Dalloway’s 
characters.  Indeed, the association of non-communication with tragedy in Septimus’ case 
casts a shadow over the seemingly less dangerous communication problems encountered 
elsewhere in the novel.  
In a move that echoes Freud’s assertion that the ability to give sense to symptoms 
proves the existence of the unconscious, Woolf’s portrayal of interpersonal connections 
that are forged despite tremendous gulfs in understanding between characters suggests 
the existence of deeper meanings, ones that cannot be accessed through attempts to know 
or, more precisely, know about other people.  These meanings are the province of 
Woolf’s notion of the privacy of the soul and, as I have argued above, are comparable to 
the meanings of the Freudian unconscious.  While connections often fail, leaving 
characters feeling hopelessly separated from those around them, Woolf also presents 
some moments when characters find a way to forge sympathy or understanding, and in 
each case, this “success” entails abandoning the attempt to know or dissect the minds of 
others.  In many cases, this success involves connection through the aesthetic sense, i.e., 
the characters’ irrational (or arational) appreciation of the beautiful.  In others, it entails 
the effort to communicate and find expression even in the face of—or, perhaps, precisely 
because of—the inexactness of language.   
The book first implies the centrality of this concern with language and expression 
in the airplane sequence, which constitutes a moment of mass interpretive failure.  The 
sequence’s many fragmented perspectives are unified by their focus on an airplane 
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skywriting above the London streets.  The sequence, like the character of Septimus, 
clearly links the problem of interpretation to a postwar condition; Londoners stare at a 
plane that should remind them of aerial bombing23 but do not make the association.  It 
seems significant that this repression of memory and emotion is accompanied by their 
mass “illiteracy” when it comes to reading the skywriting.  Although easily misread 
sympathetically as a great moment of communal interpretive effort, this scene seems to 
lampoon the characters’ efforts and highlight their futility in the face of their repression 
of memory and emotion related to the war.  In this moment, Woolf suggests that the dual 
problem of interpretation and expression is crucially linked to experiences of trauma and 
repression within the novel and sets those topics and themes at Mrs. Dalloway’s center. 
  The Clarissa-Septimus doubling implies that the tremendous stakes of 
interpretation and communication in his case are present, too, in the communicative 
difficulties experienced in Clarissa Dalloway’s circle. These relationships represent far 
more than tangential, botched upper middle-class heterosexual romances; rather, they 
highlight the centrality of problems of communication and connection and their 
relationship to an “ethics of interpretation” that should govern attempts to connect with 
others and resist the machinations of patriarchy and the state.  Often, characters achieve 
connection when the impulse to attain full understanding of the “truth” behind others’ 
motives is thwarted or abandoned, sometimes via the help of what I would qualify as 
aesthetic endeavors or efforts. This abandoning constitutes a move toward using a more 
ethical hermeneutics (as opposed to epistemology) that allows characters to understand 
other people and the world at large. 
                                                
23Which, while minimal in England itself during the First World War, was nonetheless one of the great 
technological innovations of that conflict.   
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 The novel presents many relationships—romantic and otherwise—that are fraught 
with communicative difficulties; indeed, the novel’s central triangle represents only one 
example.24  Clarissa and her husband Richard encounter many problems in their attempts 
to connect throughout the novel, and their relationship foregrounds the ways in which 
Woolf seems to link the importance of communicative effort to that of aesthetics more 
generally. Clarissa feels inadequate and unworldly when faced with the concerns with 
which Richard, as a member of the House of Commons, is preoccupied daily, and thus 
perceives a gulf between them.  Likewise, Richard does not understand the values and 
desires that govern her daily existence (indeed she herself struggles to understand these), 
which might be read as evidence of an aesthetic impulse that runs counter to the 
purposeful activities of the British state, to which Richard contributes.  The divide 
between Richard and Clarissa is encapsulated in the latter’s extreme regard for flowers:  
“She cared much more for her roses than for the Armenians.  Hunted out of existence, 
maimed, frozen, the victims of cruelty and injustice (she had heard Richard say so over 
and over again)—no, she could feel nothing for the Albanians, or was it the Armenians?  
But she loved her roses (didn’t that help the Armenians?)” (120).   Clarissa’s 
aestheticism, which is manifest in her affection for flowers and her parties, is 
misunderstood by the two men in Clarissa’s life; Peter laments Clarissa’s penchant for 
frivolous social interaction, and Richard, too, fails to see the deeper meanings of what 
                                                
24Clarissa laments the difficulty of conveying and interpreting meaning in her reflections upon her 
relationships with various friends and family members, including her daughter Elizabeth, her husband 
Richard, and her former lover, Peter Walsh.  Peter and Clarissa achieve various successes and failures in 
their attempts to understand each other.24  Like Rezia and Septimus, Clarissa and Peter exhibit marked 
frustration and even hostility toward each other, each perceiving the other as unwilling or unable to 
communicate in any meaningful way.  In her thoughts, Clarissa accuses Peter of lacking “the ghost of a 
notion what any one else was feeling” (46); indeed, when Peter attempts to “read” the scene of Septimus 
and Rezia conversing in the park, the reader finds how far Peter’s interpretations can stray from an 
understanding of what has actually occurred (71).   
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Clarissa perceives as an “offering” to others with whom she would like to connect (121). 
Clarissa embraces the unreason of aesthetic appreciation and idle chatter that, while 
viewed as merely frivolous and superficial by Richard and Peter, serve to create links 
where, in the rest of the novel, pure, cold reason cannot. Both men, in short, fail to 
recognize in her aesthetic and social impulses the attempt to build connections—in part 
because their modes for understanding and inquiry appear to be quite different from hers. 
As a result, their attempts to engage Clarissa often result in abysmal failure.  
Significantly, Richard decides to bridge this divide by meeting Clarissa on her 
own “aesthetic” terms, bringing flowers home to her and resolving to articulate his 
feelings for her:   “. . . he would go back directly after lunch and find Clarissa . . . he 
would tell her, in so many words, that he loved her. Yes, he would say that” (107).  He 
repeats his intention several times to himself on his way home, promising to 
communicate his love “in so many words” and thinking to himself that “it is a thousand 
pities never to say what one feels.”  When he finally arrives home with two bouquets of 
red and white roses, however, the sentiment remains unspoken (118).  The flowers are, 
then, both a failure and a success for Richard; through his gift, he demonstrates that he 
knows what Clarissa values (even if he still doesn’t understand why), but nonetheless 
fails to complete the effort of expressing his feelings.  25  Aestheticism bridges the divide 
where speech fails, and becomes the means by which Richard manages to convey his 
                                                
25He finally loses his reticence at the end of the novel, when he finds it impossible to avoid telling his 
daughter that he is proud of her (194), thus achieving with her what he could not with Clarissa. Of course, 
the question of whether or not Richard does truly love Clarissa remains an open question; one might 
conclude, given the incompleteness of his understanding of her and his failed attempt to express the 
sentiment, that in fact he does not. 
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meaning despite the tremendous difficulty—in fact, impossibility—of ever being able 
fully to express what one is thinking or feeling. 
As noted above, Septimus and his wife Rezia, too, experience a communication 
breakdown as result of Septimus’ affliction—and here, as in the case of Clarissa and 
Richard, the aesthetic (mediated by flowers, no less) becomes a means by which a 
connection is made.  Immediately prior to Septimus’ suicide, as they work together to 
sew a hat, Septimus and Rezia talk and laugh about the woman for whom the hat is 
intended, and Septimus becomes absorbed in making the hat beautiful (143 – 144).  The 
barriers to communication between them break down, and Rezia thinks “she could say 
anything to him now . . . he understood her at once” (146).  Thus, the processes of 
communication and artistic production (insofar as the hat may be considered artistic), 
which run counter to Bradshaw and Holmes’ curative methodologies, have a salutary 
effect on Septimus. Through this scene, Woolf implies that the inexactness of art and 
language are preferable to the science that attempts to “know” and “cure” Septimus, and 
thus that an ethical mode that places emphasis elsewhere—on understanding rather than 
knowing—is preferable and more beneficial for Septimus. In this case, it results in one of 
the few miraculous connections achieved via language in the novel. 
The most interesting and unexpected moment of communicative success occurs at 
the end of the novel between the recently deceased Septimus and Clarissa, who had never 
met.  Significantly, this success coincides with Woolf’s allusion to a mysterious “centre” 
of human experience that, while approachable, can never be fully known or attained.26  
                                                
26The fact that this discussion of a “centre” comes as Clarissa hears of a trauma is significant, too, as it 
points to a confrontation with a kind of psychic content that is necessarily and uniquely unconscious. As 
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The moment occurs at the party, which provides a site at which all of the diverse threads 
of thought and narrative parallels come careening toward the novel’s own center.  
Appropriately, Clarissa’s primary mode of connection and meaning-making, hostessing, 
intersects with Septimus’ death, which she comes to perceive as a communicative act 
(and it seems important to note here that some read the party as the moment of Clarissa’s 
great psychological or spiritual suicide, and thus as a trauma analogous to Septimus’s 
death). When Bradshaw discloses what has happened, Clarissa articulates the collision of 
these two acts by exclaiming: “Oh! . . . in the middle of my party, here’s death . . . “ 
(183).  She reflects on his suicide: 
She had once thrown a shilling into the Serpentine, never anything more.  
But he had flung it away.  They went on living (she would have to go 
back; the rooms were still crowded; people kept on coming).  They (all 
day she had been thinking of Bourton, of Peter, of Sally), they would 
grow old.  A thing there was that mattered; a thing, wreathed about with 
chatter, defaced, obscured in her own life, let drop every day in 
corruption, lies, chatter.  This he had preserved.  Death was defiance.  
Death was an attempt to communicate; people feeling the impossibility of 
reaching the centre which, mystically, evaded them; closeness drew apart; 
rapture faded, one was alone.  There was an embrace in death (184) 
Certainly, Septimus’ death has communicated something to Clarissa, and she believes 
that he has preserved his integrity by resisting the “forcing” of the soul (for she 
understands a great deal, without being told, about Sir William’s character and its 
                                                
already noted, Freud describes “traumatic knowledge” in Beyond the Pleasure Principle as content that 
exists entirely in unconscious form, as it entirely bypasses the organizing processes of consciousness. 
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probable role in Septimus’ suicide from having observed his interactions with Lady 
Bradshaw) (184 – 185).   Though distanced from him in several profound ways (his 
death perhaps being the very least of them), Clarissa discerns a meaning in Septimus’s 
behavior where the investigatory ethics of Holmes and Bradshaw found nothing of 
importance.  Moreover, she perceives within his suicide a desperate attempt to preserve 
something private at the center of human psychic experience, “a thing . . . that mattered” 
that one always approaches through communication but can never quite access.   The 
science of Holmes and Bradshaw probes this center in ways that are both ineffective and 
injurious to the subject of its therapies, whereas Clarissa’s miraculous interpretive act 
here both enacts and expresses a commitment to retaining the privacy of this core. 
Another form of miraculous understanding and interpretation occurs between 
Clarissa and the old woman she spies in the window opposite to hers.  Watching the old 
lady move quietly through her rooms, Clarissa marvels: 
Why creeds and prayers and mackintoshes? when, thought Clarissa, that’s 
the miracle, that’s the mystery; that old lady, she meant, whom she could 
see going from chest of drawers to dressing table.  [ . . . ]  And the 
supreme mystery which Kilman might say she had solved, or Peter might 
say he had solved, but Clarissa didn’t believe either of them had the ghost 
of an idea of solving, was simply this:  here was one room; there another.  
Did religion solve that, or love? (127) 
Here, of course, Woolf purposely and self-consciously couches her conception of this 
“miracle” in indefinite terms, thus preserving the mystery at the heart of her own 
language.  Indeed, Clarissa’s enigmatic epiphany—“here was one room; there another”—
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fails, at least initially, to inspire a similarly revelatory moment for the reader.  Yet, if one 
rephrases the statement as “Here was one person; there another,” one may move closer to 
grasping Woolf’s “point” here. Given the novel’s fundamental concern with the problems 
and potentialities of communication, one can read Clarissa’s voyeuristic fascination with 
the old woman, and with the separation between their rooms and bodies, as emblematic 
of Clarissa’s general sense of emotional, intellectual, and communicative dislocation 
from those around her.  In this scene, the miraculous consists in Clarissa’s ability to 
perceive this gulf while, simultaneously, seeing across it for this brief moment.  She 
cannot move from her room to the old woman’s, or from her body into that of another,27 
but sees into this private, alienated space, thus forging a connection and perceiving 
meaning within it.  Woolf suggests that there is something inherently valuable, beautiful, 
and indeed sacred in this moment, which simultaneously bridges and reaffirms the 
separateness of being.  Clarissa’s revelation here thus stages the kind of ethical 
engagement that recognizes and respects these gulfs between human beings while 
nonetheless demanding that we attempt to connect with others through non-investigatory, 
non-invasive tactics. 
Mrs. Dalloway seems ultimately to affirm that certain modes of communication, 
representation, and aesthetic production have the power to resist the coercive, 
assimilating efforts of the novel’s scientist figures.  The key to this resistance, Woolf 
implies, lies in attempts—and not necessarily successful ones—to forge a connection 
with others that retains respect for the “mystery” at the “centre” of individual experience.  
                                                
27Indeed, this is the narrative’s function, a fact that dovetails nicely with the way Woolf conceptualizes art 
and representation as an effective means of navigating the distances and discontinuities inherent in 
communication. 
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This reading of Woolf implies that she, like Freud, differentiates between more absolutist 
modes of knowing and forms of knowledge that become visible via the imperfect and 
slippery workings of interpretation and aesthetic connection.  Through Septimus’ 
character, Woolf highlights the broader concerns (national, international, and societal) 
that are anchored to problems of connection and “knowing” on the personal level, and 
suggests that a Woolfian hermeneutics (i.e., ethical interpretation) is preferable to the 
invasive epistemological modes Woolf associates, via the characters of Holmes and 
Bradshaw, with patriarchy, science, and the imperial state.  While Woolf would have 
sharply distinguished her hermeneutics from Freudian inference and logic as she 
understood them at this time, her ethics nonetheless depends on a notion of the “private” 
self that seems profoundly psychoanalytic.  Indeed, ironically enough, Mrs. Dalloway 
may be more truly psychoanalytic than the crudely Freudian J. D. Beresford novel that 
Woolf critiqued so harshly. 
 
Love, Art, and Violence Between the Acts 
Started over a decade after Mrs. Dalloway was published, Between the Acts shares 
many of the previous novel’s concerns. In 1939, the year in which she started Between 
the Acts, Woolf started reading and actually met Freud.28  As Douglass W. Orr notes, 
“Her reading in December 1939 apparently included The Future of an Illusion, 
Civilization and Its Discontents, and Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” (9). 
While I will argue that Woolf’s last novel is ultimately structured by the same opposition 
between the forces of “proportion” and those of the creative/communicative that was at 
                                                
28Humorously enough, he presented her with a narcissus at this meeting. 
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the heart of Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf’s direct interactions with and receptiveness to Freud 
during the late 1930s necessitate a more complicated reading of Woolf’s treatment of the 
unconscious in this novel. Whereas this notion of the unconscious was couched in terms 
of human mystery and privacy in Mrs. Dalloway, Between the Acts is explicitly 
preoccupied with the unconscious impulses—with Eros and the death drive.  This 
concern is at the core of the novel’s anxious preoccupation with the forces of violence 
and aggression.    
 Woolf seems to have been particularly troubled by Freud’s pessimistic 
conclusion that human nature does not tend toward peace.  In Civilization and its 
Discontents, Freud argues that 
 men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most 
can defend themselves if attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures 
among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share 
of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbor is for them not only a 
potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to 
satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work 
without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize 
his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and to kill 
him. (Civilization and its Discontents 68 – 69)    
Freud paints a picture of a “civilized society [. . .] perpetually threatened with 
disintegration” in which “instinctual passions are stronger than reasonable interests” (69). 
Freud’s discussion of group behavior and psychology in Group Psychology and 
the Analysis of the Ego was equally worrisome to Woolf.  She was clearly interested in 
 47 
Freud’s theory that humans were (at least to some extent) instinctively inclined to submit 
to the authority of others; in her reading notes for Between the Acts, she quotes Freud’s 
disturbing account of how group influence can condition individual behavior: “We are 
reminded of how many [ . . .]  phenomena of dependence are part of the normal 
constitution of human society, of how little originality and personal courage are to be 
found in it,  of how much every individual is ruled by those attitudes of the group mind 
which exhibit themselves in such forms as racial characteristics, class prejudice, public 
opinion,  etc.” (82). In these notes, Woolf adds “sex prejudice” to this list, thus implying 
that Freud’s comments may have resonated with her own perception (made explicit in Three 
Guineas) that patriarchy and fascism were linked. Her revision to the list also opens the door 
for a revision of Freud’s theory, one that insists upon considering gender difference when 
examining the bases of human conflict and the supposed power of the drives to effect 
destruction.  
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego paints a bleak picture of human 
inclinations within groups and probably (given that we know Woolf read it) contributed 
to the fearful tone of Between the Acts’ musings on the future of community and art. 
Building upon the work of another psychologist, Le Bon, Freud outlines some known 
negative aspects of group behavior:  “[A] group is impulsive, changeable and irritable.  It 
is led almost exclusively by the unconscious. The impulses which a group obeys may 
according to circumstances be generous or cruel, heroic or cowardly, but they are always 
so imperious that no personal interest, not even that of self-preservation, can make itself 
felt” (14-15). Le Bon also emphasizes a conservative, repressive quality to groups that 
would be likely to provoke anxiety for the author of the feminist antifascist political 
treatise Three Guineas:  
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Since a group is in no doubt as to what constitutes truth or error, and is 
conscious, moreover, of its own great strength, it is as tolerant as it is 
obedient to authority.  It respects force and can only be slightly influenced 
by kindness, which it regards merely as a form of weakness. What it 
demands of its heroes is strength, or even violence.  It wants to be ruled 
and oppressed and to fear its masters.  Fundamentally it is entirely 
conservative, and it has a deep aversion from all innovations and advances 
and an unbounded respect for tradition.  (17) 
 Freud seems to concur with Le Bon’s assessment, noting that “a group is an obedient 
herd, which could never live without a master.  It has such a thirst for obedience that it 
submits instinctively to anyone who appoints himself its master” (21).   
Despite the fact that groups encourage this instinctive obedience to authority 
within a collective—and, thus, are repressive to that extent— they also encourage the 
relaxing of inhibitions and the free reign of emotions and drives that are typically 
repressed, which represents another danger: “. . .[W]hen individuals come together in a 
group all their individual inhibitions fall away and all the cruel, brutal and destructive 
instincts, which lie dormant in individuals as relics of a primitive epoch, are stirred up to 
find free gratification.”   This portrayal of natural group behavior probably struck a chord 
with Woolf as she contemplated the future of humanity in light of the existence—and 
spread—of German fascism; indeed, it probably confirmed some of her fears regarding 
the potential for individuals or groups—or art—to resist the forces within the human 
psyche that create these repressive, violent dynamics.  Through her reading of Group 
Psychology, then, she may have determined that the forces of emotion and unreason that 
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Mrs. Dalloway positioned as modes of resistance to the rational and rationalizing ethos of 
postwar patriarchal society could actually be complicit in—or even fundamental to—
patriarchal violence. 
Zwerdling and other critics (including Abel) have tended to argue that Woolf’s 
fiction resists this Freudian “pessimism” by refusing his definition of human nature, 
which, unsurprisingly, seems based largely on analysis of masculine experience and the 
“innate” behavioral tendencies of men.  As her addition of “sex prejudice” to the list of 
group-effected injustices indicates, Woolf was certainly thinking about the ways in which 
Freud is blind to gender difference; thus, it makes sense that she attempts to counter 
Freud’s skepticism regarding the efficacy and future of pacifism29 by placing her 
confidence in a “feminine human nature” that could resist the violence and coercion of 
the patriarchal state.  As Zwerdling notes: 
Freud’s theory of war implied that believers in pacifism and nonviolence 
were intellectually naïve because their faith was founded on a 
misunderstanding of human nature. [. . . ] [H]er way of looking at these 
issues differed from his.  For he was a man and she was a woman, a 
distinction in “human nature” that from Woolf’s point of view the 
psychoanalysts had not sufficiently taken into account. 
Her own understanding of the subject—not just in Three Guineas but 
from the start of her career—is based on distinguishing a masculine from 
a feminine human nature. (296 – 297) 
                                                
29These were offered in Freud’s letter to Einstein, later published in Why War? 
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To some extent, Woolf’s reading notes for Between the Acts confirm that she attributed 
certain negative aspects of Freudian “human nature” solely to the male gender—for 
example, her notes assert that “the emasculation of man” represents “the only hope of 
permanent peace.” 30  That said, as I will argue in greater depth below, I do not believe 
that hope in Between the Acts resides in the purely “feminine,” but rather in the aesthetic 
and expressive, which are not coded as strictly masculine or feminine (as was also true in 
Mrs. Dalloway, which Woolf’s pairing of Septimus and Clarissa demonstrates).   
Woolf’s final novel marks a more complex engagement with the realities of the 
unconscious than that embarked upon in Mrs. Dalloway. While in Mrs. Dalloway the 
unconscious constitutes the sacred space of private human experience whose protection is 
the province of ethical interpretation, here it is a double-edged sword; it is both the source 
of the destructive drives at the heart of fascism and patriarchy and the font of creativity 
and human inclinations toward love and civilization. According to Freud, human 
civilization hinges on an almost epic battle between the two drives: 
. . . Civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to 
combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, 
peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind.  Why this 
                                                
30Freud’s presentation of gender dynamics suggest places where Woolf, in particular, would find flaws—
but, too, places where her own philosophies could intervene: 
In the great artificial groups, the church and the army, there is no room for woman as a 
sexual object.  The love relations between men and women remain outside these 
organizations.  Even where groups are formed which are composed of both men and 
women the distinction between the sexes plays no part.  There is scarcely any sense in 
asking whether the libido which keeps groups together is of a homosexual or a 
heterosexual nature, for it is not differentiated according to the sexes, and particularly 
shows a complete disregard for the aims of the genital organization of the libido. (122 – 
123) 
Freud’s comments here leave the door open for a Woolfian rejoinder that, if Three Guineas is any 
indication, would suggest that the huge blind spots within this theory with respect to gender differences are 
largely responsible for often negative (and violent) aspects of group behavior. 
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has to happen, we do not know; the work of Eros is precisely this. These 
collections of men are to be libidinally bound to each other.  Necessity 
alone, the advantages of work in common, will not hold them together.  
But man’s natural aggressive instinct, the hostility of each against all and 
of all against each, opposes this program of civilization.  This aggressive 
instinct is the derivative and the main representative of the death instinct 
which we have found alongside of Eros and which shares world-dominion 
with it.  And now, I think the meaning of the evolution of civilization is no 
longer obscure to us.  It must present the struggle between Eros and Death, 
between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself 
out in the human species.  This struggle is what all life essentially consists 
of, and the evolution of civilization may therefore be simply described as 
the struggle for life of the human species.  (81-82) 
Zwerdling and others have focused on Woolf’s clear preoccupation with Freud’s theories 
of the “death drive,” arguing that Woolf’s novel is imbued with a fear of man’s 
destructive instincts.  Building on my discussion of Woolf’s notion of the unconscious in 
Mrs. Dalloway, however, I would like to complicate this perception of Woolf’s “fear” of 
the drives.  While the novel appears to take its cues from Freud in presenting love and 
hate as inseparable, always bound together in varying alloys (Civilization and its 
Discontents 78), it nonetheless implies that the aesthetic, communicative, and artistic can 
successfully become part of Eros’s “project” to overpower the destructive drives 
circulating in a British society about to plunge back into large-scale conflict.   
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In advancing this point, Woolf recasts Freud’s theory of the drives in a very 
important (if not immediately obvious) way.  She structures her novel around the tension 
between Freud’s categories of love and hate, which manifests, I would argue, in the 
binary the novel sets up between art and violence or, to use the terms Blanche Gelfant 
uses to describe a similar tension in Mrs. Dalloway, between “the creative and the 
coercive” (231).  Moreover, the novel appears to define this potentially redemptive art 
specifically as experimental, fragmented, and anti-narrative—in short, as Modernist.31 
Woolf explicitly ties the novel’s privileging of formal experimentation and anti-narrative 
elements to its preoccupation with the drives in Isa Oliver’s cautious approval of Miss La 
Trobe’s experimental directing techniques in the pageant that is the novel’s central event:  
“The plot was only there to beget emotion. There were only two emotions:  love; and 
hate.  There was no need to puzzle out the plot” (90–91).  Here, Woolf suggests that art—
and particularly, new experimental forms—represent vitality whereas plotting and the 
simple categories of love and hate lack importance, relevance, or force.  
The novel’s very title foregrounds art and violence and suggests their central 
import:  the “acts” between which the characters are suspended could be read as either 
the acts within the pageant that the novel’s characters put on or, alternatively, the two 
European wars, one past, the other about to begin (the novel is set in 1939, three months 
before England declared war on Germany). One could also read “acts” more generally as 
moments of action—and indeed, Woolf’s prose and the pageant itself implement 
narrative rhythms that juxtapose action with duration and leave characters and/or 
audience members suspended between “acts” of various sorts.  This emphasis on acts and 
                                                
31In “Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts:  Fascism in the Heart of England,” Merry Pawlowski has already 
noted that Woolf uses experimental language and plotting to revise patriarchy and fascism. 
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action seems related to the novel’s concern with violence, as the novel frequently 
contrasts the impulse to act with the impulse to create (or be creative), associating the 
former with violent or destructive tendencies.  In an early description of Giles Oliver, one 
half of the novel’s central couple, Woolf makes clear that the powers of language and art 
stand in diametric opposition to the forces of action and “progress” that she associates 
with war: 
Giles nicked his chair into position with a jerk.  Thus only could he show 
his irritation, his rage with old fogies who sat and looked at views over 
coffee and cream when the whole of Europe—over there—was bristling 
like . . . He had no command of metaphor.  Only the ineffective word 
‘hedgehog’ illustrated his vision of Europe, bristling with guns, poised 
with planes.  At any moment guns would rake that land into furrows; 
planes splinter Bolney Minster into smithereens and blast the Folly.  He, 
too, loved the view.  And blamed Aunt Lucy, looking at views, instead 
of—doing what? (53). 32 
The juxtaposition here of Giles’ propensity for action with his failure to “command” 
metaphor provides an early and clear example of how Woolf associates an ethos of action 
and mastery (or “command”) with violence and war, and opposes this violence to art via 
an emphasis on his lack of artistic impulses—or, at the very least, his ability to 
communicate any aesthetic sense—embodied here in his failure to use metaphor.  Isa 
                                                
32One wonders whether this is a nod toward A Room with a View’s Lucy Honeychurch.  Indeed, the fact 
that Forster’s novel is intimately concerned with encounters between British culture and a foreign other 
lends credence to this suggestion. 
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Oliver,33 too, draws out an opposition between war and language when she searches for a 
word “to fit the infinitely quick vibrations of the aeroplane propeller that she had seen 
once at dawn at Croydon” (15).  Although Isa does not explicitly refer to a war plane, 
Woolf elsewhere in the novel associates the “aeroplane” with war—and thus the reader 
may reasonably perceive in Isa’s meditations her sense of imminent danger to herself and 
her country.  She unconsciously compares and contrasts war and art in her thoughts again 
later, musing on the potential of the latter to “cure” the former:  “What remedy was there 
for her at her age—the age of the century, thirty-nine—in books?  Book-shy she was, like 
the rest of her generation; and gun-shy too.  Yet as a person with a raging tooth runs her 
eye in a chemist shop over green bottles with gilt across on them lest one of them may 
contain a cure, she considered:  Keats and Shelley; Yeats and Donne” (19).   
The threat of violence is present not only in the international situation that 
constitutes the novel’s broader context, but also in the novel’s personal relationships.  
Alex Zwerdling has already noted that Woolf’s concern with violence on an international 
scale is linked to her focus on interpersonal conflict:  “The pervasive feeling of contained 
violence in the personal relationships of the novel [ . . .] are [sic] not directly caused by 
contemporary public events, but are meant to embody similar forces in a microcosmic 
setting.  ‘War’ for Woolf meant the conflict between individuals as well as between 
nations” (304).  In these relationships, the reader finds both the tension between Eros and 
                                                
33Artist figures (and unlikely ones) abound in and around Pointz Hall, the Oliver residence and the novel’s 
only setting.  Isa, who disguises her collection of poetry as an account book (“lest Giles might suspect”) 
(50), is constantly generating metaphors and verse, repeating the latter to herself, mindless of whether 
others hear.  William constitutes another unlikely artist figure who, like Isa, seeks to hide his aesthetic 
impulses; his friend Mrs. Manresa introduces him with “He’s an artist,” but William corrects her by saying 
“I’m a clerk in an office” (38). Finally, Lucy likens herself to a kind of actress when she tells Miss La 
Trobe (the pageant’s director and the novel’s most prominent artist figure) after the pageant:  “What a small 
part I’ve had to play!  But you’ve made me feel I could have played . . . Cleopatra!” (153). 
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the death drive and, too, a smaller-scale version of Woolf’s recasting of this dynamic; her 
opposition of art and violence is translated, in interpersonal relations, into a tension 
between violence and communication. Hence, we can return once again to some of the 
same devices and concerns that were present in Mrs. Dalloway.  
The novel highlights the extreme difficulty of surmounting difference and 
distance to achieve connection; as Zwerdling writes, “the world that [the novel] examines 
has been further broken down into something like an archipelago, with each character 
marooned on a different island” (323).  As in Mrs. Dalloway, characters often fail to 
communicate with one another.  Giles refuses to voice his displeasure with William 
Dodge’s presence, although “his silence made its contribution to talk” (49).  Miss La 
Trobe and Lucy Swithin, likewise, experience an instance of simultaneous failure and 
success of connection, when Lucy tries to tell Miss La Trobe what the pageant has meant 
to her:  “Their eyes met in a common effort to bring a common meaning to birth.  They 
failed” (152 - 153).  While Miss La Trobe understands what Lucy leaves unspoken, 
Woolf implies that these avoidances of articulation, of conflict, of the process of 
communicating, constitute failure. 
The pageant is emblematic of the novel’s overall preoccupation with the role of 
aesthetics in the creation and maintenance of community and reveals the challenges and 
complexities of the relationship between art and the “we” of society.  The novel’s 
primary artist figure, Miss La Trobe, feels acutely the problem of using fiction, which 
often hinges on individual vision, to forge connections and understanding among its 
audience; if the space between individuals in Mrs. Dalloway is wide, the gulf between 
artist and audience in Between the Acts is wider.   The pageant implements a 
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fragmentation that, paradoxically, represents this distance but is also part of La Trobe’s 
effort to bridge it.  Woolf’s use of stream of consciousness in describing this gulf nicely 
embodies this contradiction, presenting the fragments of what we must assume are 
different audience perspectives, run together and thereby unified: 
The tune changed; snapped; broke; jagged.  Foxtrot, was it?  Jazz?  
Anyhow the rhythm kicked, reared, snapped short.  What a jangle and a 
jingle!  Well, with the means at her disposal, you can’t ask too much.  
What a cackle, a cacophony!  Nothing ended.  So abrupt.  And corrupt.  
Such an outrage; such an insult. And not plain.  Very up to date, all the 
same.  What is her game?  To disrupt?  Jog and trot?  Jerk and smirk?  Put 
the finger to the nose?  Squint and pry?  Peak and spy?  O the irreverence 
of the generation which is only momentarily – thanks be – “the young.”  
The young, who can’t make, but only break; shiver into splinters the old 
vision; smash to atoms what was whole.  What a cackle, what a rattle, 
what a yaffle – as they call the woodpecker, the laughing bird that flits 
from tree to tree. (183) 
La Trobe highlights the fragmenting effects of her pageant’s structure in the final play, in 
which the actors hold up bits of glass to the audience in a move that jars the audience 
considerably:  “Ourselves . . . But what could she know about ourselves?  The 
Elizabethans, yes; the Victorians, perhaps; but ourselves . . . it was ridiculous.  
‘Myself’—it was impossible.  Other people, perhaps . . .” (178 - 179).  However, here too 
Woolf suggests the potential for understanding through the thwarting of understanding, as 
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the fragmentation captures “us as we are, before we’ve had time to assume . . . And only, 
too, in parts . . . That’s what’s so distorting and upsetting and utterly unfair” (184).34 
 Thus, here as in Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf is concerned with the rewards that attend 
the shift away from the search for “truth” or absolute meaning and toward the rigors of 
interpretation.  This might explain why Miss La Trobe roundly refuses to explain the play 
to the Reverend G. W. Streatfield (“a piece of traditional church furniture” (190)) and is 
mortified when he offers his glib synopsis of the play: “We act different parts; but are the 
same” (192) (an idea gleaned from the observation that each actor has played several 
different parts in the performance).  She does not desire transparency, easy explanation, 
or clear metaphors; as Bartholomew puts it at the end of the novel,  “What she wanted, 
like that carp (something moved in the water) was darkness in the mud; a whisky and 
soda at the pub; and coarse words descending like maggots through the waters” (203). 
Such artistic opacity becomes key to Woolf’s efforts to problematize the 
narratives of progress and regression that characterize a militaristic ethos and traditional 
(and especially imperial) narratives of history.  Woolf uses narrative (or, rather, anti-
narrative) devices—both within the pageant and on the level of the novel itself—to 
thwart any attempts to perceive the “history” offered in the pageant as progressive.  
While following a traditional timeline through English history starting with Chaucer’s 
England and working toward the present, the pageant itself actually seems to resist the 
march of progress in its frequent shunning of a plot.  In the last play, La Trobe seems to 
                                                
34Elisions here are Woolf’s.  Naremore comments on the reflexive element in Between the Acts’ 
fragmentation and subversion of audience, asserting that Woolf (who he claims is herself “in love with 
inaction” (91)), privileges discontinuities, pauses, and intervals as the loci of meaning-making and 
interpretive vigor, rejecting narrative continuity and “acting” as inadequate bearers of meaning.  Naremore, 
thus, intuits the ways in which Woolf’s theories, philosophies, and methodology extend out of the plot to 
structure her novels. 
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replace plotting with the pure time of duration; she purposely leaves the audience 
suspended in an unusually long intermission, or interval, for “she wanted to expose them, 
as it were, to douche them, with present-time reality.”  Unfortunately, she believes that 
the experiment fails, muttering to herself:  “Reality too strong  . . . Curse ‘em!” (179-
180).  This kind of experimentation seems to have been present throughout the play; as 
noted above, Isa Oliver remarks the confusion in the first play’s structure, wondering, 
“Did the plot matter?”  The answer, she seems to conclude, is no:  “The plot was only 
there to beget emotion. There were only two emotions:  love; and hate.  There was no 
need to puzzle out the plot.  Perhaps Miss La Trobe meant that when she cut this knot in 
the centre?” (90-91). Of course, Isa implies the difficulty of appreciating this kind of 
experimentation when she, immediately after engaging in these reflections, feels her 
attention pulled back to what is “happening”; however, as she watches the play, she 
affirms her appreciation of it, asserting:  “It was enough . . . All else was verbiage, 
repetition” (91). 
La Trobe’s reliance on fragmentation and denial of narrative progress are, 
paradoxically enough, central to her attempt to promote thoughtful discussion and 
connections among the members of her audience.  Thus, her experimentations can be 
perceived as a form of resistance to the destructive, anti-progress forces of violence that 
produce social and political fragmentation and make human progress (at least in a 
Freudian formulation) impossible.  Indeed, as I have already discussed, the fear of 
violence and human beings’ regressive tendencies are at the heart of the novel’s anxious 
mood.  One pageant spectator suggests the possible link between this fear of the unruly 
drives and Miss La Trobe’s efforts when he or she wonders: “Did she mean, so to speak, 
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something hidden, the unconscious as they call it?  But why always drag in sex. . . . It’s 
true, there’s a sense in which we all, I admit, are savages still” (199).  Another spectator 
seems to perceive this paradoxical need to embrace misunderstanding in order to 
understand—or, put differently, to accept a feeling of disconnect in order to forge 
connection: “And if we’re left asking questions, isn’t it a failure, as a play?  I must say I 
like to feel sure if I go to the theatre, that I’ve grasped the meaning . . . Or was that, 
perhaps, what she meant?  . . . that if we don’t jump to conclusions, if you think, and I 
think, perhaps one day, thinking differently, we shall think the same?” (200).   
 The novel’s preoccupation with fragmentation also translates into a marked 
anxiety regarding the potential of human beings to form communities, although 
ultimately Woolf seems hopeful about these prospects.  Reading about the fragmentation 
of the prehistoric Pangea into different continents at the beginning of the novel, Lucy 
reflects upon the initial unity of these fragments—and takes special care to mention 
Britain’s original unity with the European continent (8).  Similarly, another character 
expresses a belief in a fundamental commonality across humanity when he asserts that 
human nature is the same in the west as the east (110).  Though early in the novel Lucy 
affirms to herself “dispersed are we” 35 (103), the gramophone that La Trobe uses to 
provide a soundtrack picks up and finishes the phrase at the end of the pageant as:  
                                                
35This is one of two instances in the novel in which two characters think the same thing, independently of 
one another.  The other moment occurs when Giles, Isa, and Dodge simultaneously express, in their private 
thoughts, a sense of unhappiness – but, strangely, these musings are phrased as though articulated, the latter 
two seemingly responding to the sentences preceding them (176).  These coincidences may imply, perhaps, 
the novel’s attempt to highlight underlying commonality across individuals.  Finally, it’s worth noting that 
after the play, Miss La Trobe begins to formulate a scene that bears a striking similarity to Woolf’s 
prehistoric staging of the conflict between Isa and Giles at the end of the novel.   This coincidence, like the 
others, seems to reinforce the presence of an undercurrent of common understanding or experience and, 
moreover, constitutes another example of Woolf’s self-conscious authorship; she draws herself into 
analogy with La Trobe by having them write the same scene.  
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“Dispersed are we; we who have come together. But . . . let us retain whatever made that 
harmony” (196).   
 Woolf’s attempt to locate hope for human civilization in community might seem 
strange, given that her reading notes indicate she was particularly interested in the 
pessimistic aspects of Freud’s account of group behavior as she prepared the novel. It 
should be noted, however, that Group Psychology ultimately presents group behavior as 
complex.  It is a two-sided coin; according to Freud, groups can indeed encourage the 
surfacing of baser human instincts, but they can also take on many positive attributes and 
exhibit commendable behaviors. In short, Freud’s stance on groups is ambivalent.  Freud 
notes that whereas “with isolated individuals personal interest is almost the only motive 
force, with groups it is very rarely prominent”—that is, the desire to ensure the 
community’s stability will override individual concerns.  Moreover, groups are “capable 
of high achievements in the shape of abnegation, unselfishness, and devotion to an ideal” 
when “under the influence of suggestion” (17).  While a group’s “intellect” will always 
be lower than that of an individual, Freud asserts, its ethical achievements could 
potentially be either far lower or far greater (18). The group’s potential to inspire strong 
emotions among members is similarly two-sided.  On the one hand, it creates the 
potential for close personal connections within groups.  On the other, it can bring 
emotions to a fever pitch, provoking zealotry or, to pick a reference that would have 
particularly horrified Woolf, fascist behaviors: 
 The most remarkable and also the most important result of the formation 
of a group is the ‘exaltation or intensification of emotion’ produced in 
every member of it’ . . . In McDougall’s opinion men’s emotions are 
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stirred in a group to a pitch that they seldom or never attain under other 
conditions; and it is a pleasurable experience for those who are concerned 
to surrender themselves so unreservedly to their passions and thus to 
become merged in the group and to lose the sense of the limits of their 
individuality. (27) 
The pleasure group participants feel is undoubtedly intense and of an unusual strength 
and type, and thus speaks to the positive connective aspects of group behavior. Yet the 
frenzy of emotion and the individual’s total submersion within the group evoke images of 
the fascist collective in which such irrationality and erasure of individual thought were 
dangerous.   
Moreover, the potential of language to forge connections even where reason and 
knowledge fail, so clearly positive in Woolf’s writing, takes on an ambiguous cast in 
Freud’s formulation (inspired by Le Bon) of the group’s uses and responses to language: 
“A group . . . is subject to the truly magical power of words; they can evoke the most 
formidable tempests in the group mind, and are also capable of stilling them . . . Reason 
and arguments are incapable of combating certain words and formulas” (19).  Here, the 
same irrationality and “magical power of words” that resisted the cold rationalism of 
proportion in Mrs. Dalloway, and thus was almost entirely positive there, takes on the 
power to destroy and heal connections between group members in Freud’s theory. 
Freud’s complex vision of group dynamics and the drives’ impact on free will 
seems to condition the novel’s anxiety regarding the potential for human progress, an 
uneasiness that looms large over the end of the novel.  Between the Acts closes with 
moments that both foreground our primal origins and, at the same time, point to the 
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potential for human progress.  While reading her “Outline of History,” Lucy recounts 
prehistoric man’s evolution from the “half-man, half-ape” to the human being that 
“roused himself from his sitting position and raised great stones” (218).36  This 
resurgence of the notion of progress after it was debunked via the narrative structure of 
the pageant, in tandem with the image of a potentially generative sexual union that ends 
the novel, strike a somewhat hopeful ending note.  In the final lines of her final novel, 
Woolf writes:  
The old people had gone up to bed.  Giles crumpled the newspaper and 
turned out the light.  Left alone together for the first time that day, they 
were silent.  Alone, enmity was bared; also love.  Before they slept, they 
must fight; and after they had fought, they would embrace.  From that 
embrace another life might be born.  But first they must fight, as the dog 
fox fights with the vixen, in the heart of darkness, in the fields of night. 
Isa let her sewing drop.  The great hooded chairs had become enormous.  
And Giles too.  And Isa too against the window.  The window was all sky 
without colour.  The house had lost its shelter.  It was the night that 
dwellers in caves had watched from some high place among rocks.   
Then the curtain rose.  They spoke. (219) 
This final passage is ambiguous.  The animalistic images in Woolf’s language here, in the 
context of her reference to Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, suggest the indelible element of 
brutality in human interactions.  Despite the tenuously hopeful suggestion that this 
                                                
36Woolf’s imagery here may be intended to refer to Stonehenge.  If so, the choice is interesting; mysterious, 
polytheistic, and nature “worshipping,” the Druids could serve as an emblem of a form of “mystery” that 
breaks the mold—in this case, the mold of Christian monotheism.  
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conflict could result in the creation of a child, one wonders, given the couple’s insertion 
into this primal scene, how eagerly one might await the product of such a union37.   
Yet the book’s final sentence offsets the implied animalism of this encounter.  In 
fact, Giles and Isa will not fight as the dog fox fights the vixen; rather, they will engage 
in combat through a medium that neither of these animals possesses:  words.  Woolf truly 
leaves us with an open question with this rise of the curtain, the opening of a new act.  
The potential for savagery and brutality clearly remains present in Woolf’s final 
figuration of human relations, but the novel closes with the image of two people trying to 
communicate—an image that, as the preceding has attempted to demonstrate, Woolf 
consistently places in opposition to the savage machinations and desires of “human 
nature.”38 The book itself self-consciously participates in this resistance, and shares La 
Trobe’s anxiety about its words’ ability to counteract the violence of a new “act” in 
human history. 39 
                                                
37Indeed, it reminds me of the final lines of Yeats’ “The Second Coming”: 
“And what rough beast, its hour come round at last/Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?” 
38This juxtaposition of the regressive with the potentially regenerative seems to imply the futility of 
narratives that place human history on a straight line of either progress or regression. 
 
39Although it does not directly relate to my reading of how Woolf is using—and resisting—Freud, it should 
be noted that Freud discusses the ways in which (heterosexual) individuals can resist group influence by 
engaging in sexual relations:  “Two people coming together for the purpose of sexual satisfaction, in so far 
as they seek for solitude, are making a demonstration against the herd instinct, the group feeling.  The more 
they are in love, the more completely they suffice for each other.  The rejection of the group’s influence is 
manifested in the shape of a sense of shame.  The extremely violent feelings of jealousy are summoned up 
in order to protect the sexual object-choice from being encroached upon by a group tie” (Group Psychology 
. . . 121). By contrast, interestingly enough, Freud asserts that homosexual love does not have this 
disintegrating effect: “It seems certain that homosexual love is far more compatible with group ties, even 
when it takes the shape of uninhibited sexual tendencies—a remarkable fact . . .”(Group Psychology . . . 
123).  One might be tempted to read Freud’s comments here about the powers of heterosexual love to 
produce resistance to group influence as analogous to Woolf’s suggestion that connection via 
communication and art can constitute a resistance to coercion and the ideology of a patriarchal imperial 
British society; yet, Freud’s likening of the condition of being in love to the state of the neurotic should 
make us pause before making such an assertion:  “It may be said that a neurosis has the same disintegrating 
effect upon a group as being in love.  On the other hand it appears that where a powerful impetus has been 
given to group formation neuroses may diminish and at all events temporarily disappear . . . Even those 
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Despite this anxiety, perhaps the most powerful locus of hope in the novel resides 
in its very writing and form.  The novel’s presentation of La Trobe’s Modernist pageant 
as an “offering” (analogous to Clarissa’s parties or “idle” chatter) directed toward the 
building of community begs to be read in relation to what we know of Woolf’s artistic 
frustrations, fears, and hopes with respect to her own historical context. Indeed, perhaps 
Woolf’s rendering of La Trobe’s “triumph” in offering the pageant might effectively sum 
up Woolf’s own sense of her novels’ larger purpose or meaning to the world around her:  
“Glory possessed her—for one moment.  But what had she given?  A cloud that melted 
into the other clouds on the horizon.  It was in the giving that the triumph was” (209; 
emphasis mine). 
 
Conclusion 
Like Mrs. Dalloway, Between the Acts suggests that the mere effort to connect via 
art or communication is the great thing.  In Mrs. Dalloway, this potentially mobilizing 
form of connection depends on the adoption of an “ethics of interpretation” that preserves 
the mysteries at the heart of human experience or, in Freudian terminology, of the 
unconscious. Thus, while inviolable, the unconscious in Mrs. Dalloway represents an 
element of human experience that can be navigated successfully, allowing for more 
meaningful and humane interpersonal connections.  This confidence in the ability to 
navigate the unconscious is gone in Between the Acts, which is haunted by a more 
                                                
who do not regret the disappearance of religious illusions from the civilized world of to-day will admit that 
so long as they were in force they offered those who were bound by them the most powerful protection 
against the danger of neurosis” (Group Psychology . . . 124). 
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explicit and proximate fear of violence.  This fear is fed by Woolf’s more developed 
understanding of a Freudian unconscious populated by two powerful and contrary drives, 
Eros and the death drive.  In presenting the story of an artist’s attempt to mediate 
community interactions and connections on the eve of war, Woolf’s oddly haunting, 
bleak, and yet inspiring final novel may represent her own efforts to make an “offering” 
that could resist the forces of imminent violence.
Muddle, Mystery, and The Case of the Marabar Caves 
In 1957, scholar Robert L. Selig sent E.M. Forster a copy of his M.A. thesis on A 
Passage to India. The thesis traced allusions in the novel to a wide and diverse set of 
influences, including psychoanalysis, Plato’s myth of the cave, and Hindu mythology.  In 
tracing this lineage, Selig’s primary concern was to untangle the novel’s central event, 
the incident in the Marabar Caves.  Much to Selig’s surprise, Forster responded in the 
following letter40:  
Dear Mr. Selig,  
Many thanks for your interesting and generous thesis on A Passage to 
India, and for the M.S. copy of it which I am glad to possess. I hope you 
won't think me ungrateful and discourteous, but—as perhaps you 
presume—I fail to follow most [the original word that Forster wrote was 
"much," but he canceled it and wrote the sterner "most" instead] of your 
criticism. For one thing, you [Forster originally wrote "it" but crossed out 
the impersonal word and replaced it with the more accusing "you"] credit 
me with the reading of much I have never read. I never thought of Aum 
when I wrote Boum, and I was unaware of the subdivisions of the mystic 
syllable. I have never read Miss Weston, have only glanced at Frazer, have 
                                                
40Selig quotes the letter in an article offering a critical reevaluation of how to deal with the mysteries in A 
Passage to India.  He ends up concurring with Forster’s criticism of his article for its heavy-handed mining 
of the text for allusions and instead focuses on the playfulness of Forster’s text. 
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never been interested in Plato41, never thought of his Cave in connection 
with the Marabar, and throughout your thesis have encountered inferences 
and comparisons that surprised me. You may reply that I knew all the 
above subconsciously, and then of course you have got me! And I realize 
even on the conscious level that there is plenty of sex in the book. All the 
same I think you go too far. You tend to make every hole, and every 
object that's longer than it's broad, into a sexual symbol—rather like G. K. 
Chesterton who regarded all objects intersecting at right angles as proofs 
of the truth of Christianity. Your affection for the book is evident, and I 
much appreciate it . . . I also agree with many isolated judgements—e.g. 
the approximation of Godbole and Mrs. Moore, and my failure to present 
Ralph. It is your critical method that I feel compelled to reject--and maybe 
my subconscious will one day rise to the surface, and demonstrate to me 
that I am wrong!  
Yours truly, 
E. M. Forster  
(qtd. in Selig 473) 
In the letter, Forster objects to Selig’s effort to find specific meanings and 
allusions where, he claims, none was intended.  His comments—and, in particular, his 
mockery of that potential critical fallback, “the authorial unconscious”—evince a 
hostility toward forms of inquiry that “go too far.”  Forster seems particularly 
antagonistic toward psychoanalysis in his dismantling of Selig’s false reading, 
                                                
41Whether he was interested or not, biographical information clearly indicates that he was well read in the 
Greeks and other philosophers. 
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lampooning the notion of a “subconscious” that could inform his own work.  He suggests 
that Selig has used a flawed psychoanalytic apparatus to mine the novel’s ambiguities for 
clear symbols and “truths.”  The irony of Forster’s antipathy toward such invasive truth-
seeking methodologies is that it actually aligns him with Freudian psychology; in contrast 
to Forster’s perception of Freudian psychoanalysis, Freud’s work suggests that it is 
impossible for words to embody fully the meanings or “truths” beneath them.  Although 
Forster, like Woolf, claims to have been resistant to reading Freud,42 his affinity for 
psychoanalytic thought is evident in A Passage to India.  Just as I attempted to 
complicate the picture of Woolf’s links to psychoanalysis in the previous chapter, I intend 
to work against the grain of Forster’s professed reticence toward that school to illustrate 
its influence upon him.43  Like Freud, Forster is fascinated by the division between 
language and thought.  The truth that one wants to convey, both Forster and Freud assert, 
is never that which is said; thus, language is an endless chase after the elusive remainder 
of meaning—Lacan’s objet petit a—that is never represented:    
In Lacanian theory, there is no such thing as a truth which can be 
completely put into words; on the contrary, the exact nature of the truth is 
such that one can hardly put it into words at all.  There are always some 
elements of the Real which can never be verbalized.  Lacan calls this 
characteristic ‘le midire de la verité,’ the half-speaking of the truth.  . . . 
[T]his is essentially a Freudian idea:  complete verbalization of the truth is 
                                                
42In The Art of Fiction, Forster writes: “I couldn’t read Freud or Jung myself; it had to be filtered to me” 
(40; qtd. in Stone 334).    
 
43As Selig’s article notes, there have already been numerous psychoanalytic readings of A Passage to 
India; Wilfred Stone and Louise Dauner,43 among others, have offered critiques of the novel that 
concentrate on the Marabar Caves and their potential resonances as a symbol of the unconscious.   
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impossible because primary repression keeps the original object 
definitively beyond the realm of language, which means at the same time 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle.  The result of this is an endless 
compulsion to repeat, a never-ending attempt to verbalise the non-verbal. 
(Verhaeghe 102) 
As Lacan so famously noted when he defined the unconscious as “the discourse of the 
other,” the problem at the heart of this  “never-ending” pursuit of meaning is that of 
encountering and navigating the “otherness” within ourselves.  We are spoken rather than 
speaking, each subject the product of all the repressions and other traces that act upon her 
when she enters language. 
Forster’s novel presents a community whose members try—and fail—to master 
language’s slipperiness.  However, the more these characters attempt to rely on language 
as the vehicle or bearer of absolute truths, the more it escapes them, conveying 
unexpected and often illegible meanings. This slippage creates numerous communicative 
difficulties, ultimately forcing the characters (and, by extension, the reader) to accept and 
even embrace the divide at the heart of language.  Paradoxically, such recognition of 
one’s dividedness becomes the only locus of hope and future connection for Forster’s 
characters; it becomes a means of resisting a “master” discourse, associated with the 
Anglo-Indians, which consolidates power by claiming to bear the absolute  “truth” about 
the world of Chandrapore.  
 
Communication and the Ethics of Inquiry  
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Forster’s concern with the difficulty of connecting and communicating spans his 
literary career.   The very title of A Passage to India points to the centrality of 
communication to the novel.  The versatile word “passage” can denote a channel by 
which two areas “communicate” with each other or, alternatively, a section of prose; thus, 
in either usage, the word refers to a process of connection.  As the epigraph to Howards 
End, “Only connect,” attests, Forster’s works are often centrally fixated on the problem 
of bridging communicative gulfs against considerable odds.  For example, Forster uses A 
Room with a View to explore experiences of failed connections both within and across 
national communities, which are also central to A Passage to India.  Maurice, too, is 
concerned with its characters’ struggles to connect—and, in particular, to embrace 
homosexual desire and relationships—in the context of a society that views such 
connection as an abomination. Forster began Maurice immediately upon returning to 
England from India, where he had started taking notes for A Passage to India.  Thus, as 
Quentin Bailey has noted, these two novels have common roots that are often obscured, 
partially due to the fact that the explicit concern with homosexuality in Maurice finds 
only a repressed correlate in Passage (1).  In both, the study of communication’s limits 
gains dramatic heft from Forster’s portrayal of how these limits thwart the central 
characters’ pursuit of desire, love, and understanding.   
A Passage to India suggests that human relationships and the motives and 
sentiments that drive them cannot be treated as simple “truths” that can be dissected, 
explained, and laid bare for all to see. In the novel’s universe, failure to recognize this 
fact creates confusion and misunderstanding rather than connection, violating the same 
“privacy of the soul” that Woolf describes.  Like Woolf, Forster suggests that attempts to 
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violate this privacy can be injurious—and are, at the very least, foolhardy, as the nature 
of the unconscious is such that the “true thoughts” behind what a subject says are never 
completely knowable, even to the subject himself; this is the mark of one’s dividedness 
as a subject.   The novel insists on reminding the reader of these limitations of language 
and the elusiveness of “truth” in discourse.  From its slippery narrator, whose authority 
waxes and wanes throughout the novel, to the Marabar Caves incident, which is both 
central to the novel and, yet, denied access to the diegesis, A Passage to India creates 
gaps in “truth” that force the reader to find other ways to discern and create meaning.   
Refusing to “read” invasively—that is, rejecting a mode of communication that presumes 
language can be dissected and all of its “truths” fully “known”—creates the potential for 
connection where none was previously possible, as this rejection shifts the emphasis from 
knowing about others to understanding them; the spirit of what is said or offered through 
language, rather than its literal “truthfulness,” becomes the focus.   
Initially, Forster envisioned his novel as an attempt to foster greater cross-cultural 
understanding and amity between Indians and the British.  Ultimately, though, he 
concluded that this aim must fail.  In a letter to his friend and lover Syed Masood, a 
model for Aziz and the person to whom Forster dedicated the novel, he wrote: 
When I began the book I thought of it as a little bridge of 
sympathy between East and West, but this conception has 
had to go, my sense of truth forbids anything so 
comfortable. I think that most Indians, like most English 
people, are shits, and I am not interested whether they 
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sympathize with one another or not. (Forster 1985:15; qtd. 
in Abu Baker 69) 
Despite this disavowal of his goals in writing the novel, A Passage to India revolves 
around its main characters’ pursuit of such connections even in the face of tremendous 
cross-cultural mistrust. From its very outset, the novel suggests a fundamental link 
between its presentation of the protagonists’ desire for sympathy and its overarching 
concern with advancing an “ethics of interpretation.”  It begins with the arrival of Mrs. 
Moore and Miss Quested in the fictional Indian town of Chandrapore, where Mrs. 
Moore’s son Ronny serves as city magistrate.  The English ladies encounter a world in 
which broad cultural shorthand and generalizations abound in the relations between 
indigenous Indians and Anglo-Indians.  The Anglo-Indians are eager to offer the 
newcomers their own brand of hard-earned “wisdom” about life in the area, a body of 
knowledge built upon a scaffold of stereotypes.  This fact is evident in an early exchange 
between Adela and several of the wives of Anglo-Indian administrators.  In this dialogue, 
Adela professes her desire to see “the real India,” and a man we later discover to be Cyril 
Fielding, one of the novel’s central characters, suggests in passing that she do so by 
“seeing Indians.”   In response to these two comments, the Anglo-Indian ladies offer 
Adela some pointed “truths” about life in the area: 
    ‘As if one could avoid seeing them,’ signed Mrs. Lesley. 
 ‘I’ve avoided,’ said Miss Quested.  ‘Excepting my own servant, 
I’ve scarcely spoken to an Indian since landing.’ 
‘Oh, lucky you.’ 
‘But I want to see them.’ 
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She became the centre of an amused group of ladies.  One said, 
‘Wanting to see Indians!  How new that sounds!’ Another, ‘Natives! why, 
fancy!’  A third, more serious, said, ‘Let me explain.  Natives don’t 
respect one any the more after meeting one, you see.’ 
 ‘That occurs after so many meetings.’ 
 But the lady, entirely stupid and friendly, continued:  ‘What I mean 
is, I was a nurse before my marriage, and came across them a great deal, 
so I know.  I really do know the truth about Indians.  A most unsuitable 
position for any Englishwoman--I was a nurse in a Native State.  One’s 
only hope was to hold sternly aloof.’ 
 ‘Even from one’s patients.’  
 ‘Why, the kindest thing one can do to a native is to let him die,’ 
said Mrs. Callendar. (25; emphasis mine) 
As the ladies note here, imperial social dominance depends heavily on an ability to 
discern the “truth” about the indigenous Indian population.  Miss Quested’s well-meaning 
desire to learn about and understand a foreign context contrasts sharply with the ladies’ 
certainty and confidence in the “truth about Indians,” which has calcified their resolve to 
remain “sternly aloof.”   
  This tendency to create a taxonomy of human beings—thereby widening the 
cultural breach—is not solely the province of the Anglo-Indian women.  Several 
indigenous Indian characters speak authoritatively of English behaviors, mores, and 
values in a way that similarly forestalls actual understanding or sympathy.  When 
discussing with Aziz and Mahmoud Ali the question of whether or not it is possible to be 
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friends with an Englishman, Hamidullah asserts that English people are indistinguishable 
from one another once they have become fully acclimated to Anglo-Indian life: 
‘They come out intending to be gentlemen, and are told it will not 
do.  Look at Lesley, look at Blakiston, now it is your red-nosed boy, and 
Fielding will go next.  Why, I remember when Turton came out first.  It 
was in another part of the Province.  You fellows will not believe me, but I 
have driven with Turton in his carriage--Turton!  Oh yes, we were once 
quite intimate.  He has shown me his stamp collection. ‘  
‘He would expect you to steal it now.  Turton!  But red-nosed boy 
will be far worse than Turton!’ 
‘I do not think so.  They all become exactly the same, not worse, 
not better.  I give any Englishman two years, be he Turton or Burton.  It is 
only the difference of a letter.  And I give any Englishwoman six months.  
All are exactly alike . . .’ (7) 
Hamidullah paints the Anglo-Indians using the same broad brush strokes that the English 
ladies use for his own countrymen, suggesting that, despite their best efforts to 
distinguish themselves (as Ronny Healsop or “red-nosed boy” has attempted to), they all 
end up “exactly alike.”  Hamidullah’s position lacks nuance and is as flawed as the 
Anglo-Indian ladies’ dissertation on behavioral customs.  It is significant, however, that 
he links his perception of a lack of distinctions between these men to the colonial context 
that demands adherence to certain rigid code of conduct (“They come out intending to be 
gentlemen, and are told it will not do”).  These behaviors on both sides of the imperial 
divide imply that colonial power dynamics organize (and perhaps necessitate) this 
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approach to “knowing” about others.  Moreover, they are also a product of it.   Forster 
highlights a fundamental antipathy between power and friendship that underpins cross-
cultural dynamics in the novel.   As Forster goes on to demonstrate, the supremacy of one 
force seems to necessitate the eradication of the other.  Cultural misunderstanding feeds 
and is fed by a particular ethics of knowing that privileges “pinning down,” categorizing, 
and generally determining the “truth” about members of another “group.”  This discourse, 
in turn, becomes a means of gaining and stabilizing authority and represents the antipode 
to friendship and sympathy. One of the novel’s fundamental aims, I would argue, is to 
critique and thereby dismantle this ethics—the ethics of knowing about others—and 
replace it with the kind of ethics of interpretation that one finds in Woolf’s work, which, 
as I discussed in the previous chapter, enables less invasive inquiry, privileging 
understanding over obtaining concrete truth or knowledge.   
While this tendency to stereotype is evident on both sides of the English/Indian 
divide, Forster is generally more preoccupied with the damage it causes when present 
among the “ruling race.”  In addition to precluding friendship, this tendency frequently 
leads the English to root out and discern only very superficial “truths” behind Indian 
speech and acts.  They create absurd categories for Indians and twist their behavior to 
conform to their own culturally determined notions of consistency, as I will discuss at 
greater length below.  The superficiality of such efforts renders many situations involving 
Indians illegible to the English, even where meaning exists (Hunt 502-503).   Mrs. Moore 
notes this very tendency when she reflects on a conversation with her son Ronny, the 
“red-nosed” boy to whom Hamidullah refers as the most recent convert to the “typical” 
Anglo-Indian mindset.   In the exchange, Ronny castigates Aziz for making imprudent 
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comments about his supervisor, Major Callendar, in his first encounter with Mrs. Moore, 
comments which she in turn recounts to Ronny.  As a fellow Anglo-Indian with “native 
subordinates,” Ronny initially feels obliged to pass Aziz’s comments on to others, despite 
his mother’s strident protests.  Mrs. Moore understands that Aziz’s behavior was the 
mark not of disrespect but, rather, of an immediate and profound sympathy between 
them; he feels so immediately comfortable with her that he eschews the somewhat servile 
attitude he sometimes adopts with Anglo-Indians and describes his actual feelings.  
However, Ronny takes a very different stance on how freely Aziz spoke to his mother, 
interpreting their intimacy as evidence of an abominable forwardness and pretension on 
Aziz’s part.  After the disagreement, she attempts to puzzle through the difference in their 
perspectives: 
In the light of her son’s comment she reconsidered the scene at the 
mosque, to see whose impression was correct.  Yes, it could be worked 
into quite an unpleasant scene.  The doctor had begun by bullying her, had 
said Mrs. Callendar was nice, and then--finding the ground safe--had 
changed; he had alternately whined over his grievances and patronized 
her, had run a dozen ways in a single sentence, had been unreliable, 
inquisitive, vain.  Yes, it was all true, but how false as a summary of the 
man; the essential life of him had been slain. (34) 
In this passage, Mrs. Moore draws a crucial distinction between the literally true, factual 
account of the incident and her own sense of the actual spirit—or what I would call 
“meaning”—behind Aziz’s openness.  She implies that Ronny’s attention to the factual 
details of her story obscures its larger significance as a moment of sympathy between 
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Mrs. Moore and Aziz; thus, as is often the case throughout the novel, he misses the point 
entirely.  In this moment of tension between Ronny and his mother, Forster once again 
implies that the pursuit of literal truth precludes true understanding and, with it, the 
potential for friendship, whereas being open to less concrete, more nuanced forms of 
meaning creates the condition in which community becomes possible.   
Ronny’s attitude toward cross-cultural understanding and friendship represents 
the exact opposite of his mother’s and is emblematic of the antipathy between power and 
friendship in the novel.  In his capacity as city magistrate, he ardently pursues the factual 
and the “true” in an effort to enforce imperial authority: “Every day he worked hard in 
the court trying to decide which of the two untrue accounts was the less untrue, trying to 
dispense justice fearlessly, to protect the weak against the less weak, the incoherent 
against the plausible, surrounded by lies and flattery . . . it was his duty” (52).  In so 
strongly associating Ronny’s sense of duty with the ethics of “knowing about,” Forster 
links this ethics both to the juridical system which Ronny represents and to the larger 
Anglo-Indian power structures that it serves.  Thus, he clarifies the relationship between 
his novel’s more localized concern with friendship, sympathy, and the dynamics 
underlying imperial control.   
In a sense, this moment reveals a tension between two very different forms of law 
at the heart of the novel’s universe:  Anglo-Indian law and the law of the symbolic.  Both 
of these systems deal with the problem of binaries—that is, of difference—but they are 
distinctly at odds in Forster’s novel.   Ironically, the ultimate function of the Anglo-
Indians’ divisive discourse is to create an illusion of wholeness—at least, for the Anglo-
Indian subject.  In emphasizing the racial and cultural alterity of the Indian subject and 
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his separateness from themselves, the Anglo-Indians attempt to deny their own 
fundamental dividedness as subjects of language.  As Timothy Christensen puts it, 
Race . . . specifies the imaginary relationship of the English to the 
traumatic kernel of the real. The "real" (which I would describe . . . as that 
empty "space" within language that gives birth to the process of 
symbolization while itself resisting all signification) is experienced within 
the novel as a resistance to the creation of full and satisfactory meaning 
within intercultural communication, and materialized within both the 
psychic and geographical space of the novel as the Marabar Caves. Race, 
most simply put, allows for the denial of the primordial difference of the 
cultural self from itself that is the condition of its conceptualization. It 
does so through the displacement of this difference onto an Indian other. 
(171-172) 
In short, the English use their perceptions of Indian “otherness” to deny the absence or 
division at the heart of subjecthood; what is the province of the Lacanian “Other” (that is, 
the unconscious traces that encounters in/with language embody and leave within the 
subject) is displaced onto an inscrutable racial “other.”  Indeed, critic Sinkwan Cheng 
also perceives the “Horror” of the novel to reside not in what characters find in the 
“exceptional other,” but rather in the vacuum that is at the heart of their own interactions 
(par. 23).  In contrast to the law of the symbolic that instates this traumatic dividedness, 
and with it an endless and hopeless pursuit of this lost wholeness, the law of Anglo-India 
masquer
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pursues.  In short, Anglo-Indian law deploys the discourse of the master,44 whom Lacan 
describes as one who attempts to make his language at “one” with his own “truth.” Paul 
Verhaeghe describes the master as one who clings to “master signifiers”—that is, those 
signifiers that are meant to be identical to that which is signified.  This discourse attempts 
to deny the fact that 
 [f]rom the moment man speaks, he becomes a subject of language (a 
divided subject in fact) who tries to grasp an object which lies beyond 
language, or, more accurately, a condition beyond the separation between 
subject and object.  This object represents the final term of desire itself, 
but as it lies beyond the realm of the signifier and thus beyond the pleasure 
principle, it is irrevocably lost.  At the same time, it provides the motor 
which keeps man going for ever.  For Lacan, it constitutes the basis of 
every form of human causality.  (105) 
A condition of total silence (i.e., death) would be the only state in which the master could 
retain his status: “The only way to uphold the position of master is to remain silent.  To 
avoid signifiers saves one from being divided by them.  In the end, the only successful 
master is a dead one, one who has entered eternal silence” (Verhaeghe109). The Anglo-
Indians of Chandrapore resemble the master in this way as well, discerning and relaying a 
truth so definitive that further consideration or discussion of the relationship between 
Indians and Anglo-Indians is unnecessary.   The discourse of the hysteric, which rips 
                                                
44In The Other Side Of Psychoanalysis (Seminar 17), Lacan described four different kinds of discourse into 
which virtually all speech could be organized:  the master’s, the hysteric’s, the analyst’s, and the 
university’s. These discourses are defined by the relative positions of the subject, knowledge, the master 
signifier, and the objet petit a within a four-part algorithm, and describe the varying stances a subject can 
take with respect to the other elements.  
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open these “closed” cases by asking question after question of the master, is the means by 
which the master discourse is dismantled, as I will discuss below. 
The novel’s Anglo-Indian characters insist upon making language match up with 
or embody the “truths” beneath it, and this tendency is especially marked in the more 
domineering Anglo-Indians who use “truth” as a kind of billy club.   Even Adela 
Quested, who ultimately destabilizes this discourse and rejects the arid language of the 
hardened Anglo-Indians, initially relies on absolute facts or “truths” in making sense of 
Chandrapore’s social landscape.  She believes in being fully frank, honest, and 
transparent in her expression of her own thoughts, and she expects that others will do the 
same.  At times, these expectations cause her unknowingly to offend others or create 
misunderstandings.  By contrast, Fielding is one of the few characters who can navigate 
and respect the limits of language in his efforts to forge community and understanding.  
The disparate attitudes of both Fielding and Adela become clear in their reactions to 
Aziz’s patently untrue narrative about Chandrapore’s history, offered in an effort to 
entertain Adela and Mrs. Moore: 
He was wrong about the water, which no Emperor, however skillful, can 
cause to gravitate uphill; a depression of some depth together with the 
whole of Chandrapore lay between the mosque and Fielding’s house.  
Ronny would have pulled him up, Turton would have wanted to pull him 
up, but restrained himself.  Fielding did not even want to pull him up; he 
had dulled his craving for verbal truth and cared chiefly for truth of mood.  
As for Miss Quested, she accepted everything Aziz said as true verbally.  
In her ignorance, she regarded him as ‘India,’ and never surmised that his 
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outlook was limited and his method inaccurate, and that no one is India. 
(75-76) 
Fielding’s actions here, which demonstrate prudence and an awareness of the complex 
relationship between language and meaning, contrast favorably with an Anglo-Indian 
ethos that would have called for him to “pull up” Aziz for his inaccuracy.  While Adela 
intends to behave differently, she nonetheless resembles her countrymen in her fixation 
on the binary of true and false.   As a result, she bestows upon both the tale and the 
speaker the plenitude of the signifier of “India,” painting a picture of wholeness where 
none is possible.  In so doing, Adela shifts her attention away from the “truth of mood”—
that is, from the friendliness and hospitality that stand behind Aziz’s fabulations, which 
Fielding recognizes as more important than literal, factual truth—and thereby devalues it.   
She latches onto a lie and in so doing fails to discern the kindness and desire for amity 
that could forge enduring friendships, which carry more meaning than the “truth” behind 
the tale.   
 The attempt to embody truth in language also does violence in A Passage to India.    
For example, Adela’s earnest desire to voice certain “truths” harms her attempts to build 
friendships with other characters.  Two incidents that take place immediately prior to the 
(non-)event in the Marabar Caves suggest the dangers of her indelicate frankness.  In 
these moments, Adela articulates ideas or opinions that the narration implies should 
remain unspoken.  As a result, she damages her relationship with Aziz and obscures the 
spirit of community that inspires her speech.  The first of these moments occurs when 
Adela notes her wish for a universal religion that would help bridge different cultures and 
minimize difference.  Although Aziz admits silently to himself that he shares her dream, 
 82 
he says that “as soon as it was put into prose it became untrue” (160).   Shortly thereafter, 
Adela suggests that she, too, might become one of the Anglo-Indians who, she has been 
told, “all get rude after a year” (161).  Aziz reacts angrily to her assertion because, while 
outwardly denying its veracity, he silently feels it to be apt.  Unfortunately, Adela’s 
comments here destroy the very connections she is trying to build; for Aziz, at least, her 
efforts lack a necessary sensitivity or sensibility to the historical and cultural landscape 
that invest these statements with a certain emotional charge.  These failures of 
communication presage the failures of meaning that occur with the incident in the caves.   
 
Mystery vs. Muddle 
As I have already begun to suggest above, A Passage to India stages resistance to 
what Lacan termed the “discourse of the master.” The master discourse is characterized 
by a speaker’s attempt to make himself “one” with his own language, as the Anglo-
Indians attempt to do in their efforts to view and catalogue the “real” India.  This effort is 
evident in the disdainful tutorials people like Turton offer to Miss Quested and Mrs. 
Moore as well as in Adela’s more ingenuous and well-meaning plan to see the “true” 
India by shunning this veil of prejudice. As also noted above, according to Lacan, such 
efforts must always fail.  A signifier can never be perfectly one with that which it 
attempts to represent; instead, there is always an excess of meaning that eludes 
representation—the objet petit a –which creates an aporia at the heart of language.  Thus, 
the perfect correspondence between language and truth that many of Passage’s characters 
pursue is impossible.  As Verhaeghe puts it, “communication is always a failure, and, 
moreover . . . it has to be a failure, and that is the reason why we go on talking.  If we 
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could understand each other we would all remain silent, and the perfect, dreamt-of 
communio would take place within an appropriate silence and with hands in front of 
closed eyes” (100).   Indeed, the master can only attempt to retain his privileged position 
through such an “appropriate silence”; his “master status” depends on his denial of his 
own dividedness—that is, of his own status as a subject of language.  From this position 
outside of language, he asserts a claim to “wholeness” that allows him to perceive, 
access, and relay truths via his discourse.  However, as Verhaeghe notes, this position is 
false:  “ . . . The truth is that the master is also castrated.  In Lacanian terms, he is divided 
by his introduction into language, just like any other speaking creature” (108).  His denial 
of this castration is a denial of the unconscious for, as Lacan writes, “the unconscious is 
always manifested as that which vacillates in a split in the subject” (The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 28). This denial eventually proves 
unsustainable, as it is impossible to live and avoid the law of the symbolic.   
A Passage to India portrays the supremacy of the master discourse in the first half 
of the novel, only to dismantle it in the second half.   Like Woolf, Forster rejects the 
ethics that proceeds from this discourse, attempting to replace it with his own “ethics of 
interpretation” that is similar to Woolf’s.   Forster uses the terms “mystery” and 
“muddle” to describe the opposite poles of this ethical tension.   He suggests that the 
former term can be used to describe solvable “puzzles” with a concrete solution, whereas 
“muddle” denotes the kind of slipperiness and messiness that characterizes social life 
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and, indeed, language.  Muddles defy full explanation or knowledge; they must be 
“interpreted” rather than “known.”45  
The master pursues and claims access to the kind of ultimate “Truth” that is the 
province of mystery, but is often at a loss to find meaning in linguistic or social 
“muddles.”  In particular, this master discourse proves inadequate for sorting through the 
incident in the Marabar Caves, the novel’s muddle par excellence.  By contrast, the ethics 
of interpretation that the novel poses can navigate “muddle” successfully because it 
pursues “meaning” as opposed to “truth,” recognizing a certain necessary opacity at the 
heart of human affairs that the master’s discourse denies.  The novel suggests that there 
are profound social and even political implications for being able to distinguish mystery 
from muddle, as human relations more often than not involve the latter. 
Forster first introduces these terms and implies their importance to the novel’s 
larger related interest in language and the social in an early conversation among Adela, 
Mrs. Moore, and Fielding.  The conversation revolves around yet another instance of 
cultural disconnect, the Bhattacharyas’ seemingly inexplicable failure to turn up as 
promised to retrieve the English ladies for a visit: 
‘I do so hate mysteries,’ Adela announced. 
‘We English do.’ 
‘I dislike them not because I’m English, but from my own personal 
point of view,’ she corrected. 
                                                
45As Harriet Blodgett puts it, “A mystery . . . as both denotation and usage attest, is explicable, a solvable 
puzzle, even if it be an enigma, difficult to explain as in a religious truth, whereas a muddle is but a 
meaningless mess” (24). Blodgett also notes that Virginia Woolf may have been responsible for giving 
Forster the “purposeful coupling of muddle and mystery to lead from the realm of reason to a realm of the 
spirit” (24), as the binary appears in Jacob’s Room, which Forster read. 
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‘I like mysteries but I rather dislike muddles,’ said Mrs. Moore. 
‘A mystery is a muddle.’ 
‘Oh, do you think so, Mr. Fielding?’ 
‘A mystery is only a high-sounding term for a muddle.  No 
advantage in stirring it up, in either case . . .’ (73) 
While admitting that there are problems whose full solutions can be obtained, the novel 
also suggests that there exist situations—and, more specifically, those related to human 
and cross-cultural relations—whose meaning cannot be known because they proceed 
from something other than the purely rational. The notion of “mystery,” as Mrs. Moore 
frames it, retains confidence in the existence of truth even as this truth is obscured, while 
“muddle” is entirely senseless and offers no promise of clarity.  Despite their genuine and 
well-intentioned desire to see the “real” India, Forster suggests that Mrs. Moore and 
Adela are doomed to confusion precisely because they attempt to discern logic and 
reason in the Bhattacharyas’ snub—that is, they treat it as a mystery that can be solved 
rather than the muddle for which there is no logical explanation.46  Although Fielding 
claims that “mystery” and “muddle” are one and the same, his behavior and private 
thoughts imply a profound distinction.  Rather than attempting to determine or elucidate 
the cause of the snub—that is, to “solve the puzzle”—he is eager to explain it simply as a 
“misunderstanding,” the “type of incident that had better not be cleared up” (72).  It is 
likely that the Bhattacharyas never intended for their offer to be taken as genuine, and 
thus the “snub” resulted from a difference in social custom and produced a 
misunderstanding.  As such, the reasoning behind this cultural shorthand—which, by its 
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very nature, depends on the parties’ willingness and ability to read what must remain 
implicit— would be nearly impossible to explain to Adela and Mrs. Moore, whose codes 
differ dramatically; the rationale for the couple’s actions could never be satisfactorily 
articulated for them. Fielding seems to recognize this fact, which is why he wants to 
leave the topic immediately; the terrain of muddle, the conversation implies, is far more 
treacherous than that of mystery.  The novel ultimately points to the danger of conflating 
these terms when Aziz’s very life becomes dependent on other characters’ ability to 
identify what has happened in the Marabar Caves as a muddle, rather than a mystery.  
  
 
“A Frustration of Reason and Form”: The Marabar Caves 
 
The Marabar Caves are clearly emblematic of all that is “muddle” in the novel, 
the ultimate symbol of the unknown and inarticulable aspects of human behavior and 
language that defy explanation.  Forster’s first extended evocation of the caves insists 
upon their resistance to representation, even while the narration denies this very 
resistance: 
The caves are readily described.  A tunnel eight feet long, five feet high, 
three feet wide, leads to a circular chamber about twenty feet in diameter. 
This arrangement occurs again and again throughout the group of hills, 
and this is all, this is a Marabar Cave.  Having seen one such cave, having 
seen two, having seen three, four, fourteen, twenty-four, the visitor returns 
to Chandrapore uncertain whether he has had an interesting experience or 
a dull one or any experience at all.  He finds it difficult to discuss the 
caves, or to keep them apart in his mind, for the pattern never varies, and 
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no carving, not even a bees’-nest or a bat distinguishes one from another.  
Nothing, nothing attaches to them, and their reputation—for they have 
one—does not depend upon human speech.  It is as if the surrounding 
plain or the passing birds have taken upon themselves to exclaim 
‘extraordinary,’ and the world [sic] has taken root in the air, and been 
inhaled by mankind. (136-137) 
Forster begins by asserting that the caves are utterly describable, but the description that 
follows is a strikingly unsatisfying list of mere measurements and shapes.  What has 
often masqueraded as a strange form of “omniscient” narration throughout the novel 
founders terribly here, suffering from the same problems of representation that it 
describes and attempts to stand beyond.  As a result, the reader, too, is at a loss to 
comprehend the caves.   As Gail Fincham writes: 
the authorial voice describes from a panoramic and omniscient perspective 
the Marabar outposts "which bear no relation to anything dreamt or seen” : 
. .  [T]he reader is invited to look through a transparent window at a world 
unproblematically out there (McCabe 39). But Forster uses the 
authoritative metalanguage . . . to obscure rather than reveal what is 
described . . . . (par. 24) 
 Thus, in a mirror image of the failures of authority and knowledge that the 
incident in the Marabar Caves will induce in the novel’s Anglo-Indian characters, the 
“omniscient” narration—whose clearest “source” remains the Western author himself—
falters and thereby forfeits any claim to being able to relay the “truth” of the Caves.  
Indeed, we “are forced to take note of what we can look at but not understand. Western 
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power and knowledge, embodied in the panoptic gaze, is undermined by such a strategy. 
In the context of the Marabar Caves, looking is not necessarily knowing, and it is 
certainly not controlling” (Fincham par. 24). The failure of this supposed omniscience 
becomes clearest, of course, when the narration entirely skips over the incident in the 
caves, undeniably the central incident in the novel; even the narrator him/herself is denied 
access to that moment. The caves resist all attempts to describe the essentials of what 
they “are” or what occurs within them.  Visitors are hard-pressed to articulate their 
significance, Forster says, because their meaning cannot be conveyed in language; it 
“does not depend on human speech.”   When asked to provide general details about the 
caves prior to the incident, Aziz admits he cannot. He claims he would need Professor 
Godbole to explain them (156), indicating that the caves require a mystical apprehension.   
In defying the organizational and representational functions of language, the caves 
symbolize the absence at language’s core—an absence that represents not an emptiness, 
as readers and critics of the novel have often assumed, but rather a place in which 
something is missing. Just as the aporia at the heart of language represents a place where 
the objet petit a—that is, the surplus of meaning that signifiers try and fail to represent, 
but which discourse is always pursuing— has “torn away,” so too do the caves embody a 
meaning that simply eludes us, rather than a place where there is none. 
 The incident that renders the Marabar Caves central to A Passage to India occurs 
when Aziz takes Mrs. Moore and Adela to visit them.  In the moment before Adela and 
Aziz enter the caves, Forster foreshadows the caves’ significance as a symbol of 
language’s slipperiness by presenting yet another miscommunication, as Adela tries to 
makes sense of this social “muddle” that surrounds her: 
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What a handsome little Oriental he was . . . She did not admire him with 
any personal warmth, for there was nothing of the vagrant in her blood, 
but she guessed he might attract women of his own race and rank, and she 
regretted that neither she nor Ronny had any physical charm.  It does make 
a difference in a relationship—beauty, thick hair, a fine skin.  Probably 
this man had several wives—Mohammedans always insist on their full 
four, according to Mrs. Turton.  And having no one else to speak to on that 
eternal rock, she gave rein to the subject of marriage and said in her 
honest, decent, inquisitive way:  ‘Have you one wife or more than one?” 
The question shocked the young man very much.  It challenged a new 
conviction of his community [. . .]. If she had said, ‘Do you worship one 
god or several?’ he would not have objected.  But to ask an educated 
Indian Moslem how many wives he has—appalling, hideous!  He was in 
trouble how to conceal his confusion.  ‘One, one in my own particular 
case,’ he sputtered, and let go of her hand. Quite a number of caves were 
at the top of the track, and thinking, ‘Damn the English even at their best,’ 
he plunged into one of them to recover his balance.  She followed at her 
leisure, quite unconscious that she had said the wrong thing, and not 
seeing him, she also went into a cave, thinking with half her mind 
‘sightseeing bores me,’ and wondering with the other half about marriage 
(169).47 
                                                
47It seems significant that, for Adela, sexual desire is often sparked by images of men whom she insists on 
making abject figures, including Aziz here and the punkah wallah in the trial scene. 
 
 90 
In her unfiltered curiosity regarding Aziz’s marital status (which seems to be informed by 
Anglo-Indian misapprehensions about the predominant Muslim marriage practices in 
India at that time), Adela demonstrates the same enthusiasm for pursuing the “truth” 
about Indians that the other Anglo-Indian characters evince.  Moreover, she unwittingly 
voices an exotic fantasy of the debauched native customs whose sexual license is at odds 
with her cool English notions of proper sexual relations.48   
Her blunder catches Aziz off-guard; while he expects such insensitivity from the 
other English, he seems surprised to confront this stereotype among even the “English at 
their best,” the group to which he had assigned Adela.    Aziz retreats into a cave to avoid 
showing his distress, removing his hand from hers in a gesture that mirrors the social and 
psychic breach that has occurred.  Adela too enters a cave (it is not clear whether she 
enters the same one as Aziz or not), and the narrative then cuts to the next chapter, when 
Aziz is waiting in his cave formulating an excuse he can give Adela for his sudden 
disappearance.  When he exits, Adela has disappeared, the “incident” having already 
occurred.  These unnarrated events drive action for the entire second half of the novel.  
All that is “known” for sure is that Adela leaves the cave in distress; thereafter, the event 
is identified as a sexual assault on or “insult” to Adela.   
I contend that this moment stages a traumatizing confrontation with the absence at 
the heart of language.  The caves become for A Passage to India what Freud and Lacan 
describe as a “navel” (Verhaeghe 43).   According to Verhaeghe, the navel’s “most 
essential characteristic is that there are no words for it” because it is part of “that register 
                                                
48Also, as I will discuss further below, she simultaneously demonstrates a forbidden attraction to Aziz, the 
denial of which may be the purpose of the rape narrative she presents in the wake of the incident in the 
caves. 
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which cannot be put into words” (Verhaeghe 23). As already noted, Forster foregrounds 
the caves’ resistance to representation even before the “incident” occurs, thus lending 
weight to this reading of the caves as a place of absence.  The incident remains 
unrepresented because it is unrepresentable, a hole at the story’s center that drives 
character dialogue and interactions for over half of the novel.  
 Forster suggests the caves’ significance as a metaphor for this linguistic rupture in 
his description of Mrs. Moore’s reaction to the caves prior to the “incident.”  Upon 
entering them, Mrs. Moore finds that the caves seem to strip signifiers of their underlying 
meaning.  She is haunted by the cave’s echo, which, regardless of the word or phrase 
spoken, produces only the sound “boum”:  
A Marabar cave had been horrid as far as Mrs. Moore was 
concerned, for she had nearly fainted in it, and had some difficulty in 
preventing herself from saying so as soon as she got into the air again.  It 
was natural enough:  she had always suffered from faintness, and the cave 
had become too full, because all their retinue followed them.  Crammed 
with villagers and servants, the circular chamber began to smell.  She lost 
Aziz and Adela in the dark, didn’t know who touched her, couldn’t 
breathe, and some vile naked thing struck her face and settled on her 
mouth like a pad.  She tried to regain the entrance tunnel, but an influx of 
villagers swept her back.  She hit her head.  For an instant she went mad, 
hitting and gasping like a fanatic. For not only did the crush and stench 
alarm her; there was also a terrifying echo. 
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Professor Godbole had never mentioned an echo; it never 
impressed him, perhaps.  There are some exquisite echoes in India . . . The 
echo in a Marabar cave is not like these, it is entirely devoid of distinction.  
Whatever is said, the same monotonous noise replies, and quivers up and 
down the walls until it is absorbed into the roof. ‘Boum’ is the sound as far 
as the human alphabet can express it, or ‘bou-oum’ or ‘ou-boum,’—utterly 
dull.  Hope, politeness, the blowing of a nose, the squeak of a boot, all 
produce ‘boum.’  Even the striking of a match starts a worm coiling, 
which is too small to complete a circle but is eternally watchful.  And if 
several people talk at once, an overlapping howling noise begins, echoes 
generate echoes, and the cave is stuffed with a snake composed of small 
snakes, which writhe independently. (162-163)  
Forster stages Mrs. Moore’s confrontation with the dissociation of her own signifiers 
from their sense, foregrounding the fact that full meaning is inaccessible; it is impossible 
for language to catch up with the objet petit a, which I have suggested that the incident in 
the caves represents.  For Mrs. Moore, this moment is incredibly traumatic; through it, 
she loses her spirituality, which in turn irrevocably damages her confidence in the 
potential for actual friendship, kindness, and intuitive connection:  “. . . Suddenly, at the 
edge of her mind, Religion appeared, poor talkative little Christianity, and she knew that 
all its divine words from ‘Let there be Light’ to ‘It is finished’ only amounted to 
‘boum.’”  She realizes she no longer feels the desire to communicate with anyone (166).  
Later, she dismisses Adela’s questions about the echo by saying, “Say, say, say . . . As if 
anything can be said!” (222). The tenuous bonds forged between Aziz and Mrs. Moore 
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are sundered; Mrs. Moore loses interest as, Forster explains, “the affectionate and sincere 
words that she had spoken to him seemed no longer hers but the air’s” (166).  In the end, 
Mrs. Moore fails to build connections across the cultural divide because she mistakes the 
apparent emptiness of “boum”—that is, the denial of absolute truth in language—for the 
failure of meaning itself.  As a result, tragically, she discounts the value of 
communication, kindness, and other elements of social interaction that would engender 
sympathy.  
 Forster insisted that confronting the caves as an aporia was crucial to the 
experience of reading the novel—so crucial, in fact, that he claimed (at least initially) to 
share the readers’ ignorance of any true meaning or event behind Adela’s accusations.  In 
1924, Forster received a disgruntled letter from Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, who had 
read a draft of the novel and criticized the ambiguity of the caves incident.  Forster 
responded: 
In the cave it is either a man, or the supernatural, or an illusion.  And even 
if I know!  My writing mind therefore is a blur here—i.e., I will it to 
remain a blur, and to be uncertain, as I am of many facts in daily life.  This 
isn’t a philosophy of aesthetics.  It’s a particular trick I felt justified in 
trying because my theme was India.  It sprang from my subject matter.  I 
wouldn’t have attempted it in other countries, which though they contain 
mysteries or muddles, manage to draw rings around them (Furbank 2: 125; 
qtd. in Moran 597). 
In short, Forster is reluctant to claim absolute control or knowledge of the Caves’ 
significance. Forster’s unwillingness to admit knowledge of the Marabar’s meaning—
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much less share it with others—is significant, as it reinforces the caves’ status as a 
metaphor for the absence at the heart of language; the meaning of the event eludes 
Forster even as he describes it, just as any speaking subject’s truth is relentlessly 
pursued—but not embodied—in his own language.    Thus, he forcefully asserts the 
necessity of the divide between language and meaning.  In so doing, he both denies any 
“masterly” control over his own language and resists the discourse of the master more 
generally.  Adopting what seems to be the opposite of his position in his letter to Selig, he 
suggests that any meaning that he could assign to the event is submerged in his own 
unconscious—where, he implies, it belongs. 49   
 Forster’s use of free indirect discourse throughout the novel underscores the 
novel’s rejection of the “true,” dislocating the thoughts from a clear speaker or source of 
authority.  Forster scholar Gail Fincham comments that the novel’s style is notable first 
and foremost for being “unlike anything in his previous fiction” (par. 9).  Bette London 
concurs: 
Read in the context of Forster's earlier novels, what is striking about 
Passage is the absence of the distinctly discernible Forsterian voice: 
urbane, ironic, assured. What we have in its stead is a narrative gone 
mad—a shifting, slippery, unplaceable voice that seems to take its timbre 
                                                
49Indeed, in the letter to Selig, Forster claims enough knowledge of the Marabar Caves to identify what 
they were not (e.g., a modern dramatization of Plato’s cave or a mapping of unconscious archetypal 
symbols).  While this apparent contradiction in Forster’s thinking may have been the product of the years 
that had elapsed between the two letters, it is intriguing to consider it as a result of resistance:  Selig 
identifies the caves as the province of the unconscious, and Forster, like the patient who resists his 
unconscious thoughts coming to the fore, strains against this probing.  In this interpretation, the caves 
embody or represent the unconscious not only of the novel and its characters, but of Forster as well; the text 
both embodies and represents unconscious forces in a strange and powerful way.  It also suggests the larger 
stakes of opacity and unknowability for the novel.    
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from whatever voice it happens to be near. The resulting disturbances to 
the novel's surface articulate what might be called narrative hysteria: the 
breakdown or fragmentation of the narrative voice. The voice does not 
disappear, as several critics have claimed, but it persists, like the novel's 
celebrated echo, in distorted refractions of an original utterance that can 
never be reclaimed. (86) 
The expansive and diffuse narrative voice mirrors Adela’s hysterical reaction to the 
“incident” in the caves.  The tension between her hysterical discourse and the master 
discourse of the Anglo-Indians who attempt to “solve” her case is central to the second 
half of the novel. As Lacan describes in the case of the hysteric, Adela’s discourse is the 
means by which the master discourse is dismantled.   
 
Adela Quested and the Discourse of the Hysteric 
 Adela demonstrates the classic symptoms of the hysteric, who attempts to 
displace her own forbidden desires onto another.  Thus, it seems significant that the 
moment in the Marabar Caves comes on the heels of Adela’s meditation on desire.   One 
could convincingly argue that what “happens” in the caves has everything to do with her 
attempt to displace the desires that awaken within her at that moment. Indeed, Adela’s 
casual denial that she feels “any personal warmth” for Aziz is suspicious, and it is telling 
that her meditation on attractiveness and musings on polygamy precede this “event” that 
produces the symptoms of hysteria within her.  At the very least, the moment is strongly 
suggestive of a sexual awakening that Adela attempts to deny.  Forster himself identifies 
Adela’s behavior as hysterical:  “No one understood her trouble, or knew why she 
 96 
vibrated between hard commonsense and hysteria.  She would begin a speech as if 
nothing particular had happened.  ‘I went into this detestable cave,’ she would say dryly, 
‘and I remember scratching the wall with my finger-nail, to start the usual echo, and then 
as I was saying there was this shadow, or sort of shadow, down the entrance tunnel, 
bottling me up” (214).  
 More than just emphasizing the aporia at the center of language, this moment in 
the caves reasserts the supremacy of desire and symbolic law, both of which the novel’s 
characters have attempted to deny or bypass in the first half of the novel.  As Lacan 
argues, the master’s discourse, which is so prevalent in these early sections, thwarts 
language and, thus, in turn, desire; in insisting upon the absolute correspondence between 
his language and that which he attempts to represent, the master’s discourse denies the 
need to pursue the objet petit a.   As noted above, the master can only truly retain his 
privileged position in silence; his position depends on preventing the pursuit of the objet 
petit a and thereby trying to “opt out” of the symbolic.  The result of the supremacy of 
this master discourse in the first half of A Passage to India is aridity, miscommunication, 
and contention, as the novel’s vaguely sexed English characters widen the cultural breach 
through their “efforts” at expression and communication. According to Lacan, however, 
the master discourse is destabilized by the discourse of the hysteric, whose attempts to 
gain knowledge of her own desires are marked by the intense pursuit of the elusive 
“surplus.” 
This tension between the discourses of the master and the hysteric is evident in 
the relationship between Adela and the Anglo-Indian “machinery of justice” that attempts 
to “help” her after the incident. According to Lacan, the hysteric frequently seeks out an 
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authority figure—a master—from whom she can attempt to gain knowledge about her 
condition; as Verhaeghe puts it, she “is always in search of an incarnation of the mythical 
master” to give her the knowledge she pursues (106).  Similarly, Adela turns to the 
Anglo-Indian establishment to define the exact nature of her assault and mobilize her 
community’s response; her desire “express[es] itself by way of a demand, directed to the 
other” and prompts her to “turn the other into a master-signifier in order to get an 
answer”  (109). According to Verhaeghe, the hysteric implores the master, “Tell me who 
I am, tell me what I want.”  Whoever he is, the master is “supposed to know, he is 
supposed to know and to produce the answer.”   Unfortunately, however, “this answer 
always misses the point” (110), which, indeed, proves to be the case for the Anglo-Indian 
“masters” who take charge of Adela’s case: 
‘I know it’s all nothing; I must be sensible, I do try—‘Adela continued, 
working again towards tears.  ‘I shouldn’t mind if it had happened 
anywhere else; at least I really don’t know where it did happen.’ 
Ronny supposed that he understood what she meant:  she could not 
identify or describe the particular cave, indeed almost refused to have her 
mind cleared up about it, and it was recognized that the defence would try 
to make capital out of this during the trial.  He reassured her: the Marabar 
caves were notoriously like one another; indeed, in the future they were to 
be numbered in sequence with white paint. (221) 
Ronny assumes that he has understood what she is trying to say and, from his privileged 
position as both male and a representative of “justice,” attempts to help her have “her 
mind cleared up about it.”  Yet, the reader knows he has not understood her, and his 
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method for reassuring her—i.e., the cave numbering system project—does nothing to 
address her sense that she has been victimized.  Adela’s bizarre remark “I really don’t 
know where it did happen” is emblematic of the event’s slipperiness, as she implies that 
the incident eludes typical descriptors such as “where.” To their tremendous detriment, 
Ronny and the other colonials try—and fail—to impose a particular logic on the incident 
in the cave, the logic of a mystery whose “truth” can be determined. What Ronny terms 
the “machinery” of the imperial justice system grinds into motion after the incident, as 
the Anglo-Indians organize a trial and gather the witnesses and evidence necessary to 
present the facts that they believe will lead to Aziz’s conviction.  They treat the incident 
as a simple crime whose nature and reason, once investigated, should be perfectly clear. 
The investigators’ attempts to arrive at a logical explanation by stringing together the few 
available pieces of “evidence” against Aziz are simultaneously comedic and frightening. 
The novel highlights the ridiculousness of these attempts to impose logic on the event by 
conveying an Anglo-Indian extrapolation from the physical evidence left at the “scene of 
the crime”:  “The strap had been newly broken, the eye-piece was jammed.  The logic of 
evidence said ‘Guilty” (185).  The fallacies in this “reasoning” are obvious.  Moreover, in 
another equally absurd example of this logic, the evidence that puts investigators “on the 
track” of Aziz (186) is simply that Adela does not want to see the Indian driver after the 
incident.  From this, the Anglo-Indians infer that an Indian committed the attack and, 
thus, that Aziz (who was close at hand when she entered the cave) must have been the 
culprit.  In these descriptions of the procedure and evidence on which the Anglo-Indians 
base their case, Forster lampoons the supposedly orderly and logical investigatory 
processes directed toward obtaining the “truth” about the incident in the caves, ironically 
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juxtaposing investigators’ mania to achieve a clear and logical explanation of the event 
with their completely irrational methods and conclusions. 
Because the hysteric ultimately experiences the master’s failed attempts at 
explanation as “profoundly alienating,” she becomes the means by which the master’s 
inadequacy is unmasked: 
The hysterical subject prompts the other to know.  What she desires is 
knowledge as a means of jouissance.  This is structurally impossible and it 
transforms her from instigator of knowledge to source of failure, thereby 
demonstrating the fundamental lack.  The hysteric not only sets up the 
man-master, but also unmasks him:  his desire is also determined by objet 
a, so even he is divided.  (Verhaeghe 111) 
While the hysteric initially serves as a means of affirming the master’s position and 
“sustain[ing him] in his illusion that he is at one with this knowledge,” she always ends 
up unsatisfied; she discovers and reveals the master’s inadequacy and tenuous position, 
thus undermining his discourse as well.  Similarly, Adela Quested, who ultimately 
realizes that her “experience” in the caves is not “knowable” in the sense that Ronny and 
the other Anglo-Indians believe it to be, concludes that the search for the kind of absolute 
knowledge to which the master lays claim—and which she, too, had previously 
pursued—will always fail.  Moreover, she asserts that pursuing such a truth can be 
injurious, lamenting,  “All the things I thought I’d learnt are just a hindrance, they’re not 
knowledge at all” (219). 
At this moment, Adela begins to draw a distinction between the pursuit of “truth,” 
which she has found unfruitful, and the search for meaning, which the novel suggests 
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creates the potential for human connection.  She seems now to understand, as Debrah 
Raschke puts it, that there is a difference between the kind of absolute “truth” Plato 
envisioned outside his own cave (for which some have argued the Marabar Caves are a 
metaphor) and the meaning that “the dream world of the [Marabar] cave, as producing 
truths of its own” can bring to light (“Forster's Passage to India: Re-Envisioning Plato's 
Cave” 13).  It seems significant that Adela follows her realization that a certain kind of 
knowledge is a “hindrance” with the reflection that she is “not fit for personal 
relationships,” as she appears to connect her failed effort to pursue “truth” with the 
fractured personal and cross-cultural relations that abound in Chandrapore.  Forster 
emphasizes the causal link between this overreliance on order and rationality and the 
incidence of cultural and sexual disconnect and oppression in the chaos surrounding 
Aziz’s trial, wherein xenophobia and violent collisions between Indians and Anglo-
Indians proliferate.  As Gertrude White notes, 
The effect of their experience in the Marabar is to quench every little 
flame of kindness and good will in those around them. The bridges thrown 
across the gulfs crumble; the abysses widen and deepen. Evil and negative 
unity alone is left. The English draw together more firmly than ever 
against natives, in a union that annihilates all reason, all justice, and all 
mercy. Fear and hate unite the Indians in Aziz's defense. (650) 
While making his opening statements in the courtroom, Major McBryde unwittingly 
demonstrates the link between the “ethics of investigation” and imperial xenophobia in 
his discussion of Indian sexual preferences: “Taking off his spectacles, as was his habit 
before enunciating a general truth, he looked into them sadly, and remarked that the 
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darker races are physically attracted by the fairer, but not vice versa—not a matter for 
bitterness this, not a matter for abuse, but just a fact which any scientific observer will 
confirm” (243).  In this speech, McBryde offers yet another “scientific,” masterly 
exposition of racial and sexual dynamics that, in its insistence on its own plenitude as an 
articulation of the “truth” about Indians, only serves the forces of fragmentation.   
 
Mixing Meaning and Desire: Adela’s Epiphany 
Somewhat paradoxically, however, the impossibility of gleaning truth from the 
Marabar Caves incident creates opportunities for new starting points for meaningful 
existence, as Adela’s realizations above begin to demonstrate. Indeed, many of the 
moments that occur subsequent to the incident—and particularly the trial—suggest a shift 
in approach among several characters who become increasingly able to recognize, 
countenance, and navigate the irrational and the unspeakable.   For example, even before 
the epiphany of her trial confession provides her with partial vindication, Adela reveals 
that she has become more intuitive through her ordeal, as she is able to perceive without 
being told that Mrs. Moore believes Aziz is innocent; her sense of this sentiment is so 
strong, in fact, that she believes it has been spoken (226-227).50 
Adela’s reflections immediately prior to her epiphany regarding Aziz’s innocence 
juxtapose the memory of her attempt to “see” India with a growing realization that the 
“significance” she has attributed to Aziz is false, thus once again tying the “problem of 
knowing” to cross-cultural tensions:  
                                                
50Of course, it should be observed that Fielding has just sent Adela a letter expressing the same sentiment, 
but the assertion of Aziz’s innocence and the fact that she correctly perceives—without being told—that 
Mrs. Moore feels similarly still speaks to increasing attention to unspoken meanings in this second half of 
the novel. 
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Beneath her were gathered all the wreckage of her silly attempt to see 
India—the people she had met at the Bridge Party, the man and his wife 
who hadn’t sent their carriage, the old man who would lend his car, 
various servants, villagers, officials, and the prisoner himself. [ . . . ] Since 
they last met, she had elevated him into a principle of evil, but now he 
seemed to be what he had always been—a slight acquaintance.  He was 
negligible, devoid of significance, dry like a bone . . . . (244) 
In regarding Aziz’s figure and using negative terms (“devoid of significance”) that mirror 
the void of the Marabar to describe him, Adela begins to confront the fact that the 
meaning of the event will always elude her, that there is always a gap where the “truth” 
of it used to be: 
. . .  when Adela came to give her evidence the atmosphere was 
quieter than it had been since the beginning of the trial.  Experts were not 
surprised.  There is no stay in your native.  He blazes up over a minor 
point, and has nothing left for the crisis . . . 
But the crisis was still to come. 
Adela had always meant to tell the truth and nothing but the truth, 
and she had rehearsed this as a difficult task—difficult, because her 
disaster in the cave was connected, though by a thread, with another part 
of her life, her engagement to Ronny. She had thought of love just before 
she went in, and had innocently asked Aziz what marriage was like51, and 
                                                
51In yet another example of miscommunication and failures of understanding in the novel, this is not 
actually the question Adela asked, although this may very well have been the information she intended to 
get at with her inquiries.  
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she supposed that her question had roused evil in him.  To recount this 
would have been incredibly painful, it was the one point she wanted to 
keep obscure; she was willing to give details that would have distressed 
other girls, but this story of her private failure she dared not allude to, and 
she dreaded being examined in public in case something came out.  But as 
soon as she rose to reply, and heard the sound of her own voice, she feared 
not even that . . . (252-253)52 
Although Adela’s epiphany remains incomplete here, Forster demonstrates her 
nascent awareness that the incident is connected to her realization, achieved just before 
entering the caves, that she does not feel any desire for her fiancé; this is her “failure.”  
This awakening occurs alongside her expression of interest in Aziz’s marital life, which 
she clearly conceives of as exotic and perhaps even debauched (as she naturally assumes 
that he is allowed to have multiple wives).  Thus, I would contend that Adela’s thoughts 
about Aziz—or, at the very least, about his relationships—before entering the caves 
awaken forbidden desires within her that she cannot consciously accommodate or admit, 
and the rape narrative is the result.  Although she suggests that Aziz experienced an illicit 
desire (i.e., the “evil” that was “roused” in him) in the caves, Adela’s thoughts in the 
courtroom indicate a growing awareness that her own “problematic” desires are at the 
heart of this “incident” in the caves.  The fact that Adela’s ogling of the punkah wallah53 
                                                
52It is important to note, too, that Forster once again draws a link between the caves’ meaning and colonial 
occupation by preceding Adela’s thoughts with the xenophobic sentiments of the Anglo-Indians in the 
courtroom. 
 
53The punkah wallah is one of the more overtly sexualized figures in the novel:  “Almost naked, and 
splendidly formed, he sat on a raised platform near the back, in the middle of the central gangway, and he 
caught her attention as she came in, and he seemed to control the proceedings.  He had the strength and 
beauty that sometimes come to flower in Indians of low birth.  When that strange race nears the dust and is 
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facilitates her epiphany further indicates that her own desires constitute the key to the 
“muddle” of the Marabar Caves; just as easily as her forbidden desires originally 
prompted repression and displacement, here they reverse that process: “Questions were 
asked, and to each she found the exact reply. Smoothly the voice in the distance 
proceeded, leading along the paths of truth, and the airs from the punkah behind her 
wafted her on . . .” (252-253).   As Ted Boyle argues, this moment represents the 
weakening of Adela’s rationalizing instincts in the face of desire and emotion:  “This 
young woman who has approached marriage as though it were essentially a rational 
business transaction has been overwhelmed for a moment by her emotions, by her very 
real desire to experience the purely physical facet of marriage which her rational code 
will not allow her to recognize” (478).   She thus experiences a truth that is felt more than 
it is “known”; while she can find no articulable explanation for what has happened in the 
caves to replace the story she is retracting, she is able to realize and convey the fact that 
Aziz is innocent (255).  The event is followed by mass chaos and a proliferation of 
inconsistent stories about what has just taken place, thus shattering any hope for a 
consistent “truthful” account of even the trial: “The Indians rose too, hundreds of things 
went on at once, so that afterwards each person gave a different account of that 
catastrophe” (255).   
Thus, Forster clearly shows the weakening of British imperial epistemology 
toward the end of the novel. The festival in the final “Temple” section, while often 
presented as evidence of Forster’s deep appreciation for the exhilaration, multiplicity, and 
                                                
condemned as untouchable, then nature remembers the physical perfection that she accomplished 
elsewhere, and throws out a god—not many, but one here and there, to prove to society how little its 
categories impress her” (241). 
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inclusiveness of Hindu religion, can be read more simply as a moment in which reason 
and the search for the “truth” behind life’s mysteries are abandoned (at least temporarily), 
with exaltation as the result: 
All sorrow was annihilated, not only for Indians, but for foreigners, birds, 
caves, railways, and the stars; all became joy, all laughter; there had never 
been disease nor doubt, misunderstanding, cruelty, fear.  Some jumped in 
the air, others flung themselves prone and embraced the bare feet of the 
universal lover; the women behind the purdah slapped and shrieked; the 
little girl slipped out and danced by herself, her black pigtails flying.  Not 
an orgy of the body; the tradition of that shrine forbade it.  But the human 
spirit had tried by a desperate contortion to ravish the unknown, flinging 
down science and history in the struggle, yes, beauty herself.  Did it 
succeed?  Books written afterwards say ‘Yes.’ But how, if there is such an 
event, can it be remembered afterwards?  How can it be expressed in 
anything but itself?  Not only from the unbeliever are mysteries hid, but 
the adept himself cannot retain them. He may think, if he chooses, that he 
has been with God, but as soon as he thinks it, it becomes history, and falls 
under the rules of time. (322-323) 
Though Forster couches his message here in spiritual terms, his vision of the “mysteries” 
behind life, with its veiled truths always a step ahead of the seeker, echoes the Freudian-
Lacanian notion of the surplus of meaning which the signifying chain pursues but never 
“catches” or represents.  This moment here seems to mark the end of this hunt for a truth 
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that must be “ravished,” a conclusion that produces in ecstasy for the ceremony’s 
participants.  
Moreover, in the wake of the trial, Forster shows his characters resisting the urge 
to impose logic where it does not belong and benefitting as a result.  Fielding observes 
that Adela “was no longer examining life, but being examined by it; she had become a 
real person” (272). 54   Aziz, who is sometimes read along with Fielding as emblematic of 
the masculine (and even Western) search for certainty and fixity (Raschke, “Forster's 
Passage to India: Re-Envisioning Plato's Cave,” 15), resists any impulse to value logic 
over emotion at the end of the novel.  Upon meeting Ralph Moore, Mrs. Moore’s son, he 
realizes to himself that his sentiment for Mrs. Moore does not stand up to the scrutiny of 
pure reason, but that his love for her is real all the same:  “What did this eternal goodness 
of Mrs. Moore amount to?  To nothing, if brought to the test of thought.  She had not 
borne witness in his favor, nor visited him in the prison, yet she had stolen to the depths 
of his heart, and he always adored her” (350).  For this reason, he decides to love the 
stranger Ralph as well.  Perhaps Aziz’s realization at the end of the novel that “life is not 
a scientific manual” (312) is evidence of his progress toward realizing that the illogic of 
love or sympathy can conquer the “tests” to which such sentiment is often put. 
The most important result of this turn away from pure rationality for characters at 
the end of the novel is the potential for true connection and community (although, 
                                                
54That said, Forster qualifies his praise of Miss Quested by noting the Indian response to her confession, 
which was still perceived as too arid and spirit-less:  “But while relieving the Oriental mind, she had chilled 
it, with the result that he [Hamidullah] could scarcely believe she was sincere, and indeed from his 
standpoint she was not.  For her behavior rested in cold justice and honesty; she had felt, while she 
recanted, no passion of love for those whom she had wronged.  Truth is not truth in that exacting land 
unless there go with it kindness and more kindness again, unless the Word that was with God also is God. 
And the girl’s sacrifice—so creditable according to Western notions—was rightly rejected, because, though 
it came from her heart, it did not include her heart.” 
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unfortunately, not the full achievement of it).55  Losing his “usual sane view of human 
intercourse,” Fielding comes to believe that “we exist not in ourselves, but in terms of 
each others’ minds—a notion for which logic offers no support and which had attacked 
him only once before, the evening after the catastrophe, when from the verandah of the 
club he saw the fists and fingers of the Marabar swell until they included the whole night 
sky” (277-278).  It seems significant that as Fielding shuns reason in his musings 
regarding the need to connect with the minds of others, he likens the caves to parts of the 
hand, thereby rescuing them from the ordered numbering system of Aziz’s trial and 
restoring them to the language of the human body.  This image, then, contains the 
promise of both physical and mental connection, denying the dividing and disembodying 
forces of empire.  
 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, A Passage to India’s characters seem to realize, as Paul Verhaeghe 
puts it, that “[t]o lack the answer becomes the solution. Beyond the mysterious power of 
the master and the opacity of knowledge there is nothing to be found but the freedom of 
desire” (Viii).  Unfortunately, the novel ends with the novel’s primary (closeted) couple 
remaining hopelessly separated.56 However, by destabilizing the master discourse of 
British Imperialism within the novel’s universe, Forster opens the door for the adoption 
of an ethos with respect to both language and human relations that is more accepting of 
                                                
55This is the tragedy of the book’s final pages, in which Aziz and Fielding yearn for friendship with each 
other (as well as something beyond that).  Although I have attempted to demonstrate that the end of the 
novel presents characters making some steps toward breaking out of a structure that stifles sentiment and 
other “irrational” forces, it is clear that the structure yet remains as the novel closes and is directly 
responsible for the impossibility of romance between Aziz and Fielding. 
56The couple here is Aziz and Fielding, who agree that they are not yet able to be “friends” due to sexual 
mores as well as their own situation within imperialism.   
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the “muddle” in both. Denying the “true” story behind the incident in the caves, the novel 
points to greater meanings beyond factual “truths” and suggests, through the frustrations 
posed by its opacity, the need for inquiry that can both navigate these meanings and 
respond ethically to the challenges of “knowing” other people.
The “Ultimate Porter” on the “Ultimate Train”: Katherine Mansfield and the 
Discourse of the Master 
Of all the authors included in this study, Katherine Mansfield was perhaps the one 
most outwardly sympathetic to Freudian ideas.  There exists significant evidence of 
Mansfield’s familiarity with Freudian psychoanalysis.   She mentions it explicitly only 
once in her published work, in “Psychology,” but also demonstrates an interest in 
Freudian psychoanalysis in her unpublished story, “The Two Strangers’” (Dunbar 88). 
Mansfield’s involvement with The New Age, a leading journal, facilitated her awareness 
of Freud.  According to Pamela Dunbar, the appearance of Freud’s works on sexuality 
and repression was one of two events (the other being the Great War) that had a visible 
impact on Mansfield’s work:  
[I]n the café society she frequented on first returning to London it would 
have been impossible to avoid hearing about them .  . several members of 
her circle were deeply engaged with his ideas.  A. R. Orage, for a time a 
close friend of hers as well as an editor of the journal New Age which 
published some of her early stories, was a passionate disciple. (x) 
Moreover, Mansfield was a friend to both Leonard and Virginia Woolf, who were 
(however grudgingly, in Virginia’s case) instrumental in the dissemination of Freud’s 
ideas in English literary circles.  In addition, through her work at New Age, Mansfield 
met both Beatrice Hastings, who “helped [Mansfield] immerse herself in the intellectual 
currents of the day,” including psychoanalysis, and M. D. Eder, one of Freud’s first 
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English disciples.  While Mansfield was critical of authors like D. H. Lawrence who, in 
her view, were heavy-handed in integrating Freudian symbolism into their fiction 
(Kaplan 51), she was nonetheless intrigued by the psychoanalytic ideas to which she was 
exposed. 
Certainly, Mansfield possessed an intense interest in human psychology and the 
workings of the human mind. Like Virginia Woolf, to whom she is often compared on 
the basis of her fluid, allusive (and elusive) narrative style, Mansfield explores the inner 
workings of her characters’ private self or “selves,” navigating (often through free 
indirect discourse) their diverse and sometimes contradictory thoughts and perspectives.  
Indeed, she seems intrigued by the same “privacy of the soul” that Woolf sets up as a 
kind of sacred, inviolable center of psychic life.  Reticent or tongue-tied exteriors mask a 
rich and often turbulent inner life that Mansfield’s characters are unable or unwilling to 
describe to those around them.  Thus, as in Woolf’s work, Mansfield’s characters often 
appear psychologically marooned; this is the case in both “Je ne parle pas francais” and 
“Psychology,” the two works I discuss below.  
Mansfield conceptualized individual identity as extremely fluid and fragmented. 
As Sydney Janet Kaplan puts it, “Katherine Mansfield’s aesthetics are grounded in a 
precocious recognition of the self as many selves” (169).  Her prose reflects this concern.  
Rather than being either clearly omniscient or limited, the “voices” in her fiction occupy 
an unstable space in between these two modes.   In describing this unusual and unsettling 
aspect of Mansfield’s work, Conrad Aiken argues that Mansfield doesn’t submerge 
herself in her characters, but rather forces her characters to submerge themselves in her; 
she is their “ventriloquist” (qtd. in Bennett 6), using free indirect discourse to weave 
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seamlessly in and out of their minds and thoughts.  The effect is profoundly decentering, 
as it precludes easy identifications between the reader and these stories’ characters.  In 
fact, as Bennett has argued, her work is “in a certain sense, unreadable.”  “Certainly,” 
Bennett writes,  “it would seem that the normal protocols of reading which necessarily 
include certain sympathies, certain identifications and certain ethical judgements are 
suspended and we are left in a state of hermeneutic, ethical and indeed literary 
uncertainty” (12-13).  Mansfield fundamentally prevents her readers from gaining a 
stable or coherent picture of her characters, often creating grotesquely “dishonest” or 
fragmented ones and thereby forcing recognition of how unstable and fluid the notion of 
the “self” actually is.  Indeed, her fiction often seems directed toward debunking 
generally accepted “truths” about identity and, in particular, about sexuality. According 
to Kaplan, Mansfield was “suspicious of the idea of the essential self” and “[h]er 
emphasis on roles and role playing reflects her sense of self as multiplicity, ever 
changing, dependent on the shifting focus of relationships” (37).  Kaplan argues that 
Mansfield’s awakening to her own bisexuality—and attendant realization that her own 
desires and identifications did not fit into one simple category—may have enabled this 
perception of the self’s fluidity, providing “the impetus for newer, more elastic 
definitions of the self” (170). 
Mansfield did have some sense that the recognition of the multifaceted and 
mulitiplicitous self could be liberating.  In a 1908 letter to her cousin Sylvia Pane, she 
wrote:  “Would you not like to try all sorts of lives—one is so very small—but that is the 
satisfaction of writing--one can impersonate so many people” (Letters I, pp. 18-19; qtd. in 
Kaplan 177).  Yet later, in 1920, she reflected on the more frustrating side of 
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experiencing oneself as fragments, pondering the suggestion that one can be “true to 
oneself”:  
True to oneself!  which self? Which of my many--well really, that’s what 
it looks like coming to--hundreds of selves?  For what with complexes and 
suppressions and reactions and vibrations and reflections, there are 
moments when I feel I am nothing but the small clerk of some hotel 
without a proprietor, who has all his work cut out to enter the names and 
hand the keys to the willful guests. (Journal, p. 205; qtd. in Kaplan 177). 
Here Mansfield’s frustration with feeling like a “proprietor” who has lost control of her 
own house echoes Freud’s “Copernican” realization that “the ego . . . is not even master 
in its own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on 
unconsciously in its mind” (Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis 353). 57   In this 
maneuver, Freud profoundly decentered the subject who attempts to “know” himself. 
Freud’s formulation “Wo es war, soll Ich werden,”58 discussed at greater length in 
Chapter 1, embodies this decentering, for it indicates that the knowing subject has been 
displaced from its central vantage point, now forced to pursue meaning within the gaps 
where “it” once was. According to Michael Roth, “One can rightly say that the unified ‘I’ 
as subject was denied by Freud.  More accurately, this unified ‘I’ was seen as something 
to be aimed at, not something given; the integration of the ‘involuntary’ facets of one’s 
personality into knowing is the progress toward the ‘I’ as subject.  It is a ‘progress’ that is 
                                                
57Mansfield goes even further than Freud in this regard, dismissing the potential of memory or confession, 
two key elements in psychoanalysis, as the mere hallmarks of a misguided belief in an “essential self” that 
lies within all of us. 
 
58This could be literally translated as "Where the id was, there the ego shall be"; as noted in Chapter 1, 
however, Lacan rejects that translation in favor of, “I must come to the place where that was” (171). 
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never complete” (Psycho-Analysis as History 56). That is, knowledge of the self can only 
be pursued asymptotically, as it exists only in fragments, some of which remain hidden or 
unknowable to the subject.   
 Mansfield’s insistence upon the status of the “I” as fragmented brings her into line 
with Freud as well as Woolf, Forster, and even Sayers.   Although Woolf and Forster do 
not fundamentally deny the existence or integrity of the individual, they nonetheless 
emphasize the importance of uncertainties, inconsistencies, and fluidity within their 
characters’ perceptions of self and self-presentations.    Sayers, too, ultimately 
destabilizes her characters’ identities, as we will see in the next chapter:  while painting 
most of her characters in broad brush strokes in accordance with the conventions of the 
detective genre, she allows Peter Wimsey’s war experiences to intrude throughout her 
oeuvre in surprising and destabilizing ways, suggesting the complexities that lie beneath 
the simple “playboy” persona he fosters. In short, all of these authors challenge the notion 
that their characters can ever completely “know” about each other or be completely 
known themselves.   But unlike Woolf and Forster, who frequently attribute the 
difficulties of “knowing” about others to problems of communication and language, 
Mansfield directly points to the instability of individual identity as that which precludes 
such knowledge; one cannot be “known” because there exist a multiplicity of “selves” 
within the individual who impinge upon and comprise (and compromise) one’s public 
“self.”  This is not to say that Mansfield is not just as concerned as Forster and Woolf 
with problems of communication and connection—indeed, she is; she simply focuses 
more heavily on the multitudinous, fragmented nature of the self in this exploration.  
Nonetheless, in her focus on this self, like the other authors in this work, she echoes 
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Freud’s decentered and decentering theory of an unknowable center at the heart of human 
experience—i.e., the unconscious—that undermines the subject’s attempts to present 
itself as a coherent “whole.” 
 
“Je ne parle pas francais” and the Failed Master 
 In “Je ne parle pas francais” (1920)59, Mansfield explores identity via a 
profoundly unreliable first-person narrator, Raoul Duquette.  He is at once extremely 
voluble and revelatory and, yet, evasive and profoundly dishonest.  His narration is 
riddled with inconsistencies, ambiguities, and contradictions that undermine his attempts 
to appear forthright. Duquette’s character is repellent; as Virginia Woolf notes, the story 
“breathes nothing but hate” (The Diary of Virginia Woolf  i.216),60 presenting Raoul as 
loathsome and inviting the reader’s contempt for him.  Duquette’s loathsomeness stems 
largely from his self-important pretensions to knowing about himself and others more 
deeply than the average person.  As the story’s first person narrator, Duquette frequently 
meditates upon the fragmented nature of human identity as though he occupies a 
privileged and “whole” position, superior to the masses and, thus, immune from such 
dividedness. Mansfield suggests that this confidence is not only odious, but also 
unfounded; in fact, she consistently undermines Duquette’s claims to complete self-
awareness and perceptiveness by juxtaposing his arrogance with evidence of his own 
inaccuracy and propensity to contradict himself. 
                                                
59The version I am working from, which was published in the collection Bliss and Other Stories in 1920, is 
an abridged (and sanitized) version of an earlier draft published by the Heron Press earlier in that same 
year. 
 
60Andrew Bennett quotes this diary entry in his article “Hating Katherine Mansfield.”  Bennett notes that 
Woolf does not refer to the story by name, but contextual details, including the date of her entry, indicate 
she was referring to this story.  
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In portraying himself as the all-knowing and unfragmented “I,” Duquette attempts 
to occupy what Lacan terms the “master position.”   As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
master clings to “master signifiers,” which masquerade as being identical to what is 
signified—that is, they obscure the lack (or division) that the subject experiences with his 
or her entry into language (Verhaeghe 105).  Duquette depends on his narration to 
perform the same function, claiming to occupy a privileged position from which he is 
able to perceive and relay the “truth” of the people he observers.  Duquette’s opening 
monologue implicitly contrasts the fragmented and debased condition of those he 
observes with his own superior vantage point as the all-seeing observer: 
I don’t know why I have such a fancy for this little café.  It’s dirty 
and sad, sad, sad.  It’s not as if it had anything to distinguish it from a 
hundred others -- it hasn’t; or as if the same strange types came here every 
day, whom one could watch from one’s corner and recognise and more or 
less (with a strong emphasis on the less) get the hang of. 
But pray don’t imagine that those brackets are a confession of my 
humility before the mystery of the human soul.  Not at all; I don’t believe 
in the human soul.  I never have.  I believe that people are like 
portmanteaux -- packed with certain things, started going, thrown about, 
tossed away, dumped down, lost and found, half emptied suddenly, or 
squeezed fatter than ever, until finally the Ultimate Porter swings them on 
to the Ultimate Train and away they rattle . . . 
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Not but what these portmanteaux can be very fascinating.  Oh, but 
very!  I see myself standing in front of them, don’t you know, like a 
Customs official.   
‘Have you anything to declare?  Any wines, spirits, cigars, 
perfumes, silks?’ 
And the moment of hesitation as to whether I am going to be 
fooled just before I chalk that squiggle, and then the other moment of 
hesitation just after, as to whether I have been, are perhaps the two most 
thrilling instants in life.  Yes, they are, to me. (43) 
Denying humility in the “face” of a supposed “mystery,” Duquette takes on a position as 
the master-who-knows all and intuits what is behind the façades of the “travelers” he 
meets.  Duquette’s reference to  “portmanteaux,” too, is suggestive.  Although here he 
uses the word literally to draw an analogy between the people he observes and suitcases, 
it also echoes Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass, in which Humpty Dumpty 
redefines “a portmanteau word” as the product of two other words, the combination of 
which creates an entirely new meaning.  In the story, Humpty Dumpty displays an 
attitude toward language that seems eerily similar to Duquette’s.  Responding to Alice’s 
charge that his use of the word “glory” to signify “a nice knock-down argument” was 
nonsensical, he asserts his absolute power to make a signifier stand for whatever signified 
he chooses and embody his entire meaning therein: 
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful 
tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’  
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‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you CAN make words mean 
so many different things.’  
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master—
that's all.’  
Alice was too much puzzled to say anything, so after a minute 
Humpty Dumpty began again. ‘They've a temper, some of them—
particularly verbs, they're the proudest—adjectives you can do anything 
with, but not verbs—however, I can manage the whole lot of them! 
Impenetrability! That's what I say!’  
‘Would you tell me, please,’ said Alice ‘what that means?’  
‘Now you talk like a reasonable child,’ said Humpty Dumpty, 
looking very much pleased. 'I meant by "impenetrability" that we've had 
enough of that subject, and it would be just as well if you'd mention what 
you mean to do next, as I suppose you don't mean to stop here all the rest 
of your life.’ 
‘That's a great deal to make one word mean,’ Alice said in a 
thoughtful tone.  
Humpty Dumpty’s asserts that one can choose to be the “master” of language, rather than 
vice versa; for him, the sign is not arbitrary, as structuralists would contend, but 
something into which you can cram any meaning you choose, bending it to your will and 
specific intention.   
Humpty Dumpty’s theory of language is echoed in Duquette’s suggestion that he 
can describe and thereby, in fact, determine who these human “portmanteaux” passing 
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before his gaze are.  One might argue that he initially qualifies his ability to “get the 
hang” of people, but even there, he does so by using the impersonal pronoun “one”; in 
this move, he distances himself from those average people who are “less” able to “get the 
hang of” others.  Indeed, Duquette envisions himself as the Customs official who 
possesses the ultimate authority to identify and make public what people have left 
“undeclared” – that is, the “private” (in Woolfian terms) or “unconscious” (in Freudian 
ones) aspects of psychic life beneath our public selves.  The metaphor of the Customs 
official emphasizes Duquette’s sense of his own particularity and wholeness, while he 
uses the symbol of the portmanteaux to suggest that all the other people he sees comprise 
a bloated jumble of different parts that remains constantly at the mercy of the Ultimate 
Porter and Train (on whose level Duquette, as Customs official, appears to be).   
  Duquette meditates obsessively upon his own existence and selfhood, and it is 
clear, despite his claims to being an observer of human nature in general, that he is his 
own favorite subject matter.   Moreover, although he claims to be attracted both to his 
friend Dick and to Dick’s fiancée, Mouse, Duquette’s most intense desires appear to be 
directed toward himself.  His loving description of his own features is by far the most 
sensuous moment of the story.  This description occurs as he is meditating upon a letter 
from Dick, his supposed love object: 
I read it standing in front of the (unpaid for) wardrobe mirror. It 
was early morning.  I wore a blue kimono embroidered with white birds 
and my hair was still wet; it lay on my forehead, wet and gleaming. 
‘Portrait of Madame Butterfly,’ said I, ‘on hearing of the arrival of 
ce cher Pinkerton.’ (53) 
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 Duquette finds himself entirely distracted from the content of the note, entranced by his 
own image.  Dressed in a kimono and imagining himself as Madame Butterfly awaiting 
her husband, he blurs the boundaries between male and female, desire and desired; he is 
self-sufficient and whole because he has made himself his own love object.  The moment 
strongly echoes Freud’s description of narcissists “whose libidinal development [has] 
suffered some disturbance” and who, as a result, “plainly [seek] themselves as a love-
object” (On Narcissism 87).  
In directing his desires inwards, Duquette effectively denies his own dividedness 
as a subject of language.  In so doing, he reinforces his position “outside” of discourse 
and desire; rather than pursuing jouissance via an address to others, he speaks to and 
desires only himself.  According to Lacan, this is precisely the position of the master.  
The subject’s introduction into language serves as the motor of desire; thus, in denying 
this split at his core, the master both refuses to participate in its circulations and, in that 
refusal, claims access to a knowledge—that is, the objet petit a—that Lacan says 
necessarily eludes the speaking subject.  Put slightly differently, the master pretends to 
have access to knowledge that is precluded by the very structure of language into which 
the speaking subject is necessarily inserted.61  He denies one of Freud’s most profound 
discoveries, namely that “the Unconscious contains a knowledge which is unknown to 
the subject, and that this knowledge articulates a certain satisfaction beyond the subject” 
(Verhaeghe 105).  Ironically, this insistence that he is “at one” with knowledge renders 
the master blind to his “own truth”—that is, that “even he is divided” (107).  In order to 
                                                
61According to Verhaeghe, the subject’s pursuit of a truth that “remains unknown to himself” is “the motor 
and the starting-point of each discourse,” even the ones other than the master’s (101).  
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deny this fracture at his core, the master attempts to talk his way out of the problem, 
pursuing his lost unity through language.  He does this “by accumulating signifiers 
combined into a network” (105), evincing hyper-expressiveness in an effort to embody or 
convey the knowledge that the master claims to possess.  Ironically, then, “the cause of 
the original loss is used as a means to cancel this loss” (Verhaeghe 105).  
In the manner of the master, Duquette is garrulous in his project of conveying the 
“truth” of a “submerged world” into which he claims to have insight.  He consistently 
portrays himself as all-knowing, particularly with respect to himself, and suggests early 
on that his compulsion to communicate was inspired by his desire to relay the very sort of 
originary “truth” that Verhaeghe and Lacan identify as the impetus behind the master’s 
proliferating signifiers.   After meeting Dick Harmon, the man for whom he claims to 
have developed feelings, Duquette locates the significance of their encounter in his wish 
to convey the whole of his life (“submerged” and otherwise) to another person:   
. . . I was quite breathless at the thought of what I’d done.  I had shown 
somebody both sides of my life.  Told him everything as sincerely and 
truthfully as I could.  Taken immense pains to explain things about my 
submerged life that really were disgusting and never could possibly see 
the light of literary day.  On the whole I had made myself out far worse 
than I was -- more boastful, more cynical, more calculating. (51) 
In his retelling of the incident, Duquette asserts his own mastery over the representation 
he has offered Dick, including the partial untruths or distortions.  He admits freely to 
these inaccuracies because his awareness of them affirms the depth and extent of his self-
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knowledge.  Viewed as such, this moment of supposed surrender actually represents 
Duquette’s effort to claim complete authority over his self-representation.   
 Duquette seems to conceptualize the author as a godlike entity who possesses 
superior knowledge and even control over what “truth” is.  Early in the story, he asserts 
his own perfect and complete self-knowledge: 
I date myself from the moment that I became the tenant of a small 
bachelor flat on the fifth floor of a tall, not too shabby house . . . There I 
emerged, came out into the light [. . .]  
 Ah, I can see myself that first evening . . . walking about on tiptoe, 
arranging and standing in front of the glass with my hands in my pockets 
and saying to that radiant vision: ‘I am a young man who has his own flat.  
I write for two newspapers.  I am going in for serious literature.  I am 
starting a career.  The book that I shall bring out will simply stagger the 
critics.  I am going to write about things that have never been touched on 
before.  I am going to make a name for myself as a writer about the 
submerged world.  But not as others have done before me.  Oh, no!  Very 
naively, with a sort of tender humour and from the inside, as though it 
were all quite simple, quite natural.  I see my way quite perfectly.  Nobody 
has ever done it as I shall do it because none of the others have lived my 
experiences.  I’m rich--I’m rich. (48; emphasis mine) 
In this passage, he once again affirms his ability to see himself “perfectly” (albeit 
retrospectively) and embody these insights in his descriptions of himself.   He asserts 
absolute control over his life story by setting its “beginning” in adulthood  (“I date myself 
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from the moment that I became the tenant of a small bachelor flat on the fifth floor of a 
tall, not too shabby house . . .”), thus bypassing stages in his life—in particular, 
childhood and birth—in which he possessed little to no agency; he imagines himself 
simply emerging into being out of the ether that day.  Moreover, he brags that he can see 
other aspects of the world “quite perfectly” and “from the inside,” and believes it is his 
duty as an author to convey the perceptions gained from his privileged perspective to the 
world at large. 
However, as Lacan notes, the master’s paradoxical attempts to pursue his lost 
unity via language—the structure that created this disunity—necessarily fail, as the 
superior position the “master” attempts to claim is fundamentally unstable and cannot be 
sustained.  The notion that the master and the master-signifier can be one and the same is 
false.  The agent pretends to be at one with the master-signifier—“one and undivided” 
(Verhaeghe 107)—but must ultimately realize that admit his own dividedness as a subject 
of language (Verhaeghe 108).   
In Verhaeghe’s formulation via Lacan, the speaker who attempts to be at one with 
his own “truth” finds that he ultimately loses control of it as it disperses across the 
proliferation of signifiers that convey and pursue it; the subject is “a passive effect of the 
signifying chain, certainly not the master of it.  The agent of discourse is only a fake 
agent, ‘un semblant,’ a make-believe entity.  The real driving force lies underneath, in the 
position of the truth” (101-102).  The existence of language creates the condition in 
which the subject comes into being.  Far from being the agent who controls the structure 
and content of language, the speaking subject is at the mercy of discourse.  As an effect,  
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The ego does not speak, it is spoken.  Observation of the process of free 
association leads to this conclusion, but even ordinary speaking yields the 
same result.  Indeed, when I speak, I do not know what I am going to say, 
unless I have learned it by heart or I am reading my speech from a paper.  
In all other cases, I do not speak so much as I am spoken, and this speech 
is driven by a desire with or without my conscious agreement.  This is a 
matter of simple observation, but it wounds man’s narcissism deeply; 
which is why Freud called it the third great narcissistic humiliation of 
mankind. (Verhaeghe 101) 
Thus, as much as the master might like to believe he can use discourse to his own 
advantage to bolster and validate his powerful position as “he-who-knows,”62 such 
control is impossible.  He who speaks is always a subject of desire and, as such, is driven 
by it –“with or without [his] conscious agreement” (Verhaeghe 101). 
Duquette’s musings regarding his own identity ultimately embody and reveal his 
own “decentering.”  While Duquette portrays himself as a unified and all-knowing 
subject, his reflections are riddled with contradictions and evidence of his own 
fragmentation. This tension in Duquette’s discourse becomes clear even in his very first 
real introduction to the reader: “My name is Raoul Duquette.  I am twenty-six years old 
and a Parisian, a true Parisian.  About my family— it really doesn’t matter.  I have no 
                                                
62I take this phrase from Verhaeghe’s comparison of “Freud the seeker” and “Freud-who-knew,” the latter 
being a failed master, according to him (56).  According to Verhaeghe, “Freud-who-knew” held sway in 
Freud’s case study of Dora, wherein he attempted to explain all of Dora’s symptoms, motivations, and 
dreams in intricate detail, to the point where “Dora couldn’t get a word in edgeways” (Verhaeghe 57).  
Instead of allowing her (and her unconscious) to speak, Freud attempts to explain the “truths” behind her 
condition for her.  He ultimately disavowed his approach in this case and warned others against adopting it, 
as it thwarted the patient’s ability to navigate and work through her unconscious thoughts and desires.  
Thus, the Dora case study revealed the dangers of attempts be the one “who knows” and explains—that is, 
of the master position, which Duquette attempts to occupy.  
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family; I don’t want any.  I never think about my childhood.  I’ve forgotten it” (47).  
Duquette’s overview of himself and his life is sketchy, but it exudes the same confidence 
in his ability to convey the “truth” that is evident in his later assertions of a privileged 
authorial position.   He seems particularly careful to deny the force or influence of 
memory in his life, as though he believes that admitting its significance would be to 
acknowledge forces that undermine or destabilize the individual: 
. . . I’ve no patience with people who can’t let go of things, who will 
follow after and cry out.  When a thing’s gone, it’s gone.  It’s over and 
done with.  Let it go then!  Ignore it, and comfort yourself, if you do want 
comforting, with the thought that you never do recover the same thing that 
you lose.  It’s always a new thing.  The moment it leaves you it’s changed.  
Why, that’s even true of a hat you chase after; and I don’t mean 
superficially—I mean profoundly speaking . . . I have made it a rule of my 
life never to regret and never to look back.  Regret is an appalling waste of 
energy, and no one who intends to be a writer can indulge in it. You can’t 
get it into shape; you can’t build on it; it’s only good for wallowing in.  
Looking back, of course, is equally fatal to Art.  It’s keeping yourself 
poor.  Art can’t and won’t stand poverty. (46) 
Duquette values art—and, more specifically, writing—as a means of creating and 
asserting one’s own reality; as a result, he fears the impact of memory (which the subject 
cannot alter) because it could undermine the efforts or authority of the artist to create a 
world for the reader.  Above all, he wishes to consolidate the supremacy of an ‘I’ who 
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can set the parameters of his own existence, live in that present, and ignore anything he 
cannot directly alter or affect as unimportant.  
Paradoxically, through Duquette’s increasingly passionate disavowals of 
influences that could loosen his control over his own story and destabilize him, his 
dividedness as a subject becomes increasingly evident.  His denial of the past—which, as 
Freud tells us, exerts a myriad of powerful pressures on the individual that are beyond his 
awareness or control—proves unsustainable.  This fact is apparent when, immediately on 
the heels of this denial, he describes in significant detail the “one memory that stands out 
at all” for him: 
When I was about ten our laundress was an African woman, very 
big, very dark, with a check handkerchief over her frizzy hair.  When she 
came to our house she always took particular notice of me, and after the 
clothes had been taken out of the basket she would lift me up into it and 
give me a rock while I held tight to the handles and screamed for joy and 
fright.  I was tiny for my age and pale, with a lovely little half open mouth 
-- I feel sure of that. 
 One day when I was standing at the door, watching her go, she 
turned round and beckoned to me, nodding and smiling in a strange secret 
way.  I never thought of not following.  She took me into a little outhouse 
at the end of the passage, caught me up in her arms and began kissing me.  
Ah, those kisses!  Especially those kisses inside my ears that nearly 
deafened me.   
 [ . . . . ]   
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 As this performance was repeated once a week it is no wonder that 
I remember it so vividly.  Besides, from that very first afternoon, my 
childhood was, to put it prettily, ‘kissed away.’  I became very languid, 
very caressing, and greedy beyond measure.  And so quickened, so 
sharpened, I seemed to understand everybody and be able to do what I 
liked with everybody. 
 I suppose I was in a state of more or less physical excitement, and 
that was what appealed to them.  For all Parisians are more than half—oh, 
well, enough of that.  And enough of my childhood, too.  Bury it under a 
laundry basket instead of a shower of roses and passons outré. (47-48) 
In this moment, it seems as though Duquettte momentarily loses control over his tale, 
admitting this memory of trauma to his narrative despite his assertions that the past does 
not matter.  At first, he retains his absolute authority and knowledge by demonstrating a 
preternatural awareness of himself and his qualities at that age (“I was tiny for my age 
and pale, with a lovely little half open mouth—I feel sure of that”), but his description 
soon dissolves into something less affected and performed; he both reveals a moment in 
which he lost control and clearly undermines his own claims to a wholeness that depend 
on denying memory’s force.  In so doing, he highlights the falsity and fragility of his 
position of “master.” Moreover, here he suggests the conditions that may have inspired 
him to seek this role in the first place; indeed, he claims that these encounters with the 
laundress first inspired him to believe that he could understand everybody and be able to 
“do what I liked with everybody” (47).  Through his tales, he is not only denying the 
dividedness at his core that language instates but, also, the feeling of being violated—the 
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rupture—that trauma creates.63  The absolute knowledge and control that are the province 
of the master represent a diametric counterpoint to the powerlessness of the molested 
child whose history continues to intrude upon and shape Duquette’s psychic life against 
his will.    
 Duquette’s desire to deny language’s function as an address to an “other” outside 
of oneself is clear in the story’s very title, which derives from a phrase Dick’s fiancée 
utters multiple times throughout the story.  The phrase is obviously a paradox; through it, 
she uses a language she claims she doesn’t know in order to deny fluency. Dick notes that 
the statement is a lie when Mouse first makes it, but she repeats the phrase several times, 
and Duquette takes it up as a kind of mantra, thus indicating its significance beyond the 
literal (and false) assertion that Mouse doesn’t speak French.  Mansfield implies that it 
represents Mouse’s perception of the difficulty—if not impossibility64 — of actual 
communication and intimacy with others.  Thus, it is appropriate that the phrase resonates 
with Duquette, and that Mansfield makes it the title of her (or, rather, his) story.  For 
Duquette, it represents his own refusal of the social functions of language, a resolve to 
“opt out.”  
As Duquette’s story of the laundress and numerous other contradictions within his 
story indicate, however, Duquette’s attempts to remain firmly in his own solipsistic 
vacuum are only marginally successful.   Duquette’s inability to ignore memories of the 
past undermines his efforts to exercise complete control over his tale; language slips 
                                                
63Duquette frequently denies the existence of splits and divisions, as is evident not only in his imperious “I” 
narration, but also in his blurring of gender boundaries. 
 
64From her first meeting with Duquette until their parting after Dick has abandoned her, the shy Mouse 
seems to use the phrase to indicate a feeling of isolation or nervousness around others. 
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away from him, relaying thoughts and memories which he clearly wished to repress and 
thereby thwarting his attempts to make discourse the vehicle of a very deliberate, 
carefully composed story about himself.  Ironically, then, it is in these moments of lost 
control that Duquette comes closest to relaying the truth of his own “submerged world.”  
 
Conquering Love:  “Psychology” and the Evasion of Desire 
As noted above, “Psychology” (1920) is the only one of Mansfield’s stories in 
which she explicitly mentions psychoanalysis.  As Mansfield scholar Pamela Dunbar 
notes,  
In keeping with the general British coyness about acknowledging any 
acquaintance with Freud, Mansfield nowhere mentions his name.  But in 
“Psychology” (1919?65), one of her most intriguing stories, she does refer 
to the then revolutionary technique of ‘psycho-analysis’—and in a context 
which makes clear she has an understanding of what it involved.  And 
whilst her declared approach to her art was devoutly anti-theoretical the 
content and layered structure of many of her stories show what appears to 
be a considerable debt to the lead metaphor and insights of depth-
psychology. (x- xi) 
Appropriately, given this explicit nod to Freud, the story focuses on the 
relationship between language and desire that is at the heart of Freud’s thought. 
“Psychology,” like “Je ne parle pas francais,” is a story preoccupied with its characters’ 
failure to recognize and accept the “impossible” conditions imposed on all subjects of 
                                                
65This “?” is in the original.  
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language. “Je ne parle pas francais” explores this problem with respect to a single 
character who attempts to envelop a vast “perfect” knowledge of the wider world within 
his own narration—who, in a sense, wants to swallow the world whole.  In so doing, he 
avoids the pursuit of the objet petit a, the last term of desire that remains always out of 
reach for the subject of language.  In short, he denies the Lacanian “Other” that 
comprises the unconscious traces that encounters in/with language embody and leave 
within the subject, instead channeling desire only toward his own images and fantasies of 
himself.  By contrast, “Psychology” presents a similar avoidance of desire, but within a 
relationship.  Although they do not share Duquette’s solipsism, the two unnamed 
characters in the story evince the same confidence in their ability to “know” about one 
another without participating in or contributing to the circulations and uncertainties of 
desire itself.  Like Duquette, they attempt to set themselves apart from language as the 
motor of desire, with disastrous results.  
As in “Je ne parle pas francais,” the protagonists in “Psychology” are artists; he is 
a novelist and she is a playwright.  The story takes place largely over a single visit the 
man pays to the woman’s home studio, during which they engage entirely in superficial 
chitchat about the arts and other “weighty” matters.  Like Duquette, Mansfield’s 
unnamed protagonists attempt to take on the master’s position insofar as they claim to be 
“at one” with the truth that lies beneath the words they and others speak.   This conceit 
hinges on the pair’s perception that they are able to effect a “complete surrender” to each 
other, laying themselves bare through their arid discussions of the arts and other 
impersonal matters:   
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Like two open cities in the midst of some vast plain66 their two minds lay 
open to each other.  And it wasn’t as if he rode into hers like a conqueror, 
armed to the eyebrows and seeing nothing but a gay silken flutter—nor did 
she enter his like a queen walking soft on petals.  No, they were eager, 
serious travelers, absorbed in understanding what was to be seen and 
discovering what was hidden— making the most of this extraordinary 
absolute chance which made it possible for him to be utterly truthful to her 
and for her to be utterly sincere with him. (84) 
The two are supremely confident in their “extraordinary” ability to speak and perceive 
everything about each other, even that which is “hidden” to everyone else.  As 
Mansfield’s language makes clear, they view their powers to know about each other as 
“absolute.”  It is notable that Mansfield is careful to deny an element of domination in 
these characters’ efforts to know each other, which would seem to distinguish them from 
the kind of truth-seeking in which characters like Adela Quested, Drs. Holmes and 
Bradshaw, and Raoul Duquette engage.  Yet I would argue that the element of “mastery” 
in the Freudian-Lacanian sense is still present in the couple’s insistence on gaining access 
to that which is hidden within discourse and using language in a way that is “utterly 
truthful.”  
Verhaeghe (using Lacan) argues that the pursuit of such absolute “truth” in 
discourse is both misguided and, indeed, fatal to the human being as social creature.  As 
already noted, Lacanian psychoanalysis reveals that communication must always be a 
failure in the sense that it can never fully embody the meaning or intent behind the 
                                                
66This may be a reference to the Biblical story of Sodom and Gomorrah (two of the “Cities of the Plain”), 
and thus allude to the sterility of their relationship and foreshadow a crisis. 
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speaker’s words.  In fact, if this “dreamt-of perfect communication and sexual 
relationship” were possible, then  
the truth would find complete expression in the desire of the agent for the 
other, thus realizing the perfect relationship between them, whose product 
would be the definitive satisfaction that embraces the truth.  This 
Hollywood scenario would be conditional upon everything taking place 
outside the realm of the signifier, otherwise it would be structurally 
impossible.  Once one speaks, the verbalization of the truth of the matter 
becomes impossible, resulting in the impossibility of realizing one’s desire 
in the place of the other . . . and thus in the impotence of the convergence 
between product and truth. (Verhaeghe 103) 
Lacan’s formulation of the master’s discourse reveals, then, that the couple’s claims to 
have achieved perfect understanding through speech must necessarily be false.  The 
achievement of speech that could actually embody truth would herald the end not only of 
language, but also of the speaking subject itself for, as already noted in Chapter 2, 
language “provides the motor which keeps man going for ever” and which “[f]or Lacan  . 
. . constitutes the basis of every form of human causality”  (Verhaeghe 105).  The master 
pursues this silent state because he perceives it as his only way of avoiding or denying his 
own dividedness but, ultimately, the living master must always be deposed.  On the 
evening the story takes place, the couple in “Psychology,” like the faltering master, 
depends more on silence than speech in attempting to maintain their privileged, all-
knowing position with respect to each other—particularly when they are on the verge of 
admitting passion to their relationship.  Unfortunately, their failure to recognize this as a 
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flawed approach leads to the demise of their friendship entirely; they discover that, in 
addition to forestalling romance, silence prevents any kind of meaningful human 
connection.  
 As already noted, silence stops the signifying chain that is the vehicle of desire.  
Such a lack of passion is crucial to the special “communion” that the couple has achieved 
in their friendship, having already reached an advanced enough age (30) to forego such 
things: 
And the best of it was they were both of them old enough to enjoy their 
adventure to the full without any stupid emotional complication.  Passion 
would have ruined everything; they quite saw that.  Besides, all that sort of 
thing was over and done with for both of them -- he was thirty-one, she 
was thirty -- they had had their experiences, and very rich and varied they 
had been, but now was the time for harvest -- harvest.  Weren’t his novels 
to be very big novels indeed?  And her plays.  Who else had her exquisite 
sense of real English Comedy? . . . (84) 
While their attempts to express themselves in language through their artistic efforts might 
suggest a desire to communicate, it appears they have frequently avoided 
communication—and desire itself—in their everyday life, and that their art is in fact the 
means by which they avoid actual discourse.  Like Duquette, they may value their art 
because it provides them with the illusion of complete, God-like control over the worlds 
(and words) they create.  Certainly, here they turn to thoughts of their writing in order to 
avoid the messiness and inexactness that a frank conversation about their feelings would 
entail.  Their perfect harmony depends on their patently absurd resignation at 30 and 31, 
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respectively, to being “past” passion.  Moreover, in their view, this position outside the 
circulations of desire affords them a privileged, detached perspective on human behavior.  
In this way, too, they resemble Duquette.   
Like the flawed therapist who asserts his authority by becoming the one “who 
knows,” the couple affirms their superior knowledge and perspective by “diagnosing” the 
afflictions of their own “sick” society: 
He got up, knocked out his pipe, ran his hand through his hair and 
said:  “I have been wondering very much lately whether the novel of the 
future will be a psychological novel or not.  How sure are you that 
psychology qua psychology has got anything to do with literature at all?” 
“Do you mean you feel there’s quite a chance that the mysterious 
non-existent creatures -- the young writers of today -- are simply trying to 
jump the psychologist’s claim?” 
“Yes, I do.  And I think it’s because this generation is just wise 
enough to know that it is sick and to realise that its only chance of 
recovery is by going into its symptoms -- making an exhaustive study of 
them—tracking them down—trying to get at the root of the trouble.” (86) 
This direct reference to psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis highlights the fact that it 
is not society but the characters themselves who are “afflicted.”  In fact, this moment 
constitutes their attempt to cover their growing realization that their relationship has 
reached a moment of crisis and combat the profound paralysis they experience with this 
epiphany.  A shift in their relationship becomes apparent when the man notes that the 
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woman’s studio is the one place that disrupts his perfect detachment from the world 
around him: 
“I simply haven’t got any external life at all.  I don’t know the 
names of things a bit— trees and so on—and I never notice places or 
furniture or what people look like.  One room is just like another to me— 
a place to sit and read or talk in— except,” and here he paused, smiled in a 
strange naïve way, and said, “except in this studio.”  He looked round him 
and then at her; he laughed in his astonishment and pleasure.  He was like 
a man who wakes up in a train to find that he has arrived, already, at the 
journey’s end. 
“Here’s another queer thing.  If I shut my eyes I can see this place 
down to every detail--every detail . . . Now I come to think of it—I’ve 
never realised this consciously before.  Often when I am away from here I 
revisit it in spirit—wander about among your red chairs, stare at the bowl 
of fruit on the back table—and just touch, very lightly, that marvel of a 
sleeping boy’s head.”  
[ . . .] 
“I love that little boy,” he murmured.  And then they were both 
silent. (85) 
Somewhat like Duquette, the man is inclined to privilege his own internal reality and its 
logic over the external; the environment in which he reads and talks is typically just a 
backdrop to his life rather than a component thereof, and, significantly, other people 
simply blend into it.  In noting this avoidance of “any external life,” the man 
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acknowledges an inclination to live outside of discourse and the social.  The woman’s 
studio thwarts this cool detachment because it represents a place in which he finally 
begins to countenance the possibility of admitting desire into his life.  In noting this 
sensation has existed for some time before becoming conscious, moreover, he tacitly 
acknowledges the existence of psychic forces beyond his conscious control—that is, of 
the unconscious itself.  Of course, he immediately perceives this loss of control as 
frightening and potentially devastating.  His loving returns “in spirit” to his friend’s 
house reveal the growth of a dreaded “passion” that could “ruin everything.”  His focus in 
particular on the statue of the sweetly sleeping child invokes the specter of sexual 
reproduction and childbirth, bringing its possibilities into their theretofore placid and 
sexless relations.  Mansfield further emphasizes this moment’s status as a sexual 
awakening through images of stirred waters; in this transition, their comfortable silence 
becomes dreadful: 
A new silence came between them.  Nothing in the least like the 
satisfactory pause that had followed their greetings -- the “Well, here we 
are together again, and there’s no reason why we shouldn’t go on from 
where we left off last time.”  That silence could be contained in the circle 
of warm, delightful fire and lamplight.  How many times hadn’t they flung 
something into it just for the fun of watching the ripples break on the easy 
shores.  But into this unfamiliar pool the head of the little boy sleeping his 
timeless sleep dropped -- and the ripples flowed away, away -- 
boundlessly far -- into deep glittering darkness. 
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And then both of them broke it.  She said:  “I must make up the 
fire,” and he said: “I have been trying a new . . . ”  Both of them escaped.  
She made up the fire and put the table back, the blue chair was wheeled 
forward, she curled up and he lay back among the cushions.  Quickly!  
Quickly!  They must stop it from happening again. (85) 
Mansfield contrasts the aridity of the fire in which the woman seeks refuge—and which 
she envisions as able to enclose (and thereby protect) the lost, comfortable silence they 
previously enjoyed—with the image of threateningly boundless waters into which the 
child’s head falls, the form this “new” silence has taken in her mind.  In its fluidity and 
mention of the child, who as noted above represents a clear symbol of fertility and 
sexuality, the image is emblematic of the desires they attempt to deny.   
After engaging in some idle conversation about novels and psychology, the 
couple briefly regains some of their equilibrium during their “diagnosis” of the afflictions 
of their generation, which I have already mentioned above.  At first, it appears that this 
conversation has enabled them to regain the superior position outside actual discourse (as 
opposed to chatter) that they previously occupied, complete with their special silent 
telepathy:  “On the talk went.  And now it seemed they really had succeeded.  She turned 
in her chair to look at him while she answered.  Her smile said:  ‘We have won.’  And he 
smiled back, confident:  ‘Absolutely’” (86).  In this wordless “exchange,” they seem to 
have regained their perfect silent communion and the sense of command with which they 
began the story.  However, it does not last, and the silence that was once stabilizing 
becomes fatal to their relationship.  They find that despite their best efforts at remove, 
detachment, and silence, they have been “inserted” into language in the sense that Lacan 
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describes, and escape is impossible.  Mansfield’s narration reflects a sensitivity to the 
precariousness of their position, noting that the woman senses the potential to be 
“destroyed” if they were to “give way” to their feelings. 
 Unfortunately, the couple ultimately fails to recognize that the greater danger lies 
on the other side, in refusing to admit desire.  Mansfield implies that the couple would 
need to find a way to articulate their feelings, in all their inexactness and threatening 
amorphousness, in order for their friendship to survive this moment.  Yet they ultimately 
fail to see the possibilities of expression and articulation as anything other than 
potentially devastating.  At first, they entertain the possibility of a romantic relationship, 
as the imperative to speak strengthens and intensifies and the tenuous sense of triumph 
they have achieved through “psychology” dissolves into a realization of its falsity:  “. . . 
the smile undid them.  It lasted too long; it became a grin. They saw themselves as two 
little grinning puppets jigging away into nothingness” (86).  With this new sense of 
unease in their silence comes a sense of the sterility of their current state, as well as some 
inclination to embrace the “thrill” of uncertainty: 
[ . . .] They were silent this time from sheer dismay. 
 The clock struck six merry little pings and the fire made a soft 
flutter.  What fools they were—heavy, stodgy, elderly—with positively 
upholstered minds. 
 And now the silence put a spell upon them like solemn music.  It 
was anguish -- anguish for her to bear it and he would die—he’d die if it 
were broken . . . And yet he longed to break it.  Not by speech.  At any 
rate not by their ordinary maddening chatter.  There was another way for 
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them to speak to each other, and in the new way he wanted to murmur:  
‘Do you feel this too? Do you understand it at all?’ . . . 
 Instead, to his horror, he heard himself say:  ‘I must be off; I’m 
meeting Brand at six.’ (86-87) 
His longing to articulate questions rather than speak in the authoritative voice of the 
literary critic that he hid behind previously is significant, as it creates the potential for 
him to speak in a way that goes beyond “maddening chatter” and opens up the 
opportunity for meaningful discourse between them.  Yet he finds himself unable to 
speak in this “new way”; in a moment that, ironically, reveals just how little he is master 
of himself or his speech, he is surprised to hear himself declare that he must go 
immediately. 
 The woman outwardly accepts his excuse and resumes their inane conversation, 
affirming his reasons for leaving, but inwardly reflects that a crisis has occurred with his 
failure to articulate anything beyond his intention to leave: “’What the devil made him 
say that instead of the other?’ . . . ‘You’ve hurt me; you’ve hurt me! We’ve failed!’ said 
her secret self while she handed him his hat and stick, smiling gaily.  She wouldn’t give 
him a moment for another word, but ran along the passage and opened the big outer 
door” (87).  The two characters remain silent while she attempts to “plead” with him 
telepathically: “Why don’t you go? No, don’t go. Stay. No–go!” (87).  She directly links 
his imperious attitude to this failure of speech, reflecting that he is “superior to it all,” 
including the fantasy of life together, represented in her vision of sharing a garden, that 
his “spiritual vision” had inspired for her (87).  Interestingly, their “telepathy” retains 
some little integrity or efficacy here; through free indirect discourse, he “responds” to her 
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reflections that he could not share her vision of the shared garden:  “She was right.  He 
did see nothing at all.  Misery!  He’d missed it.  It was too late to do anything now.  Was 
it too late?  Yes, it was.  A cold snatch of hateful wind blew into the garden.  Curse life!   
He heard her cry ‘au revoir’ and the door slammed” (87).  Yet this mode of language-less 
“discourse” is revealed here as meaningless, as it completely fails them in their attempts 
to resolve the crisis through a new understanding. The scene is somewhat reminiscent of 
Joyce’s “The Dead,” which concludes with Gabriel Conroy resigning himself to a 
bloodless existence after a momentary awakening of desire for his wife.67  Mansfield 
implies here that the man’s failure to communicate inspires a similar resignation.  The 
wind that blows in from the garden appears “cold” and “hateful” in the wake of his 
inability to express his feelings, thus indicating that the garden has transitioned from a 
symbol of life and fertility to one of cold, barren aridity.  Indeed, his exclamation “Curse 
life!” indicates that in opting out of language and thereby closing the door on any 
potential romantic relationship with the woman, he has committed to avoiding life itself.  
Mansfield’s characters thus bear out Lacan’s assertion that to avoid the circulations of 
discourse entails death.  The couple’s shared telepathy, however remarkable or rare, is 
worthless (to say nothing of harmful) because it allows them to stand outside of the very 
system that powers desire and, thus, the drive for life.    
 Indeed, for the woman, too, this moment produces a kind of vacuum of feeling 
and meaning, an ending or death that parallels the “end” of the non-speaking subject as 
described by Lacan.  At the end of the story, the woman descends into a “black gulf” of 
                                                
67In the story, Gabriel’s failure to pursue his desire for his wife (awakened in a fleeting moment, after 
several years of ostensibly passionless marriage) and inability to communicate his feelings relegate him to 
the ranks of the living dead, Joyce implies.  The story ends with Gabriel lying silently in bed as snow 
blankets the world, unifying the living and the dead and implicitly likening them.   
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despair:  “Running back into the studio she behaved so strangely.  She ran up and down 
lifting her arms and crying:  ‘Oh!  Oh!  How stupid!  How imbecile!  How stupid!’  And 
then she flung herself down on the sommier thinking of nothing—just lying there in her 
rage.  All was over.  What was over?  Oh—something was.  And she’d never see him 
again—never” (87).  Though the woman changes her mind about seeing him again at the 
end of the story, Mansfield signals that this moment represents the utter, irrevocable 
failure of desire in the story’s final moments.  At the end, a friend visits the woman, “an 
elderly virgin” and “pathetic creature” who comes by frequently with flowers (which are 
often “soiled”), expecting every time to find herself and her kindness turned away.  Up to 
this point, the female protagonist has unfailingly invited her in, but in this moment she 
lies and says that she has “got someone with [her]” and is “hopelessly busy all evening” 
(88).  The older woman is openly good-natured at the snub and insists on leaving the 
flowers she has brought with her friend:   
‘It doesn’t matter.  It doesn’t matter at all, darling,’ said the good friend.  
‘I was just passing and I thought I’d leave you some violets.’  She fumbled 
down among the ribs of a large old umbrella.  ‘I put them down here.  
Such a good place to keep flowers out of the wind.  Here they are,’ she 
said, shaking out a dead bunch (88). 
The old woman’s appearance at that particular moment and persistent kindness inspires a 
strange and ambiguous moment of “epiphany” for the younger woman, through which 
she seems to achieve some sense of resolution for this inner crisis:  
For a moment she did not take the violets.  But while she stood just 
inside, holding the door, a strange thing happened . . . Again she saw the 
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beautiful fall of the steps, the dark garden ringed with glittering ivy, the 
willows, the big bright sky.  Again she felt the silence that was like a 
question.  But this time she did not hesitate.  She moved forward. Very 
softly and gently, as though fearful of making a ripple in that boundless 
pool of quiet, she put her arms around her friend. 
‘My dear,’ murmured her happy friend, quite overcome by this 
gratitude. ‘They are really nothing.  Just the simplest little thrippenny 
bunch.’ 
But as she spoke she was enfolded—more tenderly, more 
beautifully embraced, held by such a sweet pressure and for so long that 
the poor dear’s mind positively reeled and she just had the strength to 
quaver: ‘Then you really don’t mind me too much?’ 
‘Good-night, my friend,’ whispered the other. ‘Come again soon.’ 
(88) 
One could read this moment as a celebratory embrace of love as it exists outside of 
heterosexual romantic relationships, here in the form of a friendship between the two 
women.  Ironically, however, I would argue that this is the moment in which their 
friendship is most false and that the embrace represents the younger woman’s newfound 
resolve to shun meaningful connection hereafter.  Her decisiveness in the face of the 
“silence that was like a question” as she embraces the older woman might indicate that 
she now pursues such a relationship, but her choice for the object of this gesture belies 
that notion.  The woman’s friend, elderly and virginal, is a fairly obvious and perhaps 
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even crude symbol of deferred desire and aridity, as are the dead flowers68 for which the 
woman thanks her friend by hugging her.  Moreover, it is significant that the woman lets 
her lie stand, failing to invite her friend into her house and instead imploring her to 
“Come again soon.”  In using this phrase, she both delays intimacy and offers only the 
most generic invitation; indeed, as a staple of the neighborhood shopkeeper (or, worse, 
his silent window signs), it contains very little warmth.  Finally, the fact that she embarks 
upon the embrace with extreme care to avoid “making a ripple in that boundless pool of 
quiet” implies that her regained resolve stems not from a decision to tackle the question 
posed by the silence, but to ignore it.  In so doing, she seems to abandon all the 
possibilities embodied in the image of the little boy, which had represented so much 
promise for her and her male friend earlier in the story. 
 Mansfield indicates as much when she describes the female character’s return to 
the inner sanctum of her studio, where she tidies the scene of her undoing on the sofa:  
“The sommier was very untidy.  All the cushions ‘like furious mountains’ as she said; she 
put them in order before going over to the writing-table” (88).  Having achieved order 
there once again, she writes her male friend a letter expanding upon the conversation 
about the psychological novel in which they had earlier sought refuge.  She signs the 
latter with the same phrase she had used with the elderly virgin: “Good-night, my friend.  
Come again, soon.” This moment could conceivably represent an achievement, insofar as 
the woman overcomes her distress to contact her male friend and indicate her willingness 
                                                
68The elderly woman notes that she has protected the flowers from the same chill wind that the male 
protagonist mentioned during his exit, while he was in the throes of disappointment and confusion over the 
missed opportunity with the woman.  In echoing that moment here, Mansfield telegraphs once again the 
connection between this moment of failure between the couple and the desiccation and sterility that the 
woman and her flowers represent.  
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to try to achieve intimacy with him once again.  Yet the impersonality of this first 
“attempt” to connect implies the opposite.   In the letter, she resorts once again to safe 
topics and delivers an “invitation” that she had used the moment before to turn her older 
friend away.   
 
Conclusion 
Mansfield’s tales reflect an awareness of the fact, best articulated by Lacan, that 
opting out of the circulation of desire and language has dire consequences.  It is 
impossible ever to achieve “perfect” communion of the kind pursued by the couple in 
“Psychology,” and the attempt to be at one with language, to be master of it, necessarily 
fails—and takes the subject with it.  Mansfield’s characters refuse to be part of the system 
of language and, in that, refuse desire itself.  This refusal is at the heart of their 
pathologies, engendering a solipsism that is, ultimately, profoundly devastating.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Mystery without Solution:  Death, Trauma, and the Unconscious in Dorothy 
Sayers 
 
“It is fortunate for the mystery-monger that, whereas, up to the present, there is only one 
known way of getting born, there are endless ways of getting killed” – Dorothy Sayers. 
 
The work of detective novelist Dorothy Sayers is not often included within the 
canon of Bloomsbury fiction.  That said, both her biography and her fiction reveal 
suggestive connections and affinities between Sayers and the world of artists like 
Virginia Woolf.  Sayers lived in Bloomsbury for a significant portion of her adult life 
and, thus, was embedded in the area’s “bohemian” culture and allowed it to inform her 
work. The character Harriet Vane, who was first introduced in Sayers’s 1931 novel 
Strong Poison, provides a kind of mirror to Sayers’s life in Bloomsbury.  Like Sayers, 
Vane is a detective novelist who has an affair with a “real” novelist named Philip Boyes.  
The relationship between Boyes and Vane is based on Sayers’ affair with John Cournos, 
an American novelist and journalist whose work aligned more closely with that of the 
Modernists than Sayers’s.  Barbara Reynolds, Sayers’s close friend and biographer, notes 
that Cournos was “in touch with literary and Bohemian London and he and Dorothy may 
have had friends in common,” suggesting that both Sayers and Cournos circulated within 
London literary circles.69  Cournos was dismissive of Sayers’s writing career, however, 
                                                
69Cournos interviewed the likes of H.G. Wells, John Masefield, G. K. Chesterton, and Gordon Craig.  Craig 
invited Cournos to join the Theatre Committee, whose members included W. B. Yeats, Ezra Pound, and 
Ralph Hodgson (Reynolds 132).  According to Barbara Reynolds, he received recognition as an Imagist 
after his first novel, The Mask, was released in 1919.  
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and Strong Poison mirrors this tension in the relationship between Boyes and Vane. 70  
Despite the fact that Sayers’s status as a detective novelist alienated her from more 
“literary” writers like Cournos, these biographical overlaps represent moments of 
dialogue between her world and that of the more “established” literary community in 
London.  Her letters mention Mansfield and indicate that she read both Woolf and 
Forster, commenting frequently (and not altogether kindly) on the latter.71 
Sayers’s tendency to explore and often critique the gender conventions of her era 
brings her in line with Modernists and Bloomsburians such as Virginia Woolf.  Sayers’s 
brand of feminism, like Woolf’s, rejected conceptions of gender centered entirely on 
otherness and difference.  As critic Laurel Young writes: 
Whatever she thought of feminism as such, Sayers could not help but be 
aware of herself as a New Woman. Her life was radical for her time, but 
consistent with the theoretical model of other intellectual women of the 
Golden Age, especially those associated with the Modernist movement in 
literature. Writers such as Virginia Woolf, Djuna Barnes, and Gertrude 
Stein "rejected an older, Victorian or Edwardian female identity, tied as it 
was to sexual purity and sacrifice" and "wished to free themselves 
completely from considerations of gender, to be autonomous and powerful 
individuals, to enter the world as if they were men." (Smith-Rosenberg 
295; qtd. in Young, par. 10) 
                                                
70In another major point of intersection between fiction and reality, Boyes does not believe in the institution 
of marriage but convinces Harriet to live with him regardless, proposing marriage only after he has “tested” 
her commitment by seeing the extent to which she is willing to shun conventional social strictures; this plot 
point mirrors Cournos’s attempt (albeit unsuccessful) to convince Sayers to live a similarly unconventional 
lifestyle (and indeed, after the attempt failed, he revealed that his adamancy about not getting married was a 
test—and that he would have married her eventually if she had sufficiently proven her love). 
71Cf. The Letters of Dorothy Sayers, ed. Barbara Reynolds, vols. 2 and 3. 
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Young argues that while it is not known conclusively whether Sayers read Woolf, she 
seems to have been influenced by her A Room of One’s Own, specifically in her vision of 
the brain as ‘that great and sole true Androgyne’” ("HNQH" 44; qtd. in Young, par.11). 
Harriet Vane novels frequently meditate upon the special challenges women faced in the 
early part of the 20th century, which Sayers herself confronted.  In particular, both Sayers 
and Vane were preoccupied by the challenge of wanting to maintain professional and 
personal autonomy while still granting romantic relationships a role in their lives.  
Strikingly, like Woolf’s fiction, Sayers’s work pairs a focus on gender dynamics with 
portrayals of central male characters directly affected by their service in World War I.  
Throughout the novels in which she appears, Harriet Vane struggles to reconcile her 
position as a feminist New Woman with her passion for Lord Peter Wimsey, Sayers’ 
most celebrated detective, who suffers from the “emasculating” symptoms of shell shock.  
Through this pairing of Harriet’s fraught experience of gender difference with Wimsey’s 
posttraumatic stress disorder, Sayers draws together the same two primary victims of 
patriarchal British society—women and veterans—that Woolf identifies in Mrs. 
Dalloway. 
Ironically, two novels in which Vane does not appear foreground one of the most 
profound commonalities between Bloomsbury and Sayers.   In two of her interwar 
detective novels, Whose Body? (1923) and The Unpleasantness at the Bellona Club 
(1928),  Sayers demonstrates the same concern with the ethics of knowing that is 
apparent in the works of Woolf, Forster, and Mansfield discussed in earlier chapters.  As 
in the case of these other authors, Sayers’s interest seems conditioned by an awareness of 
Freud’s notion of the unknowable or unconscious content at the heart of mental life. 
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Sayers and the Detective Novel 
Sayers's emphasis upon the existence of “the unknowable” within human 
experience appears at odds with the traditional conventions governing the classical 
detective novel.  Critics generally agree that the Golden Age of detective fiction in 
Britain arose during the interwar period as a soothing, consolatory genre, staging 
situations in which all of a particular community’s uncertainties and anxieties could be 
dispelled via the detective’s solution of a crime (which was often a murder).72 According 
to this reading, the Golden Age detective novel served as a mode of escape from the 
uncertainty and instability of postwar life in Britain.  As Julian Symons puts it, “the fairy 
tale land of the Golden Age was one in which murder was committed over and over again 
without anyone getting hurt” (104).  Symons asserts that the murder mystery novel’s 
relationship to “reality” changed drastically after 1914, claiming that whereas the pre-war 
novel more or less reflected social and political conditions accurately, the detective novel 
became retrospective after 1914 and thereby avoided a response to war (19).  In his 2005 
overview of the detective genre, Charles Rzepka argues that, by presenting situations in 
which a clear “rational intention” underlies acts of violence and death, the interwar 
detective novel became a reconstituting, solidifying, and normalizing force (153).73  
                                                
72According to Carl Lovitt, the Golden Age of “classic” detective fiction extended from roughly 1918 to 
1939 (Walker and Frazer 68), thus spanning the interwar period in Europe.  Works in that genre became 
tremendously popular during this time; according to Julian Symons, the number of crime stories published 
multiplied by five from 1914 to 1926, and by ten between 1914 and 1939 (118).  These stories became 
especially popular among women, who were in “surplus” after the war.  According to Charles Rzepka, 
writers of detective fiction, recognizing shifts in male-female demographics among middle-class readers, 
assured this popularity by moving away from plots focused on “adventure elements” to “plots of 
ratiocination and inspired observation verging on ‘intuition,’ capabilities which most women at the time 
were more inclined to admire” (158).   
 
73Rzepka goes on to argue that, beyond exorcising the physical and emotional threats posed by reality and, 
specifically, post-WWI England, the mystery novel was able to allay social and class-related concerns by 
creating a world in which solid class boundaries remained well-defined and a ruling upper class still 
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Accordingly, the Golden Age detective epitomizes that which is logical, orderly, and 
explainable; as critic Gayle Wald notes, he is “a human metaphor for order, as possessor 
of all codes, representative of logic and science” (Walker and Frazer100). 74 
To some extent, these aspects of the Golden Age detective novel place it in 
opposition to the experimentations and innovations of Modernism.  In fact, Marjorie 
Nicolson’s 1929 essay “The Professor and the Detective” valorized detective fiction 
“precisely because it provided an escape not from life but from ‘high’ Modernist 
literature” and moved away from an “excessive subjectivity” toward “welcome 
objectivity” (qtd. in DiBattista 178).  According to Carolyn Durham, Nicolson perceived 
in Joycean avant-garde Modernism “such crimes as subjectivity, purposelessness, 
pessimism, emotionalism, and formlessness,” which are “avenged by the causal structure, 
intellectual engagement, purposeful plot and character, and rational order characteristic of 
the classic detective novel” (par. 5).  This perceived natural antipathy between 
                                                
populated and controlled the English countryside’s ‘big houses’ (153).  Somewhat ironically, the group that 
critics have identified as most directly targeted and reassured by the creation of these images of pre-war 
gentility was the English middle class.  Rzepka writes:    
For those with some disposable income the interwar years were devoted to 
getting things back to normal.  It was to this group of readers—white collar 
clerks, retail employees, professionals and academics of both sexes, 
conservative politicians and middle-class housewives, all of whom were 
relatively well educated and well placed to advance in the post-war economy – 
that detective fiction in the Golden Age most directly appealed.  With its reliable 
evocation of order out of disorder, its respect for the rule of law in defence of 
life and property, and its faith that a rational intention informs even the most 
baffling acts of violence, the new genre of detection seemed tailor-made to allay 
the anxieties that lingered below the superficial complacency of British middle-
class life (153). 
 
74For W. H. Auden, similarly, detective novels stage society’s confrontation with and ultimate absolution of 
sin.  According to Auden, the fictional murderer commits a crime against society (wherein the victim who 
could seek restitution is removed, and the social collective forced to take his or her place), and thereby 
exposes all members of this society to accusations of guilt.  The detective confers absolution by “giving 
knowledge of guilt,” identifying the real murderer and thereby restoring the rest of society to a state of 
innocence.  This resolution, Auden argues, allows the reader to “[indulge in the] fantasy of being restored 
to the Garden of Eden, where one knows love as love and not as the law” (Winks 24).  One can see how 
this staging of guilt from which society is ultimately absolved might make the detective novel attractive 
during the interwar period. 
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Modernism and detective fiction might explain the curious fact that, while making 
numerous literary references, fewer than a dozen crime stories written during the Golden 
Era make any reference to the work of modern authors (Symons 125). 75   
Sayers’s work is most often considered to fit comfortably within the conservative 
and formulaic restraints governing the genre.  Dorothy Sayers herself believed that the 
murder mystery was necessarily divorced from its reality and context:  “These mysteries 
made only to be solved, these horrors which [the reader] knows to be mere figments of 
the creative brain, comfort him by subtly persuading that life is a mystery which death 
will solve, and whose horrors will pass away as a tale that is told” (qtd. in Winks 53).  
Moreover, in 1941’s Mind of the Maker, she wrote: 
The desire of being persuaded that all human experience may be presented 
in terms of a problem having a predictable, final, complete and sole 
possible solution accounts, to a great extent, for the extraordinary 
popularity of detective fiction . . . It is significant that readers should so 
often welcome the detective-story as a way of escape from the problems of 
existence.  It ‘takes their minds off their troubles’.  Of course it does; for it 
                                                
75Critic Michael Holquist suggests that detective fiction complemented (rather than opposed) Modernism. 
Like Nicolson, he notes that intellectuals during the interwar period used detective fiction as a respite from 
the young century’s philosophical and intellectual challenges.  He writes:  “Is it not natural to assume . . . 
that during this period when rationalism is experiencing some of its most damaging attacks, that 
intellectuals, who experienced these attacks first and most deeply, would turn for relief and easy 
reassurance to the detective story, the primary genre of popular literature which they, during the same 
period, were, in fact, consuming?  The same people who spent their days with Joyce were reading Agatha 
Christie at night” (147).  In his widely-cited 1950 essay “Who Cares Who Killed Roger Ackroyd?”  
Edmund Wilson rails against a critical tendency to value detective fiction for its ability to provide this 
“escape” from Modernism.  Wilson defends artists like Joyce and Woolf against critics such as Maugham, 
De Voto, and Krutch, who assert that literature has become so excessively philosophical, psychological, 
and symbolic that the detective novel has become the only form of “pure story-telling” in their time (Winks 
38).  Denying detective fiction’s artistic merit on the basis of the level of the writing, Wilson accuses the 
detective novel of being mere food for a lazy mind whose “silliness” and “harmfulness” place it somewhere 
between smoking and crossword puzzles on a list of diversions (Winks 39).     
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softly persuades them that love and hatred, poverty and unemployment, 
finance and international politics, are problems, capable of being dealt 
with and solved in the same manner as the Death in the Library . . . Life is 
no candidate for the detection club . . . (qtd. in Coomes 154). 
 Sayers seems to have concurred with Nicolson’s assessment of detective fiction as 
a direct counterpoint to Modernism--and, more generally, to high culture itself.  In 
“Aristotle on Detective Fiction,” Sayers clearly opposes the detective novel to examples 
of contemporary fiction that are, according to her, lengthy and dull works that use stream-
of-consciousness techniques to explore the “morbid psychology” of their characters 
(Winks 27).    Sayers deplores “that school of thought for which the best kind of play or 
story is that in which nothing particular happens from beginning to end” (Winks 25).  
This is a style that she pointedly lampoons in Gaudy Night,76 in which Harriet attends a 
literary party and is told about a novel called Mock Turtle.  Apparently a Modernist work 
containing “some powerful anti-Fascist propaganda” that is only “a bit too long,” Mock 
Turtle 
. . . is about a swimming instructor at a watering-place, who had 
contracted such an unfortunate anti-nudity complex through watching so 
many bathing-beauties that it completely inhibited all his natural emotions.  
So he got a job on a whaler and fell in love at first sight with an Eskimo, 
because she was such a beautiful bundle of garments.  So he married her 
and brought her back to live in a suburb, where she fell in love with a 
vegetarian nudist.  So then the husband went slightly mad and contracted a 
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complex about giant turtles, and spent all his spare time staring into the 
turtle-tank at the Aquarium, and watching the strange, slow monsters 
swimming significantly round in their encasing shells.  But of course a lot 
of things came into it—it was one of those books that reflect the author’s 
reactions to Things in General.  Altogether, significant was, he thought, 
the word to describe it. (219) 
As a critic, her assessment of such novels was equally scathing: “The detective story is 
sharply distinguished from the kind of modern novel which, beginning at the end, 
rambles backwards and forwards without particular direction and ends on an 
indeterminate note, and for no ascertainable reason except the publisher’s refusal to 
provide more printing and paper for seven-and-sixpence” (27).77  According to Sayers, 
instead of providing this supposedly undirected focus on psychological interiority, 
detective novels are concerned with advancing the plot through action (Winks 16; 29).  In 
fact, in some of her essays, Sayers forcefully asserts that the psychological must be 
avoided altogether in the detective novel.   In her 1929 introduction to the The Omnibus 
of Crime, she writes:  “Make no mistake about it, the detective-story is part of the 
literature of escape, and not of expression” (Winks 82) and “does not, and by hypothesis 
never can, attain the loftiest level of literary achievement.  It presents us only with the fait 
accompli, and looks upon death and mutilation with a dispassionate eye.  It does not 
                                                
77Whether or not she means to deride the entire body of contemporary Modernist works, Sayers makes 
clear that she has at least some of the canonical Modernists in mind when making comparisons between 
detective fiction and the contemporary novel, noting one could not make a detective novel as long as 
Ulysses, for “effect of final discovery would be lost” (Winks 28).  Somewhat amusingly, she is careful to 
explain that she means Joyce’s Ulysses, and not the Odyssey itself.  The irony of this comment is, of course,  
that readers of Ulysses have remarked that this story demands exactly the same readerly faculties that 
detective fiction requires, including attention to small details or “clues” and a willingness to forgo 
understanding until the end.   
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show us the inner workings of the murderer’s mind—it must not . . .” (Winks 77).  
According to this argument, in-depth psychologies would “clog” what S. S. Van Dine has 
termed “the narrative machinery” (Symons 10) of the detective novel, which, in turn, 
would prevent the emotional catharsis that Sayers suggested was the primary object of 
reading a detective story.78    
 In practice, Sayers’s interest in character psychologies was greater and more 
complex than the preceding statements might suggest. While staying out of the minds of 
her criminals (for the most part), Sayers provides a good deal of insight into the 
psychology and motivations of her detectives, Lord Peter Wimsey and Harriet Vane.  
Throughout the series of novels in which Harriet appears, Sayers portrays Vane’s 
ongoing struggle to reconcile her desire for intellectual and physical independence with 
the prospect of sexual partnership.  In fact, in novels like Gaudy Night, such 
“superfluous” concerns arguably present tensions and questions that are far more 
interesting than the mystery at hand. 79   Moreover, Sayers delves deeply into the 
psychology of Wimsey and explicitly ties this exploration to the way he conducts 
investigations.  Educated at Eton and Oxford and descended from a noble family, 
Wimsey initially appears to be simply a spoiled playboy who provides detective services 
for his own amusement.  Yet Sayers quickly disabuses her reader of this perception, 
                                                
78In her 1946 essay “Aristotle on Detective Fiction,” she conceptualizes the mystery novel as a new 
incarnation of Aristotelian tragedy, wherein the reader obtains emotional catharsis through “the final 
discovery” of the denouement (Winks 28), and the feelings of pity and fear aroused by the criminal 
situation are ultimately dissipated.   
 
79Indeed, the end of Busman’s Honeymoon pairs the couple’s final achievement of marital intimacy with 
Peter’s breakdown at the end of a case, when Harriet (and, therefore, the reader) learns the back story 
behind Peter’s sufferings from shell shock.  Gayle Wald has commented upon the destabilizing impact 
romance has in Sayers’s novels.  She notes that while detective fiction generally seems to embody the 
forces of order and logic, the means by which society’s ills will be “cured,” authors like Sayers integrated 
sexual politics into their novels in ways that foreground and emphasize (rather than repressing) romance 
and desire as irrevocably destabilizing influences that the detective’s authority cannot entirely counter. 
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fleshing him out as a deeply complex character.  In Whose Body?, Sayers’s first novel 
and the first work in which Wimsey appears, she explores the psychological turmoil that 
has resulted from his service in the war, which underpins his ostensibly frivolous interest 
in detection.  Through such character psychologies and references to the hidden (and, 
indeed, unconscious) aspects of psychic experience, Sayers frequently compromises the 
stability and soothing plenitude of her novels’ psychical universe.  In so doing, she 
suggests the enduring presence of larger problems and traumas for her characters that 
seem stubbornly—and threateningly—to resist solution or even understanding.    
 
The Mystery that Must Remain Unsolved:  Sayers, Shell Shock, and the Unconscious in 
Whose Body? 
 “It’s disquieting to reflect that one’s dreams never symbolise one’s real wishes, 
but always something Much Worse . . .” – Harriet Vane, Gaudy Night (Reynolds 81) 
 
Sayers’s interest and skill in exploring psychological issues in her novels 
increased throughout her career.  Despite her espoused enthusiasm for the “rules” of 
detective fiction that she helped to set out, she also strove to bring the detective novel 
back into the tradition of Sheridan Le Fanu and Wilkie Collins by fleshing out 
characterization and essentially bringing it back to the “novel of manners” (Connelly 36).  
This effort entailed the very attention to character psychology that her essays critique.  As 
Laurel Young writes,  
Sayers states that her goal in writing detective fiction was to bring it back 
in line with the mainstream of English literature; she wished to produce a 
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text "less like a conventional detective story and more like a novel" (208). 
Although this had been her intention from her first detective novel, Whose 
Body? (1923), Sayers felt she did not achieve it until Gaudy Night. (par. 1) 
As noted above, milestones in Sayers’s life were often translated into her fiction.  In 
Gaudy Night (1937), Harriet Vane reflects on her own struggle to reconcile a more 
literary form with the detective genre, ultimately deciding that she must "abandon the jig-
saw kind of story and write a book about human beings" (302).80  Vane’s epiphany 
mirrored Sayers’s own self-conscious realization of the need to make the detective novel 
more psychologically complex.81   
Sayers appears to have been interested in advancements in the psychological 
sciences during her lifetime, including Freud’s theories.  It is perhaps unsurprising that a 
detective novelist would be intrigued by Freud, who explicitly likened psychoanalysis to 
detection when he noted:  “In both we are concerned with a secret, with something 
hidden” (“Psycho-analysis and the Establishment of the Facts in Legal Proceedings” 
108).   Critic Kelly C. Connelly argues that Sayers’s work comes close to fitting into a 
more literary and psychological subsection of the detective genre called the “whydunit,” 
which was directly influenced by developments in psychological medicine in the early 
20th century:  
The “whydunit” is heavily influenced by Freud’s attempts to explain the 
unconscious motivations behind man’s actions, focusing not just on the 
                                                
 
80Laurel Young discusses this quote in her article about this transition in Sayers’s writing.  
 
81As Connelly notes, this attempt is less about eliminating the formulaic, puzzle-oriented focus of detective 
fiction and more about finding, in Sayers’s words, a “new and less rigid formula [. . .] linking it more 
closely to the novel of manners and separating it more widely from the novel of adventure” (“Introduction” 
36). 
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facts of the case but also on the psychological issues raised by the 
criminal’s actions. Sayers does not quite reach the “whydunit,” as the 
focus of her novels remains solely on the psychology of the detective 
rather than that of the criminal. Nonetheless, Lord Peter’s appreciation of 
the impact of his actions on the criminals suggests a new concept of the 
criminal as a complex figure rather than as a symbol of evil. (40)82  
As Connelly notes, Sayers herself was reflective regarding this shift in both her work and 
the genre as a whole—and Freud was largely responsible for making this progression 
possible: 
Sayers wrote favorably about the few changes that were being made to the 
detective story in the late years of the Golden Age. In particular, she 
observed with pleasure that “a little more psychological complexity is 
allowed than formerly” (33). In “Chesterton and the Modernist Context,” 
John Coates explains that the works of psychologists, including Sigmund 
Freud, changed man’s sense of himself in the years prior to the First 
World War [. . .] (52). By raising questions about the state of man’s 
personality and of the possibility of untruth and potential criminal 
impulses in the heart of every man, Freud changed the world’s view of the 
self. As Sayers noted, issues of Freudian psychology began to appear in 
                                                
82 Connelly is not entirely correct in her assertion that Sayers failed to explore the psychology of her 
criminal characters in any kind of depth (cf. Gaudy Night in particular). Moreover, while Sayers almost 
universally focalizes her narratives through her detective characters and often fails to delve deeply into the 
psychology of her criminals, Lord Peter is always thoughtful and reflective regarding the motivations of his 
prey.  Thus, it is difficult to claim that Sayers neglects the psychology or motivations of any character but 
her detectives.   
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the detective novel, slightly shifting the focus of the formula from plot or 
puzzle to character development.  (36) 
 Several events in Sayers’s life also contributed to her interest in psychology and, 
more specifically, in the condition of “shell shock.” Coming into adulthood during World 
War I, Sayers herself survived several zeppelin raids when she taught school in the port 
town of Hull for a period in 1916 (Reynolds 91).  She also encountered many men who 
informed her portrayals of characters haunted by the specters of war—and it is in these 
portrayals that her interest in the Freudian unconscious becomes most visible.  In a July 
1915 letter to her friend Muriel Jager, Sayers notes that both her uncle and cousin were ill 
from their war experiences and one (she does not say which) was afflicted with “neuritis” 
(Reynolds 85).83   In 1916, while an undergraduate at Oxford, Sayers wrote a poem 
entitled “To Members of the Bach Choir on Active Service,” one of several works she 
produced during that time period that contained a “note of realism” conditioned by the 
civilian population’s growing awareness of the horrors of trench warfare (Reynolds 92).  
Later that year, her translation of a 16th century sonnet about Icarus by Desportes was 
published in the Oxford Magazine, on a page otherwise filled with death notices for 
Oxford undergraduates. Thus, even this more retrospective artistic effort did not escape a 
form of collision (via a visual juxtaposition) with the war and its impact.  
 Sayers later fell in love with Captain Eric Whelpton, a soldier who had 
“invalided out” of the army and suffered from both bouts of amnesia and fainting fits, the 
latter of which were eventually tied to polio.  This frail soldier would later become at 
                                                
83It seems important to note, too, how the arrival of these men affected Sayers’s mother, who Sayers reports 
almost had “another of her nervous attacks” as a result of the visit. In short, Sayers’s awareness of 
psychological illness and nervous problems in particular appears to have been acute. 
 157 
least partial inspiration for The Unpleasantness at the Bellona Club’s George Fentiman.   
Whelpton was a victim of shell-shock who suffered from what Sayers termed “nameless 
nerve attacks” and amnesia (112, 106).  Biographer James Brabazon notes that Sayers 
was forced to attend to Whelpton’s various health needs with a care and meticulousness 
that mirrored the dynamic she would create between Lord Peter Wimsey and his butler, 
Bunter.  Bunter served as Peter’s batman in the war and came into his service post-
armistice when he discovered Peter was suffering from a nervous breakdown.84  
Whelpton himself noted that he saw “the figure of a detective” taking form in Sayers’s 
mind during the period of their intimacy, asserting that he and another man named 
Charles Crichton became the inspiration for Peter Wimsey (114). 
 Sayers’s marriage to war veteran Oswald Arthur “Mac” Fleming further 
influenced Sayers’s portrayals of war’s impact on its participants.  When Dorothy met 
him in 1925, he was a reporter for News of the World.  He had served in both the Boer 
war, where he served as a war correspondent, and World War I, during which he both 
assisted in ammunition transport to the Royal Artillery forces in France and served as 
special correspondent to the Sunday Chronicle.   According to Barbara Reynolds, “Like 
many veterans, he had been gassed and still suffered from the effects of what was then 
called shell-shock” (179).  Mac’s daughter from his first marriage, Ann Schreurs, later 
said that she thought her father’s personality had been irrevocably altered by his 
experiences in the war. In addition to his own traumatic experiences, two of his brothers 
were killed and another badly injured.  The stories that Sayers heard from Mac and his 
                                                
84We only learn the full parameters of Bunter’s return to Peter in Sayers’s last novel, Busman’s 
Honeymoon. 
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friends were to form the basis of many of her portrayals of war veterans, particularly in 
The Unpleasantness at the Bellona Club (Reynolds 189).   
 In addition to gaining this firsthand awareness of the effects of “neuritis,” 
neurasthenia, and other war-related psychological conditions through relationships 
throughout her young adulthood, Sayers seems to have been aware of Freud’s work on 
“war neuroses” and other psychological issues as early as 1923, when Whose Body? was 
published.  In that work, Julian Freke, the murderer, is the author of a psychological work 
entitled “An Answer to Professor Freud, with a Description of Some Experiments Carried 
out at the Base Hospital at Amiens.”  What at first seems like a passing reference to the 
existence of a dialogue—and, ostensibly, debate—between the fictional Freke and Freud 
seems more significant when the reader discovers the novel’s larger interest in the ethical 
problems that attend efforts to know the “truth” about the minds of others.  Whose Body? 
is centrally focused on such ethical problems.  It distinguishes between a form of 
knowing or inquiry that seems Freudian—that is, respectful and cognizant of the 
existence of the unconscious—and a more scientific one that is invasive, directed toward 
obtaining absolute, complete knowledge of a person or situation.  
Freke clearly chooses the latter of these two ethical modes, while Lord Peter 
spends much of the novel straddling the line between them.  Although his career as a 
detective leads him, like Freke, to pursue the hidden “Truth” behind human behavior, 
Peter’s sufferings from shell shock force him to confront an arena in human life in which 
such truth is both meaningless and unobtainable—that is, the unconscious.  As I will 
discuss at greater length below, Freud’s work on trauma posits the existence of a form of 
traumatic knowledge that is the exact opposite of “simple” empirical knowledge.  
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Wimsey confronts this “alternative” content in recurrent nightmares and flashbacks that 
recur most frequently as his cases near solution.   These nightmares remind Wimsey of 
the profound psychic consequences of death and killing.  They draw his attention away 
from the pursuit of full “truth” and solution, which Wimsey finds highly pleasurable, and 
toward the human consequences of his investigation for both the victim and the murderer 
(who will probably be put to death if convicted).   
He is torn between these two ethical systems for the majority of Whose Body? 
The novel revolves around the mysterious appearance of a nude (except for a pince-nez) 
corpse in the bathtub of a Wimsey family acquaintance.  The body is initially thought to 
be that of a missing financier, Sir Reuben Levy (though this notion proves false, Wimsey 
does later discover that Levy has indeed been murdered by the same person who put the 
lookalike body in the bathtub). As the case begins, Peter reflects upon the tension he feels 
between the pure intellectual enjoyment he gains from solving crime “puzzles” and the 
knowledge that what feels like a game to him involves the brute realities of murder, 
violence, and criminal punishment.  That is, Lord Peter worries that his pursuit of truth 
comes at the expense of—or, at least, involves a total disregard for—human beings.  In 
Whose Body?, Wimsey discusses his ambivalent feelings toward his hobby with Inspector 
Charles Parker: 
‘It’s a hobby to me, you see.  I took it up when the bottom of things was 
rather knocked out for me, because it was so damned exciting, and the 
worst of it is, I enjoy it—up to a point.  If it was all on paper I’d enjoy 
every bit of it.  I love the beginning of a job—when one doesn’t know any 
of the people and it’s just exciting and amusing.  But if it comes to really 
 160 
running down a live person and getting him hanged, or even quodded, 
poor devil, there don’t seem as if there was any excuse for me buttin’ in, 
since I don’t have to make my livin’ by it.  And I feel as if I oughtn’t ever 
to find it amusin’. But I do.’ (127) 
Significantly, Wimsey links his desire to solve mysteries with his need to recover from 
the traumas of war, the details of which are described here (as throughout the Wimsey 
novels) only in pieces.  Wimsey provides some further details later in the novel, when he 
discusses his condition with Dr. Freke:  “ . . . I took up these cases as a sort of distraction. 
I had a bad knock just after the war, which didn’t make matters any better for me, don’t 
you know” (181).  These moments reflexively suggest that Wimsey’s exploits might 
serve a similarly soothing function for the reader, as critics have argued was detective 
fiction’s primary purpose during this time. However, in discussing his interest in solving 
murders for “fun” and his experiences in the war in the same breath, Wimsey draws 
attention to this darker side of his own psychology and highlights the fact that attempts to 
“know” can have an ethical dimension.  Moreover, Wimsey’s comments work against the 
notion that detection (or reading detection, for that matter) is a matter of pure pleasure.  
Although Wimsey claims that his enjoyment of pursuing murderers would be pure if it 
occurred “on paper”— that is, through fiction—he finds he is unable to avoid associating 
his “hobby” with far more serious ethical concerns.  Furthermore, in articulating this 
association, the novel reflexively thwarts the reader’s ability to “enjoy every bit” of the 
pursuit “on paper.” Thus, both Wimsey and the novel that contains him foreground the 
seriousness beneath his “frivolity.”  
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In this discussion between Wimsey and Parker, Parker attempts to allay Wimsey’s 
feelings of guilt by arguing that the detective’s duty is to pursue truth at all costs:  
. . . ‘[Y]ou’re thinking about your attitude.  You want to be consistent, you 
want to look pretty, you want to swagger debonairly through a comedy of 
puppets or else to stalk magnificently through a tragedy of human sorrows 
and things. But that’s childish.  If you’ve any duty to society in the way of 
finding out the truth about murders, you must do it in any attitude that 
comes in handy. You want to be elegant and detached?  That’s all right, if 
you find the truth out that way, but it hasn’t any value in itself, you know.  
You want to look dignified and consistent—what’s that got to do with it? 
You want to hunt down a murderer for the sport of the thing and then 
shake hands with him and say, ‘Well played—hard luck—you shall have 
your revenge tomorrow!’  Well, you can’t do it like that.  Life’s not a 
football match.  You want to be a sportsman.  You can’t be a sportsman.  
You’re a responsible person.’ (130) 
While Parker’s dismissal of Peter’s insistence on “playing the game” rings true in a 
postwar context in which this genteel notion of “fair play” has been more or less 
destroyed by the scale, violence, and seeming inexplicability of war, his insistence that 
the search for “truth” is an absolute good is much more problematic within the larger 
context of the novel.  In fact, Peter’s tendency to question the ethics of attempts to find 
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the “truth” behind mysteries represents a crucial difference between his own efforts and 
those of the murderer he pursues.85   
 That murderer is Dr. Freke, the scientist who has supposedly written the article 
responding to Freud’s work on shell-shock victims.  Freke is a neuroscientist who, while 
maintaining a psychiatric practice on Harley Street, remains significantly more passionate 
about his research at the hospital, where he dissects human brains.  He is the 
quintessential empiricist scientist who values the tangible and visible above the 
theoretical—in that sense, he resembles the Freud who pre-dates the Interpretation of 
Dreams.  When showing Parker the place where he stays when doing this research, he 
tells him:  “It’s a fatal thing for a theorist, Mr. Parker, to let the practical work get 
behindhand.  Dissection is the basis of all good theory and all correct diagnosis.  One 
must keep one’s hand and eye in training.  This place is far more important to me than 
Harley Street, and some day I shall abandon my consulting practice altogether and settle 
down here to cut up my subjects and write my books in peace.  So many things in this life 
are a waste of time, Mr. Parker” (111).  Here, Freke indicates he strongly prefers a form 
of investigation that involves literally opening and peering inside the human brain, which, 
significantly, necessitates the death of the thinking subject.  His coldly scientific curiosity 
regarding the human brain is, in fact, his primary motive for murdering Sir Reuben Levy.  
Even though he admits initially to possessing a “sensual” motive for killing Levy—
namely, that years ago Levy stole his fiancée and eventually married her—he claims that 
                                                
85This is not to say that Parker does not perceive a need for Peter to subscribe to a coherent ethical code in 
his investigation, but, for him, that mostly involves eschewing immature and/or snobbish behavior in order 
to get the job done--with “truth” as the ultimate goal.  Thus, while possessing the best of intentions, Parker 
here resembles Freke in arguing that “truth” is a supreme goal that should trump all others.  I do not suggest 
that Sayers means to imply that Parker is “the same” as Freke – but he does, perhaps, represent a more 
banal advocate of an ethics that can easily become injurious or even dangerous. 
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his murderous plans ultimately stemmed from a desire to use Levy’s brain for his 
research. In his confession to Lord Peter, he writes: 
Of all human emotions, except perhaps those of hunger and fear, the 
sexual appetite produces the most violent, and, under some circumstances, 
the most persistent reactions; I think, however, I am right in saying that at 
the time when I wrote my book, my original sensual impulse to kill Sir 
Reuben Levy had already become profoundly modified by my habits of 
thought. To the animal lust to slay and the primitive human desire for 
revenge, there was added the rational intention of substantiating my own 
theories for the satisfaction of myself and the world.   
Admitting that Lord Peter has found him out and thereby “spoiled the completeness of 
[his] demonstration,” Freke goes on to request coolly that he make an account of Freke’s 
murderous experiment “known among scientific men, in justice to my professional 
reputation” and asks that Wimsey make arrangements for his brain to be preserved as a 
means of ensuring his own legacy (195-196, 211).  Sayers’s description of Freke’s 
physical features reflects the eerily clinical, detached, and invasive curiosity he 
possesses:  “A face beautiful, impassioned and inhuman; fanatical, compelling eyes, 
bright blue amid the ruddy bush of hair and beard. They were not the cool and kindly 
eyes of the family doctor, they were the brooding eyes of the inspired scientist, and they 
searched one through” (178-179).   Freke thus represents a brand of inquiry that is 
invasive and even violent, one that is deadly when applied to one’s relations with human 
beings.   
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 As noted above, one of the most profound anxieties underpinning Whose Body? is 
the question of whether Wimsey’s ethics of inquiry and detection is different from 
Freke’s—that is, more psychoanalytic than forensic.  Sayers highlights the potential link 
between the two men and their methods in the same conversation between Parker and 
Freke quoted earlier, when Parker basically restates, in slightly different language, the 
very analogy Freud drew between the criminal and the hysteric.  Rather than comparing 
the detective to the analyst, however, Freke links detection specifically to the work of a 
forensic scientist:   
  ‘ . . . I have no doubt many of your diseases work quite as 
insidiously as any burglar.’ 
 ‘They do, they do,’ said Sir Julian, laughing, ‘and it is my pride, 
as it is yours, to track them down for the good of society.  The neuroses, 
you know, are particularly clever criminals—they break out into as many 
disguises . . . But when you can really investigate, Mr. Parker, and break 
up the dead, or for preference the living body with the scalpel, you always 
find the footmarks—the little trail of ruin or disorder left by madness or 
disease or drink or any other similar pest.  But the difficulty is to trace 
them back, merely by observing the surface symptoms—the hysteria, 
crime, religion, fear, shyness, conscience, or whatever it may be; just as 
you observe a theft or a murder and look for the footsteps of the criminal, 
so I observe a fit of hysterics or an outburst of piety and hunt for the little 
mechanical irritation which has produced it.’  
‘You regard all these things as physical?’ 
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‘Undoubtedly.  I am not ignorant of the rise of another school of 
thought, Mr. Parker, but its exponents are mostly charlatans or self 
deceivers.” (112) 
Freke links the truth-seeking impulses of criminal investigation to the kind of 
scientific inquiry he conducts.  The fact that he has apparently engaged in some kind of 
intellectual debate with Freud in print (as noted above), paired with this moment in which 
Freke takes a sideways shot at psychoanalysis and their “charlatans” and “self deceivers,” 
indicates that Freke himself believes that his own methods stand in opposition to 
psychoanalytic theory.  He contrasts psychoanalysis with his brand of reductionist 
science, which asserts that physical phenomena can be reduced down to their very 
chemical components.  For him, the “truth” of human experience resides in each 
chemical reaction and electrical firing within the human body, and he insists upon 
pursuing that truth regardless of the cost.86  The difference between Freke-ian forensic 
science and Freudian psychoanalysis is clarified in the story of Freud’s own career. As I 
already mentioned in the introduction, Freud trained as a doctor and was initially, like 
Freke, intensely interested in the neurological and anatomical bases of psychological 
phenomena before he took a decisive shift in the Interpretation of Dreams toward 
analysis and interpretation of what was not observable or quantifiable—that is, the “gaps” 
in mental events in which the unconscious is manifest.  Like the younger Freud, however, 
Freke is focused solely on the “neurological ingredients” of behavior and psychic 
experience, ignoring the subtleties of “the language of mental processes” upon which 
                                                
86This tendency becomes clear in Freke’s statement that he would love to “have the exploring” of some of 
the brains of the people who espouse belief in psychoanalysis so he could explain their flawed thinking 
(113). 
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psychoanalysis ultimately came to focus.  In his conversation with Parker, Freke claims 
detection is analogous to his own ethics of inquiry, the polar opposite of “charlatan” 
Freudianism.    
Sayers further implies the potential link between detection and science when she 
likens Peter’s authoritativeness about literature to Freke’s all-encompassing knowledge 
of human bodies.  This suggestion appears in the third-person limited perspective of a 
medical student named Piggott whom Parker has invited to Peter’s house as a consultant 
on the case.  The medical student describes what he perceives to be Peter’s unsettling 
habit of “knowing” about literature in the way that Freke attempts to know about 
cadavers:  “ . . . Lord Peter had a funny way of talking about books . . . as if the author 
had confided in him beforehand, and told him how the story was put together, and which 
bit was written first. It reminded you of the way old Freke took a body to pieces” (157).87 
  Ultimately, however, Sayers reveals that Wimsey resists the ethical traps that 
characterize Freke’s brand of inquiry.   As Wimsey’s uncle Paul Legardie says in a 
preface to later editions of some of the Wimsey novels, Peter has the “valuable quality of 
being fond of people without wanting to turn them inside out” (xi), and both his methods 
and the profound empathy he seems to feel (albeit unconsciously and against his will) 
toward those affected by his investigation distinguish him from Freke.  Sayers makes 
Wimsey’s war experience and consequent sufferings from shell shock the vehicle for this 
empathy, which in turn engenders an investigatory approach that is more associative 
                                                
87Peter’s ability to know about books so absolutely, to the point of seeming to understand the intentions 
behind each artistic choice, draws attention to a potential point of reflexivity in the novel.  The detective 
makes literature a matter of “knowing all” in much the same way that the Golden Age detective novel is 
said to provide its readers with the complete and ultimate truth behind its intrigues.  In a sense, as this 
moment strongly suggests, Wimsey’s struggle throughout the novel to stake out his ethical position with 
respect to knowledge and inquiry mirrors the novel’s attempt to do the same for detective fiction.   
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(and, therefore, Freudian) than forensic (or “Freke-ian”).  Indeed, Wimsey’s methods 
seem to align with a more Freudian model that locates significance in the association 
between ideas, objects, or characters, rather than relying purely upon forensic clues or 
pure logic.  As Wimsey explains, “it’s only in Sherlock Holmes and stories like that, that 
people think things out logically” when committing crimes; as a result, the search for 
meaning must take a different approach.  According to Wimsey, the key to concealing a 
crime is to “prevent people from associatin’ their ideas” (123), which implies that 
successful detection depends on the ability to connect people or ideas.  Similarly, in 
psychoanalysis, analysis of the patient’s symptoms or the “clues” in an individual case 
depends on being able to trace the unconscious connections between the “psychic 
predeterminants” via interpretation and make them conscious to the patient (Introductory 
Lectures 345).  Wimsey solves the crime when he is able to find the connection between 
two crimes that initially appear to him to be separate (171).88  As Wimsey reflects when 
solving the case, Freke’s success in getting away with the murder depends on preventing 
investigators from making certain associations (173).  Wimsey’s ability to make the 
obscured connections makes the crucial difference when all other forms of investigation 
fail.  
Wimsey is often painfully aware and respectful of inquiry’s ethical dimensions, 
whereas Freke, who is willing to kill for the sake of scientific knowledge, clearly believes 
                                                
88The crime Wimsey is called in to investigate is the unexpected appearance of a dead body in the bathtub 
of Thipps, an architect who knows Wimsey’s mother.  The police initially assume the body to be that of Sir 
Reuben Levy, a financier who has recently disappeared, but that turns out to be untrue.  Wimsey ultimately 
discovers that it is actually the corpse of a workman who died of natural causes, and that Levy remains 
missing.  He only solves the crime when he figures out how the corpse and Levy’s disappearance are truly 
related.  Freke’s plan becomes compromised when Wimsey is able to link Levy to Battersea Park, where 
the anonymous corpse of the workman that was initially assumed to be Levy was found (“He reckoned, of 
course, on nobody’s ever connecting Levy with Battersea Park” (171)). 
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that the attainment of truth and knowledge should trump any ethical concerns.  This is not 
to say that Wimsey is ever unsuccessful in his investigations or refuses to reveal the 
guilty party, but he consistently reflects upon the ramifications of inquiry and attempts to 
be humane even toward the murderer in his efforts to lay the facts of the case bare.  His 
concern for all of the parties involved in the investigation—and the responsibility he feels 
toward them—clearly stem from Wimsey’s memories of feeling responsible for the lives 
and well-being of his men during his service in World War I.   The end of his cases 
routinely triggers symptoms of shell shock.  In Whose Body?, for example, his realization 
that Freke is the murderer prompts him to have a nightmare later that night about an 
incident whose full parameters remain undefined, but which clearly pertains to the war: 
Mr. Bunter [. . .] was aroused in the small hours by a hoarse 
whisper, ‘Bunter!’ 
‘Yes, my lord,’ said Bunter, sitting up and switching on the light. 
‘Put that light out, damn you!’ said the voice.  ‘Listen—over 
there—listen—can’t you hear it?’ 
‘It’s nothing, my lord,’ said Mr. Bunter [ . . .] ‘Why, you’re all 
shivering—you’ve been sitting up too late.’ 
‘Hush! no, no—it’s the water,’ said Lord Peter with chattering 
teeth; ‘it’s up to their waists down there, poor devils.  But listen!  can’t 
you hear it?  Tap, tap, tap—they’re mining us—but I don’t know where—I 
can’t hear—I can’t.  Listen, you!  There it is again—we must find it—we 
must stop it . . . Listen!  Oh, my God!  I can’t hear . . . I can’t hear 
anything for the noise of the guns.  Can’t they stop the guns!’ (140) 
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Wimsey’s tendency to associate the “game” of investigating murders and the 
ramifications of discovering the guilty party with the trauma of his wartime experiences 
indicates that he does not share Freke’s cold-bloodedness in his pursuit of truth.  The 
difference between the two men becomes clear in their dialogue when Wimsey, having 
concluded that Freke is the murderer, visits him under the pretense of seeking treatment 
for the renewed symptoms of shell shock.  Freke explains Wimsey’s symptoms entirely 
in terms of physical brain injury and notes that the “sense of responsibility” Wimsey 
seems to feel with respect to the vaguely defined trigger situation (that is, the discovery 
of the murderer in the Levy case) has stimulated the damaged regions of Wimsey’s brain; 
thus, he suggests that Wimsey “must learn to become irresponsible” (183).89  Wimsey 
clearly cannot match Freke’s sangfroid, however, as his very decision to seek Freke’s 
“help” is an act of warning; Wimsey seems to feel morally obligated to allow his prey 
time to escape or at least give him an opportunity to decide for himself how to proceed, 
having been caught.  It seems significant that Freke entirely misunderstands the nature of 
Wimsey’s feelings of responsibility.  When he asks Wimsey to forego them, he is really 
only asking Wimsey to forego his obligation to pursue the truth—which, as the murder 
itself proves, is the only consideration of real importance for Freke.  For Wimsey, 
however, this responsibility pertains to the duty to protect human lives; this is the specific 
aspect of wartime experience of which Wimsey is reminded when solving cases, which is 
replicated in his dreams.  His reluctance to involve himself in helping a criminal along to 
the gallows originates from the horror of responsibility he developed through his 
experience as a soldier.  
                                                
89Of course, he has selfish reasons as well for doing this; he has realized that Wimsey is there to warn him 
that his plan has been discovered. 
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In linking the solution of the crime to Wimsey’s wartime memories, Sayers 
complicates any attempt to read the novel as a “soothing” fiction. While Wimsey indeed 
achieves full knowledge of the motives and actions that contributed to the crime’s 
execution, his traumatic memories bring the fraught post-World War I context to the fore, 
rather than suppressing it.   Moreover, and most importantly, Peter’s symptoms serve as 
reference to a form of knowledge that is not visible, measurable, or knowable—that is, 
that resists the efforts of the forensic scientist. Traumatic knowledge resides entirely in 
the unconscious; indeed, for Freud, the defining characteristic of a traumatic event is that 
it entirely bypasses the processes within consciousness that would limit, order, and assign 
meaning to it and goes straight to the unconscious (Beyond the Pleasure Principle 33).  
Building upon Freud’s formulation, Cathy Caruth asserts that the meaning of trauma lies 
not in the historical referent of what is perceived and can be described (what she calls 
“simple knowledge”) but in a moment that is lost to consciousness and cannot be known, 
seen, or recorded.  Thus, in bringing these spaces of “alternate” knowledge to the fore via 
Wimsey’s nightmares, the novel attends to aspects of human experience that can never be 
investigated or known.   
Significantly, Freud himself points to the crucial difference between Wimsey and 
Freke when he qualifies the analogy he draws between the hysteric and the criminal, each 
of whom possess a “secret” that needs to be detected. The crucial difference between the 
two, Freud notes, is that “[i]n the case of the criminal it is a secret which he knows and 
hides from you, whereas in the case of the hysteric it is a secret which he himself does 
not know either, which is hidden even from himself” (108).   Whose Body? draws the 
same distinction between these two forms of “secret knowledge.”  Whereas the novel 
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certainly presents “truths” that can be pursued and laid bare, Wimsey’s illness points 
urgently toward what cannot be known, and thus undermines any claim he might stake to 
being the “possessor of all codes” that Wald describes.  Sayers does provide the reader 
with the solution to the murder mystery, but in bringing the ethics of inquiry under 
scrutiny and suggesting the enduring power of the “alternate” form of unconscious 
knowledge for which trauma is a referent, she creates a far less enclosed universe than 
one might initially suppose.  
 
War and Trauma in The Unpleasantness at the Bellona Club 
 Sayers’s 1928 The Unpleasantness at the Bellona Club is even more directly 
engaged with the post-WWI context, and particularly with the lingering psychic effects of 
the war on its veterans.  Here, as in her treatment of Wimsey’s post-traumatic stress 
disorder in Whose Body?,  Sayers’s allusions to these lasting effects point to a larger 
structuring tension between two different modes of knowing—one scientific, and another 
which is, if not specifically psychoanalytic, certainly concerned with psychic content that 
is hidden, unconscious, and therefore technically “unknowable.”  Even more than Whose 
Body?, Bellona resists the comforts and tidiness that typically characterize the endings of 
detective novels, even while it stages a conventional denouement wherein the guilt is 
clearly assigned and the murderer expelled from the community that serves as the novel’s 
backdrop.  Once again, in this novel, Sayers’s stated anti-Modernist ethos and belief in 
the value and necessity of adhering to generic conventions seem distinctly at odds with 
both her novel’s style and its concerns. 
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 The novel’s very premise places the war at the story’s center, thus thwarting any 
claim one could make that Sayers ignores the pain of war’s wounds in English society.  
Its title brings the importance of war to the fore; the titular club at which the 
“unpleasantness” takes place is named after a Roman goddess of war, and this name, 
juxtaposed with the priggishness of referring to a murder as an “unpleasantness,” seems 
to encapsulate a tension between awareness and avoidance that structures life in post-
World War I England.  To some extent, Sayers attributes such priggishness and 
forgetfulness to an older generation of Britons who did not fight in World War I and who 
therefore do not understand the special nature of the conflict, its scale, and its lasting 
impact. The tension between the older generation and the young crop of veterans seeking 
to cope is central to the novel, but I contend this antagonism has less to do with 
generational distance than vast differences in attitude toward the importance of memory 
and remembrance to the process of healing.  The novel’s focus on remembrance is central 
to its exploration of the ethics of knowledge and inquiry.  
 Opening on Armistice night, the novel makes the war a primary focus from the 
start; events related to ceremonies and traditions of this day figure heavily in the 
concealment and ultimate discovery of the crime.  The opening scene foregrounds the 
tension between forgetting and remembrance as forms of healing as Wimsey reflects to 
another club member and veteran:  “Cheer up.  All this remembrance-day business gets 
on your nerves, don’t it?  It’s my belief most of us would only be too pleased to chuck 
these community hysterics if the beastly newspapers didn’t run it for all it’s worth.  
However, it don’t do to say so.  They’d hoof me out of the Club if I raised my voice 
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beyond a whisper.”90 Here, Wimsey seems skeptical of the efficacy of these ceremonies, 
but his critical stance is largely inspired by the media’s exploitation of them, rather than 
an objection to the communal effort to honor the dead and heal.  In fact, Wimsey’s 
attitude towards veterans like George Fentiman reveals a sensitivity to the enduring 
presence of war’s memories that his earlier comments obscure.  
Eerily evocative of Eliot’s “The Waste Land,” the first scene previews the way in 
which the novel veers away from the intrigue of the “pure” puzzle into murkier—and, 
indeed, more Modernist—artistic waters.  It opens with Lord Peter and Captain George 
Fentiman, both veterans of the war (and both of whom, we soon discover, suffer from 
shell shock) joking about the blurring of the line between the living and the dead in the 
Club and its members: 
‘What in the world, Wimsey, are you doing in this Morgue?’ 
demanded Captain Fentiman [. . .]. 
‘Oh, I wouldn’t call it that,’ retorted Wimsey amiably. ‘Funeral 
Parlor at the very least.  Look at the marble.  Look at the furnishings.  
Look at the palms and the chaste blonde nude in the corner.’ 
‘Yes, and look at the corpses.  Place always reminds me of that old 
thing in Punch, you know—‘Waiter, take away Lord Whatsisname, he’s 
been dead two days.’ Look at Old Ormsby there, snoring like a 
hippopotamus.  Look at my revered grandpa—dodders in here at ten every 
                                                
90Despite being apparently dismissive of Remembrance Day activities, Wimsey is nonetheless there to 
attend a dinner hosted by Colonel Marchbanks, who lost his son in the war and holds the event annually for 
his son’s closest friends.  Wimsey’s attendance and clear reverence for the event and its host seem directly 
at odds with the cynicism he offers in nearly the same breath in which he announces his purpose for being 
in the Bellona that day.  
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morning, collects the Morning Post and the arm-chair by the fire, and 
becomes part of the furniture till the evening.  Poor old devil!  Suppose I’ll 
be like that one of these days.  I wish to God Jerry had put me out with the 
rest of ‘em.  What’s the good of coming through for this sort of thing?’ (1) 
While easily read as a simple lampooning of the staleness and even obsolescence of Club 
life, this moment clearly links the effects of war to this feeling of staleness and, like 
Eliot’s poem, evokes a pervasive sense of loss and acute awareness of mortality that 
persists even ten years after the armistice.  George goes on to reflect upon the enduring 
impact of the war on its veterans when Peter asks Fentiman how he is doing: 
“Oh, rotten as usual.  Tummy all wrong and no money.  What’s the 
damn good of it, Wimsey?  A man goes and fights for his country, gets his 
insides gassed out, and loses his job, and all they give him is the privilege 
of marching past the Cenotaph once a year and paying four shillings in the 
pound income-tax.  Sheila’s queer too—overwork, poor girl.  It’s pretty 
damnable for a man to have to live on his wife’s earnings, isn’t it?  I can’t 
help it, Wimsey.  I go sick and have to chuck jobs up.  Money—I never 
thought of money before the War, but I swear nowadays I’d commit any 
damned crime to get hold of a decent income.” 
Fentiman’s voice had risen in nervous excitement.  A shocked 
veteran, till then invisible in a neighbouring armchair, poked out a lean 
head like a tortoise and said “Sh!” viperishly. 
“Oh, I wouldn’t do that,” said Wimsey lightly.  “Crime’s a skilled 
occupation, y’know.  Even a comparative imbecile like myself can play 
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the giddy sleuth on the amateur Moriarty.  If you’re thinkin’ of puttin’ on 
a false moustache and lammin’ a millionaire on the head, don’t do it. That 
disgustin’ habit you have of smoking cigarettes down to the last millimetre 
would betray you anywhere.” (2) 
The exchange highlights the untenable position of the veteran in the postwar context, thus 
resisting the kind of cultural erasure with which detective fiction is normally credited.  
Moreover, far from distancing the detective intrigue from the brute reality of murder, 
Sayers uses the exchange to lay the groundwork for George Fentiman’s motive to kill, 
suggesting a potential link between criminal behavior and societal conditions.   Wimsey 
highlights this dialogue’s foreshadowing function in his parodic vision of how George’s 
murder of a millionaire would be solved forensically in the traditional detective story. 
At the end of the chapter, George’s comment that he is unable to distinguish 
between the living and the dead in the Club is revealed as horrifyingly apropos when he 
and Wimsey discover that George’s “revered grandpa” is, in fact, literally dead: 
Wimsey bent down over General Fentiman and drew the Morning 
Post gently away from the gnarled old hands, which lay clasped over the 
thin chest.  He touched the shoulder—put his hand under the white head 
huddled against the side of the chair.  The Colonel watched him anxiously.  
Then, with a quick jerk, Wimsey lifted the quiet figure.  It came up all of a 
piece, stiff as a wooden doll. 
Fentiman laughed.  Peal after hysterical peal shook his throat.  All 
round the room, scandalised Bellonians creaked to their gouty feet, 
shocked by the unmannerly noise. 
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‘Take him away!’ said Fentiman, ‘take him away.  He’s been dead 
two days!  So are you!  So am I!  We’re all dead and we never noticed it!’ 
(3) 
The discovery fulfils the grotesque promise suggested by George’s ramblings about the 
living dead and Wimsey’s attempt at parody in response to George’s proposed turn 
toward crime.  What should arguably be a purely serious, tragic, and shocking moment 
becomes darkly humorous when the corpse can be lifted, somewhat unexpectedly, as 
easily as a doll.   Moreover, George’s reaction implies the inescapability of the psychic 
wounds inflicted upon him, as it is the first indication that George suffers from shell 
shock.  
 The development of the murder plot in Bellona often hinges largely upon 
character points or events related to these armistice celebrations or the war’s impact on 
the novel’s characters. For example, Sayers consistently returns to the topic of George’s 
“nerves.”  In a conversation between Wimsey and Mr. Murbles, the lawyer who hires 
Wimsey to investigate the circumstances of General Fentiman’s apparently natural death, 
Sayers compares the manliness of George’s brother and fellow veteran, Robert, to 
George’s “weakly” response to war’s traumas: 
‘I don’t know Robert very well,’ interjected Wimsey.  ‘I’ve met 
him.  Frightfully hearty and all that—regular army type.’ 
‘Yes, he’s of the old Fentiman stock.  Poor George inherited a 
weakly strain from his grandmother, I’m afraid.’ 
‘Well, nervous anyhow,’ said Wimsey, who knew better than the 
old solicitor the kind of mental and physical strain George Fentiman had 
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undergone.  The War pressed hardly upon imaginative men in responsible 
positions.  ‘And then he was gassed and all that, you know,’ he added 
apologetically.’ (12) 
While apparently apologizing for George’s sensitivity here, Peter seems far more 
sympathetic to it than Murbles.  Sayers goes on to contrast this sensitivity to the brutality 
and callousness that attend Robert’s “frightful” heartiness.  According to George,  
[Robert]’s so thick-skinned; the regular unimaginative Briton.  I believe 
Robert would cheerfully go through another five years of war and think it 
all a very good rag.  Robert was proverbial, you know, for never turning a 
hair.  I remember Robert, at that ghastly hole at Carceny, where the whole 
ground was rotten with corpses—ugh!—potting those swollen great rats 
for a penny a time, and laughing at them.  Rats.  Alive and putrid with 
what they’d been feeding on.  Oh, yes.  Robert was thought a damn’ good 
soldier. (83) 
In contrast, Sayers portrays George as entirely unhinged as a result of his wartime 
experience; like Mrs. Dalloway’s Septimus, he frequently mutters to himself (171) and 
experiences hallucinations (122).  Perhaps most significantly, George’s compromised 
mental state leads him to believe that he has something to “confess,” even though he has 
committed no real crime.  In Mrs. Dalloway, the content of Septimus’s confession 
arguably pertains less to a particular act or offense than his wider sense of having 
committed acts that extend far beyond the boundaries of typical human experience.  One 
could argue that a similarly amorphous and complex impulse inspires George to admit 
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falsely to murdering his grandfather.91  Although his confession fits well within the 
traditional detective formula because it represents the final step in the novel’s 
construction of George’s illness as a red herring, it is strange and unsettling because 
George has no concrete reason (other than his illness) for believing in his own guilt.  
Thus, through George’s confession, Sayers blurs the line between the assignable, 
expiable guilt that the detective novel supposedly stages and then alleviates, and the more 
amorphous, illogical, and inexplicable guilt of the survivor.  
 In addition to highlighting the importance of George’s experiences and symptoms 
and contrasting them favorably with Robert’s callousness, the novel presents Robert’s 
lack of sensibility as detrimental to several characters, including Robert himself.  We 
learn that Robert Fentiman found his grandfather dead in the Bellona Club’s library and, 
as he assumed that the elderly general died of natural causes, felt no qualms about 
attempting to conceal the body.  He did so because the general’s rich and ailing sister has 
written a will giving a significant portion of her wealth to her brother only in the case that 
she predeceases him.  Robert, as the heir to the general’s fortune, is thus anxious to make 
his grandfather’s death (which, in fact, preceded his sister’s) appear to have occurred 
later.  His coolness makes it possible for him to concoct a daring plan for preventing his 
grandfather’s body from being found, which complicates Wimsey’s investigation once he 
determines that the general did not, in fact, die of natural causes.  Robert’s calm and lack 
of emotion not only allow him to handle his grandfather’s body multiple times in the 
process of concealment, but also to take advantage of Remembrance Day’s two minutes 
of silence (during which everyone in the Bellona Club goes outside on the balcony) to 
                                                
91The reader is not actually privy to the exact moment of George’s confession; instead, he learns of it when 
Wimsey does, via Parker. 
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transport the body.  In so doing, he commits egregious outrages against family, country, 
and fellow veterans.  Robert suffers greatly from the consequences of his irreverence, as 
it leads him into his one major error in attempting to misrepresent the time of his 
grandfather’s death.  He fails to replicate the dress his grandfather was likely to adopt on 
Remembrance Day accurately, forgetting to place a poppy in the general’s lapel. This 
mistake is what convinces Peter Wimsey that the general did not die in the Club on that 
day, but rather some time before.  Thus, Robert’s inattentiveness to the wounds of war 
and their importance leads directly to the failure of his monetary aspirations.  Just as the 
novel seemingly cannot avoid portraying the realities of war—even within a genre that 
ostensibly works against such remembrance—so Robert ultimately finds he cannot ignore 
their importance and impact. 
Bellona’s portrayal of George and repeated emphasis on grief are components of a 
larger foregrounding of trauma and its signifiers within the novel.  As such, they point to 
the existence and importance of unconscious forces that these characters must negotiate 
in order to communicate and operate effectively.  Like Whose Body?, Bellona places a 
tension between the scientific and interpretive modes at the center of its story, the latter 
being the mode that Sayers suggests can (and must) achieve such negotiation.  As in 
Whose Body?, the fact that the murderer in Bellona is a doctor is suggestive of a larger 
critique of scientific forms of inquiry and knowing or the “ethics of investigation.”  Both 
novels present scientists who pursue truth and knowledge at any cost and tie the 
murderer’s decision to kill to his desire to pursue professional objectives that are equally 
violent and damaging.   
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At first, Sayers suggests that Bellona’s murderer, Dr. Penberthy, is the antithesis 
of Whose Body?’s Dr. Freke.  During the coroner’s inquest, Mr. Murbles favorably 
compares Penberthy’s sensitivity and “decorum” to the cheerfully clinical interest Dr. 
Horner takes in General Fentiman’s corpse when it is exhumed for an autopsy: 
‘Ah! very nice indeed,’ said Dr. Horner appreciatively, as the 
corpse was disengaged from the coffin and transferred to the table.  
‘Excellent. Not much difficulty over this job.  That’s the best of getting on 
to it at once. How long has he been buried, did you say?  Three or four 
weeks?  He doesn’t look it.  Will you make the autopsy or shall I?  Just as 
you like.  Very well.  [. . .]  I suppose we’d better secure the stomach, as it 
stands. . . . Pass me the gut, would you?  Thanks.  D’you mind holding 
while I get this ligature on? Ta.’ (Snip, snip.) ‘The jars are just behind you.  
Thanks.  Look out!  You’ll have it over.  Ha! ha! that was a near thing.  
Reminds me of Palmer, you know—and Cook’s stomach—always think 
that a very funny story, ha! ha!—I won’t take all the liver—just a 
sample—it’s only a matter of form—and sections of the rest—yes—better 
have a look at the brain while we are about it, I suppose.  Have you got the 
large saw?’ 
‘How callous these medical men seem,’ murmured Mr. Murbles. 
‘It’s nothing to them,’ said Wimsey.  ‘Horner does this kind of job 
several times a week.’ 
‘Yes, but he need not be so noisy.  Dr. Penberthy behaves with 
decorum.’ 
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‘Penberthy runs a practice,’ said Wimsey with a faint grin.  ‘He has 
to exercise a little restraint over himself.  Besides, he knew old Fentiman, 
and Horner didn’t.’ (120-121) 
Indeed, Horner’s cavalier and almost boisterous attitude contrasts sharply with 
what appears to be Penberthy’s reluctance to participate in the autopsy.  As the reader 
soon discovers, however, this reticence can be attributed to the fact that he has murdered 
the General so he can pursue his own dissection projects.  In fact, Dr. Penberthy is 
remarkably like Julian Freke in both his career interests and the ruthlessness of his 
ambition.  Like Freke, he is a dissector who seeks to understand the whole of human (and 
particularly criminal) behavior—in this case, by investigating the behavior of glands.   
Sayers suggests the tremendous stakes of Penberthy’s investigations in Lord Peter’s 
dialogue with Father Whittington at Penberthy’s lecture.  Father Whittington is attending 
in the hopes that Penberthy’s research on glandular functioning will present solutions to 
some of society’s “heart-breaking problems.”  When Wimsey comments,  “Glad to see 
there’s no antagonism between religion and science,” Whittington replies, “Of course not. 
Why should there be?  We are all searching for Truth.”  Having been joined by 
Penberthy, however, the priest gently suggests the danger of attempting simply and 
unilaterally to correct certain aspects of human behavior: 
[. . . ] ‘Well, Dr. Penberthy, I’ve come, you see, to hear you make 
mincemeat of original sin.’ 
‘That’s very open-minded of you,’ said Penberthy, with a rather 
strained smile.  ‘I hope you are not hostile.  We’ve no quarrel with the 
Church, you know, if she’ll stick to her business and leave us to ours.’  
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‘My dear man, if you can cure sin with an injection, I shall be only 
too pleased.  Only be sure you don’t pump in something worse in the 
process . . .’ 
‘I’ll be as careful as I can,’ said Penberthy.  (143) 
Ironically, just as sin originates from man’s inability to resist tasting the fruit of 
knowledge (according to Whittington’s Christian beliefs), Penberthy’s scientific interest 
in pursuing the origins of criminality is directly responsible for his decision to commit the 
sin murder.  The priest, Penberthy, and Wimsey return to the topic again after the lecture, 
and again emphasize the high stakes of Penberthy’s cold science: 
‘Well,’ said Lord Peter, ‘have the altars reeled?’ 
‘Dr. Penberthy has just informed me that they haven’t a leg to 
stand on,’ replied the priest, smiling.  ‘We have been spending a pleasant 
quarter of an hour abolishing good and evil.  Unhappily, I understand his 
dogma as little as he understands mine.  But I exercised myself in 
Christian humility.  I said I was willing to learn.’ 
Penberthy laughed. 
‘You don’t object, then, to my casting out devils with a syringe,’ 
he said, ‘when they have proved obdurate to prayer and fasting?’ 
‘Not at all.  Why should I?  So long as they are cast out.  And 
provided you are certain of your diagnosis.’ 
Penberthy crimsoned and turned away sharply.   
‘Oh, lord!’ said Wimsey.  ‘That was a nasty one.  From a Christian 
priest, too!’ 
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‘What have I said?’ cried Father Whittington, much disconcerted. 
‘You have reminded Science,’ said Wimsey, ‘that only the Pope is 
infallible.’ (150-151) 
Penberthy reacts badly to the priest’s comment about diagnosis, of course, because he has 
“misdiagnosed” the General’s death as natural—for his own nefarious purposes, as the 
reader later discovers.  In this exchange, Sayers links the presumed scientific infallibility 
that Wimsey perceives (through the lens of Whittington’s concerns) within Penberthy’s 
ethos to the “mistaken” diagnosis, which proves to be the sign of an even greater “evil.” 
Thus, in this moment, Sayers directly links “infallible science” itself to the ethos that 
drives Penberthy to murder.  
Like Woolf in Mrs. Dalloway and Between the Acts, Sayers suggests that the 
artistic impulse stands in opposition to this clinical scientific mode and can serve as a 
force of resistance (or foil) to it.  This suggestion is latent in her presentation of the 
character of Ann Dorland, Penberthy’s former lover and one of the suspects in the 
general’s murder.  Dorland’s characterization points to the existence of connections 
among Sayers’s portrayal of this “redemptive” artistic mode and both Modernism and 
psychoanalysis. 
The conflict between science and art in the novel is actually embodied in 
Dorland’s character. Dorland is a penniless relative of the general’s sister, Lady Dormer.  
Ann stood to inherit the majority of Lady Dormer’s estate, as the elder woman had made 
Ann the primary beneficiary of her wealth in the event that her brother predeceased her.  
Thus, Ann becomes a primary suspect.  Wimsey discovers that while naturally inclined to 
pursue Modernist painting and interested in modern authors, Dorland is pulled toward 
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more scientific interests (including chemicals and glands) by her relationship with 
Penberthy.  This alliance and her scientific interests bolster the case against her in the 
general’s murder.  Wimsey notes the evidence of her prior artistic leanings while 
searching her apartment, as he comes across some well-read—albeit dusty—modern and 
Modernist works: 
‘M-m.  Well now.  Let’s start with the shelves by the fireplace.  
Dorothy Richardson—Virginia Woolf—E. B. C. Jones—May Sinclair—
Katherine Mansfield—the modern female writers are well represented, 
aren’t they?  Galsworthy.  Yes.  No J. D. Beresford—no Wells—no 
Bennett.  Dear me, quite a row of D. H. Lawrence.  I wonder if she reads 
him very often.’ 
He pulled down Women in Love at random, and slapped the pages 
open and shut.  
‘Not kept very well dusted, are they?  But they have been read.  
Compton Mackenzie—Storm Jameson—yes—I see.’ (182) 
In addition to these literary interests, Wimsey and Parker discover that Dorland is a 
painter, ostensibly in the Modernist school.  Although both detectives note that her work 
is poor, it is nonetheless significant that her artistry appears to be a passion away from 
which Penberthy lures her.  More importantly, however, one of her paintings actually 
becomes Wimsey’s key to solving the mystery; in it, he recognizes a Modernist rendering 
of Penberthy and divines that the two were romantically linked, which provides a crucial 
link in his reconstruction of events.  Through Penberthy and Dorland and their respective 
interests, Sayers highlights the tension between the scientific and the interpretive, 
 185 
positioning the latter as a mode of resistance to the former—and, indeed, as the key to his 
own solution. 
Significantly, the first conversation between Wimsey and Dorland, in which the 
relationship between Penberthy and Dorland is revealed to the reader, contains several 
references to Freudianism and Freud. When Wimsey is trying to determine the nature of 
Ann Dorland’s distress, he asks, “Is it Freudian, or sadistic, or any of those popular 
modern amusements?”  Although she initially suggests he is on the wrong track in this 
regard, she eventually admits that the man she was seeing (Penberthy) claimed that she 
“had a mania about sex,” and says, “I suppose you would call it Freudian, really” (203).  
Although it remains unclear how applicable Freud’s theories would actually be to her 
“condition,” it seems important that Freud’s name comes up frequently at the very 
moment at which science and art, and the forms of knowledge they embody and offer, are 
so forcibly compared in the contrast between Dorland’s artistry and Penberthy’s science. 
One could argue that Wimsey’s successful reading of the artistic sign (i.e., 
Dorland’s painting) finds an analogue in his reading of Dorland’s psychological signs or 
symptoms, when he notes, “You’re not the kind of woman to be upset about nothing” in 
response to Ann’s remark that Penberthy dismissed her emotions as dysfunction.  In a 
sense, Wimsey’s success in the Bellona case is due to his ability to read the signs of art 
and human nature effectively.  It seems far from accidental that here, as earlier, Wimsey 
asserts the relevance and importance of emotional responses that appear illogical and 
inexplicable to others.  He affirms that Dorland surely has some kind of reason for acting 
the way she does, just as he defended George against unjust critiques that did not take his 
shell shock into account.  His attention to the more amorphous signs of the unconscious 
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and creativity proves more efficacious than a scientific methodology that looks to 
dissection and the reduction of human behavior to glandular function. 
 This deemphasizing of the power of reason and logic undermines any attempt to 
view the novel as mere intellectual puzzle. The novel further undermines such claims by 
drawing attention to—rather than eliding—the genre’s potentially escapist function and 
linking it to the realities of war.  Affirming the comforts that creating art can afford, 
Wimsey says to Dorland: 
‘. . . I wish I could do something of that kind.  As I say, I have to 
fall back on books for my escape.  Reading is an escape to me.  Is it to 
you?’ 
‘How do you mean?’ 
‘Well—it is to most people, I think.  Servants and factory hands 
read about beautiful girls loved by dark, handsome men, all covered over 
with jewels and moving in scenes of gilded splendor.  And passionate 
spinsters read Ethel M. Dell.  And dull men in offices read detective 
stories.  They wouldn’t, if murder and police entered into their lives.’  
Even in the same breath that Wimsey acknowledges detective fiction’s escapist function, 
he reminds the reader of the unpleasant reality of “real” murder and violence.  In so 
doing, he dispels the conditions under which the larger novel, the one he operates in, 
could serve as a mental retreat from such realities.  As the conversation continues, the 
extent to which Sayers’s novel bucks the conventions of the genre becomes increasingly 
clear:   
 187 
‘I don’t know,’ said Ann Dorland. ‘Of course, a detective story 
keeps your brain occupied.  Rather like chess. Do you play chess?’ 
‘No good at it.  I like it—but I keep on thinking about the history 
of the various pieces, and the picturesqueness of the moves.  So I get 
beaten.  I’m not a player.’ 
‘Nor am I.  I wish I were.’ 
‘Yes—that would keep one’s mind off things with a vengeance.  
Draughts or dominoes or patience would be even better.  No connection 
with anything.  I remember,’ added Wimsey, ‘one time when something 
perfectly grinding and hateful happened to me.  I played patience all day.  
I was in a nursing home—with shell shock—and other things.  I only 
played one game, the very simplest . . . the demon . . . a silly game with no 
ideas in it at all.  I just went on laying it out and gathering it up . . . a 
hundred times in an evening . . . so as to stop thinking . . .’ 
‘Then you, too . . .’ 
Wimsey waited, but she did not finish the sentence. 
‘It’s a kind of drug, of course.  That’s an awfully trite thing to say, 
but it’s quite true.’ 
‘Yes, quite.’  
‘I read detective stories, too.  They were about the only thing I 
could read.  All the others had the War in them—or love . . . or some 
damn’ thing I didn’t want to think about.’ 
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‘You’ve been through it, haven’t you?’ said Wimsey gently. (200-
201) 
Ironically, while still affirming detective fiction’s potential to serve as a kind of 
psychic balm, this detective novel presents its hero as someone who finds such escapism 
practically impossible.  Even when playing chess, a game of pure strategy, he finds 
himself reflecting upon the history of each piece and the “picturesque” or aesthetic 
components of play.   Thus, while admitting that in general the genre may serve this 
sublimating purpose, Sayers prevents her own fiction from doing so. She both makes the 
reader self-conscious and presents a detective who is constitutionally unable to avoid 
considering the human implications of even the “purest” intellectual endeavor.  Rather 
than ignoring or sublimating traumatic occurrences within the story of motivated murder 
and clearly assignable guilt, the novel foregrounds the effects of war and trauma and 
makes the potential link between the genre’s obsession with death and the postwar 
condition explicit.  Moreover, in drawing attention to the shadowy contours of traumatic 
memory and its lingering effects, the novel once again suggests the power of a 
knowledge that stems from the unmappable and unknowable unconscious and implies the 
inescapability of trauma’s effects. 
 Although ultimately providing its readers with a soothing solution, whereby the 
guilty party is discovered and his poisonous influence removed, the novel ends on an 
unsettling note—one that, appropriately, once again makes reference to the war.  Colonel 
Marchbanks suggests a link between the lingering effects of war and Penberthy’s 
decision to commit murder, as the doctor was an army surgeon in the Great War: 
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“Dear, dear!  Sometimes, Lord Peter, I think that the War has had a bad 
effect on some of our young men.  But then, of course, all are not soldiers 
by training, and that makes a great difference.  I certainly notice a less fine 
sense of honor in these days than we had when I was a boy.  There were 
not so many excuses made then for people; there were things that were 
done and things that were not done.  Nowadays men—and, I am sorry to 
say, women too—let themselves go in a way that is to me quite 
incomprehensible.  I can understand a man’s committing murder in hot 
blood—but poisoning, and then putting a good, lady-like girl into such an 
equivocal position—no!  I fail to understand it.” (222) 
This speech reflects the same disconnect between the older and younger generations that 
was apparent at the beginning with the reaction of Club elders to George’s “hysteria.”  It 
also draws attention to the disintegration of concepts such as traditional notions of 
“honor” and the profoundly damaging effects of war on its participants. Even if the 
Colonel demonstrates little understanding or empathy for those afflicted, his monologue 
highlights the need for both in its outlining of the links between societal ills and the 
postwar condition for the men who fought. 
Although Marchbanks succeeds in allowing Penberthy to regain some of this lost 
“honour” by providing him with a gun to use for suicide, Penberthy’s death carries only a 
tenuous sense of closure and resolution.  It leads directly into the conclusion of the novel, 
which, like the opening, at first glance reads merely as a wry characterization of the older 
generation as stuffy and out of touch.  Upon more careful examination, however, one 
finds it actually contains ominous references to the enduring presence of the war and 
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violence in the world of the characters.  In this moment, Wetheridge, the club’s resident 
voice of the indignant and put-upon older generation, is once again threatening to quit the 
Club with his refrain that it “isn’t half what it used to be”: 
“Look at all the disturbance there has been lately.  Police and reporters—
and then Penberthy blowing his brains out in the library.  And the coal’s 
all slate.  Only yesterday something exploded like a shell—I assure you, 
exactly like a shell in the card-room; and as nearly as possible got me in 
the eye.  I said to Culyer, ‘This must not occur again.’  You may laugh, 
but I knew a man who was blinded by a thing popping out suddenly like 
that.  These things never happened before the War, and—great heavens! 
Great heavens, William!  Look at this wine!  Smell it!  Taste it!  Corked?  
Yes, I should think it was corked.  My God!  I don’t know what’s come to 
this Club.” (228) 
This image of a fireplace that mimics the sounds and even physical dangers of shellfire 
conveys the sense that the Bellona Club (and perhaps Europe at large) is haunted.  The 
specter of violence is, as throughout the novel, inescapable.   
 
Wimsey, Trauma, and the Return of the Repressed 
As this final scene highlights, the problem at the crux of postwar life in Whose 
Body? and The Unpleasantness at the Bellona Club is that the conflict continues into the 
present for several of Sayers’s characters.  Through moments in which even a cheerful 
fireplace takes on a sinister cast and references to the frightening dreams and memories 
of her veteran characters, Sayers stages the relentless return of the event, which is a 
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defining characteristic of trauma.  By serving as a reference to trauma and traumatic 
knowledge, Sayers’s novels forcibly break from the mold of Golden Age detective fiction 
and align with the work of Modernists and Bloomsburians such as Woolf. 
 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud describes a trauma as a moment of 
“accident” in which traumatic stimuli surprise the conscious mind and thereby bypass it, 
as consciousness is caught unprepared to master and order this energy (33; 38).   Put 
differently, it is a “lack of any preparedness for anxiety” (36).  One strange aspect of 
trauma, Freud notes, is that the mind tends to return compulsively to unpleasant or 
traumatic subject matter, often causing a person to repeat or re-enact the traumatic 
situation (for example, through dreams or in play), a tendency that runs counter to 
Freud’s observation that humans typically seek the pleasurable and avoid that which is 
unpleasant (24). He determines that the compulsive return to traumatic events in dreams, 
fantasies, or hallucinations must constitute the mind’s attempt to order retrospectively the 
event via the secondary processes that were bypassed in the moment of the original 
trauma.   
Peter Wimsey certainly exhibits the symptoms of trauma and “shell shock” as a 
result of his service in World War I.  Although Wimsey himself views his turn toward 
detective work as a mere “drug” or cure that serves as a distraction from traumatic 
memory, one could also argue that his compulsion to detect is actually part and parcel of 
the same repetitions that constitute the brain’s attempt to master the “unbound energies” 
that result from trauma.  Taking this logic to the level of the novel itself, one could also 
say that Sayers’s obsessive return to the subject of Wimsey’s illness allows her novels to 
stage a “working through” of trauma on a literary level.  Like Peter’s traumatic 
 192 
symptoms, Sayers’s references to Wimsey’s illness are fragmentary, incomplete, and 
scattered over a long period of time, each mention providing a partial index to the 
meaning underlying his behavior. Her novels typically broach the subject of Peter’s 
illness when he is about to finish a case, which, as noted above, triggers nightmares for 
him.  In 1927, Sayers produced an introduction to Unnatural Death ostensibly written by 
Peter Wimsey’s uncle, Paul Austin Legardie, that offers details regarding Wimsey’s 
history and war experiences for the first time in Sayers’s novels.  Describing the series of 
events that led to Peter’s breakdown after the war (which was partially caused by the 
desertion of his fiancée Barbara while he was still serving abroad) and eventual turn to 
detection, Legardie writes: 
The only trouble about Peter’s new hobby was that it had to be more than 
a hobby, if it was to be any hobby for a gentleman.  You cannot get 
murderers hanged for your private entertainment. Peter’s intellect pulled 
him one way and his nerves another, till I began to be afraid that they 
would pull him to pieces.  At the end of every case we had the old 
nightmares and shell-shock over again. (xi) 
Legardie notes that Wimsey’s cases have prompted his condition to improve: “Of late he 
has become a little more ready to show his feelings, and a little less terrified of having 
any to show” (xii).  While more symptomatic than curative, Peter’s repeated involvement 
in murder mysteries does mimic the process by which the trauma victim attempts to gain 
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mastery over the experience that haunts him, prompting greater expressiveness and 
openness, if not an actual cure.92 
 
Sayers as Freudian, Sayers as Modernist 
 References to Wimsey’s illness and memories of war punctuate all of the novels 
in which he appears, but it is only in her final Wimsey novel, Busman’s Honeymoon, that 
Sayers provides the reader with more complete narrative treatment of his condition. 
Moreover, it is the novel in which Sayers makes a link between her brand of detective 
fiction and Modernism most explicit.   While most of the novel’s chapters, in line with 
the tendency Symons noted, use epigraphs from pre-20th century sources, the chapter in 
which the murderer is revealed, “Prickly Pear,” differs dramatically; in the place of these 
older and generally more literarily conservative choices, Sayers uses a selection from T. 
S. Eliot’s “The Hollow Men”:   
This is the dead land 
This is the cactus land 
Here the stone images 
Are raised, here they receive 
The supplication of a dead man’s hand 
Under the twinkle of a fading star . . . 
 
Between the idea 
                                                
92According to Legardie, Wimsey was an incredibly delicate (his nickname was “Flimsy”) and sensitive 
boy who possessed “beautiful frankness” prior to the war, when he lost these qualities and affected an 
“impenetrable frivolity of manner” and “a dilettante pose” (x). 
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And the reality 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Falls the Shadow 
The choice is both startling, given the poetic choices for all the other epigraphs, and 
suggestive, given that the chapter begins with Harriet’s inquiry into Peter’s nightmares.  
Evoking a dry, barren, and dead world not dissimilar to Eliot’s "Waste Land,” the poem 
is often read as Eliot’s condemnation of a post-World War I West.  Through its 
placement immediately prior to the revelation of the murderer’s identity and Harriet’s 
mention of Peter’s nightmares, as well as its reference to the murder weapon (a cactus), 
the poem is emblematic of the surprising complexity and depth that stand behind Sayers’s 
“frivolous” literary offerings and forges a direct link between her work and the larger 
contemporary tradition of Modernism.  The poem embodies references to trauma, death, 
and the post-World War I context, and, as the epigraph to Busman’s chapter of resolution, 
suggests their enduring influence and presence in the novel’s world as well.93   
This moment perfectly embodies the hybridity of Sayers’s detective fiction, 
which, while certainly embracing some of the conventions of the genre, also breaks the 
                                                
93It seems significant, too, that the book does not end with the capture of the murderer, but goes for almost 
80 more pages, describing Peter’s breakdown after the end of the case and providing further details about 
his condition.  The presentation of these details coincides with one of the major challenges Harriet Vane 
has faced in her short marriage to Peter; thus, Sayers implies a subtle connection between death and 
romance that has existed throughout the Wimsey/Vane novels.  Indeed, if death (in all its forms) is the 
central trauma upon which the Wimsey novels have focused up to this point, love runs a close second (and 
Legardie’s reference to Wimsey’s former fiancée in a discussion of his experience as a soldier and 
subsequent illness implies as much).  Busman’s Honeymoon, more than any of the other novels, 
foregrounds this fact.  As the novel draws to a close and Peter suffers a breakdown, his mother acquaints 
Harriet with further background about his war experiences.  Harriet is then faced with the challenge of 
treating Peter with appropriate sensitivity and respect and the newfound intimacy that their new 
“arrangement” has created.  Thus, both violence and love meet and seem to register as traumatic for 
Wimsey at the novel’s close, although Harriet is ostensibly able to help him through the breakdown. 
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mold in a variety of ways. Both Whose Body? and The Unpleasantness at the Bellona 
Club highlight the way in which Sayers’s breaks with detective fiction conventions 
demonstrate an affinity of concern and purpose with both the Modernists and, more 
specifically, the members of the Bloomsbury group.  Like the Bloomsburians, Sayers 
showed herself to be critical of modes of inquiry and knowing that failed to encompass or 
respect human privacy or the importance of memory or experience.  The linkage between 
the concerns of these authors is clear in their common interest in trauma and the war. For 
all of them, trauma becomes an index to forms of knowledge that cannot be ascertained 
by scientific or clinical means. Thus, it points toward an ethics of interpretation and 
inquiry that is both more generally respectful of the mysteries at the heart of human 
experience—psychic and otherwise—and also potentially redemptive and ameliorative in 
a postwar world reeling from the after-effects of global conflict. 
Epilogue 
The contrast between “truth” and “meaning” is at the heart of the works in this 
study. Hayden White once made the comment that the truth cannot set us free—but 
meaning will.    To a large extent, this idea is fundamental to these Bloomsbury group 
texts and their marshaling of Freudian psychoanalysis.  “Freud-who-knew,” who 
attempted to elucidate the “truths” at the heart of his patient Dora’s neurosis, failed in his 
analysis, whereas Freud the seeker formulated a notion of the unconscious that became 
the basis of a more ethical—and effective—way of asking questions about the human 
psyche.  In effect, Freud discovered that path to understanding begins with a willingness 
to ask a question to which there is no definitive answer.   
 The works by Woolf, Forster, and Mansfield discussed above share this 
perspective with Freud.  In Woolf’s universe, the attempt to understand another person, 
even in the face of seemingly insurmountable barriers to comprehension, is at once 
necessary and, yet, rare and miraculous.  In both Mrs. Dalloway and Between the Acts, 
the most hopeful moments occur when characters abandon cold, pure reason or bland 
empiricism to embrace connection, often through art.  This shift in attitude allows certain 
characters to preserve the “mystery” at the heart of human experience or “privacy of the 
soul,” which cold science (represented in Mrs. Dalloway by Drs. Holmes and Bradshaw) 
probes and violates, much to the detriment of the “probed.”  Septimus Warren Smith 
chooses to commit suicide rather than submit to the invasive methodologies of his 
doctors, which entail silencing him while using absurd physical metrics, such as 
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Septimus’s weight, as a measure of his wellness.  Woolf presents communication and 
connection, even when they don’t “make sense,” as constituting a form of resistance to 
the noxious patriarchy that Woolf perceived at the center of post- and interwar British 
life.  
 Naturally, the ability to claim knowledge of the absolute “truth” about other 
people represents a powerful means of consolidating control and authority.  Like Woolf, 
Forster explores this aspect of the drive for “truth” and its negative impact.  In colonial 
Chandrapore, the Anglo-Indians solidify their power by learning the “truth” about 
Indians, marshaling what Lacan would identify as a master discourse.   Such discourse 
claims to be absolutely and entirely at one with the reality or “truth” that it describes. The 
incident in the Marabar Caves destabilizes this master discourse and gives rise to the 
discourse of the hysteric in the form of Adela Quested’s rape narrative, which reveals the 
master discourse’s inadequacy to the task of representing pure, unvarnished “truth.”  
Though Adela destroys many relationships in the process of finally realizing that a rape 
did not occur, the manner in which her hysteria destabilizes the predominant Anglo-
Indian discourse of logic and rationality creates the potential, at the end of the novel, for 
greater understanding and communication in the future, particularly with respect to the 
“forbidden” love of Fielding and Aziz.  The potential to live and talk outside of 
imperialism and the master discourse it marshals is not yet entirely possible at the end of 
A Passage to India, but the realizations that the incident in the Marabar Caves 
provokes—for both the characters and the reader—represent a source of hope that such a 
possibility is imminent. 
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Katherine Mansfield, too, explores the dangers of the master discourse in two of 
her stories, “Je ne parle pas francais” and “Psychology.”  Both of these stories focus on 
artist figures who, like the Anglo-Indians in A Passage to India, lay claim to being able to 
embody the absolute truth of what they describe in their discourse.  In “Je ne parle pas 
francais,” the narrator claims access to a privileged perspective on both himself and 
others; as a detached artist, he can see everything in the “jumbled portmanteau” of human 
nature and relay each detail to his reader, no matter how depraved.  In “Psychology,” the 
central couple hide behind their art and supposed ability to communicate “perfectly” with 
one another, sometimes telepathically, in order to opt out of discourse altogether.  
Though they believe they are uniquely able to use language to convey their thoughts in 
their entirety, their failure to articulate their feelings for each other, in a moment of 
emotional crisis, undermines this claim. When confronted with this crisis, they fall silent, 
which as Lacan asserts is the only tenuous and fleeting recourse the master can take to 
avoid being revealed as divided; in opting out of the circulation of desire and the pursuit 
of the objet petit a that is at its core, the speaking subject avoids having to admit a sense 
of lack that would drive that search. By refusing to speak to each other in any kind of 
meaningful way, the couple submits to a kind of “living death,” becoming a cautionary 
tale about dangers of marshaling this kind of discourse. 
 As I have already noted, Dorothy Sayers occupies a strange place in this 
collective of artists in conversation with Freud.  Firstly, of course, she is not typically 
considered part of the Bloomsbury group, even though she lived and worked there and 
much of her writing referenced her Modernist contemporaries.  Secondly, as the purveyor 
of classical detective novels that generally followed a rigid formula and adhered to 
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certain rules, Sayers viewed herself and her work in opposition to the efforts of the 
Modernists, which she often found scattered and purposeless.  Finally, unlike the works 
by Woolf, Forster, and Mansfield discussed above, Sayers’s detective novels hinge on the 
pleasures of full discovery; they create a universe in which all ills and unknowns 
ultimately have a motivation and “truth” at their core that can be discovered through 
reason and empirical investigation.   
Sayers also places a detective suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder at the 
center of many of these stories, thus complicating any claim her novels might stake to 
being a mindless balm for a postwar British society in desperate need of escapist fare.  
Sayers undermines her own “soothing” portrayal of motivated, explainable death by 
consistently drawing attention to the specters of war that haunt her characters, and most 
particularly Lord Peter Wimsey.  In allowing references to Wimsey’s unconscious 
thoughts and fears to seep into her orderly murder puzzle, Sayers references a different 
kind of “truth”—or, rather, meaning—that is more powerful than the solution at the end 
of her novels.  Although the classical detective is often associated with a forensic 
scientific mode of investigation dependent on empirical physical evidence, Sayers aligns 
Wimsey with a more Freudian psychoanalytic mode of going about “knowing” (as 
opposed to knowing about) others—and, in fact, it is the murderers in Whose Body? and 
The Unpleasantness at the Bellona Club who are the hard scientists, not the detectives.  
Wimsey, by contrast, is consistently attentive to the ethical dilemmas and stakes of 
pursuing the truth behind the murders he investigates, and always weighs the human 
impact of his efforts against the benefits of discovery and knowing the “truth” behind a 
crime.   
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More importantly, however, he is a vehicle through which Sayers brings the 
specter of war—and the power of unconscious meaning—to the fore.  In explicitly 
linking Peter’s nightmares about his experiences as a soldier to the conclusions of his 
cases, Sayers thwarts any kind of escapist pleasures the novel could afford with respect to 
the Great War.  Moreover, the pleasures of full discovery are partially countered by the 
unsettling presence of Wimsey’s unconscious memories. 
None of the writers above ever explicitly expressed an artistic indebtedness to 
Freud.  Sayers and Mansfield seem to have been more openly hospitable to 
psychoanalysis, while Woolf and Forster expressed emotions ranging from suspicion to 
outright hostility toward Freudian thought.   Nonetheless, it is undeniable that Freud’s 
revolutionary rethinking of the human psyche and the division between consciousness 
and the unconscious influenced all of these writers.  In particular, they all demonstrate an 
interest in deconstructing the notion that an absolute, discoverable “truth” exists at the 
heart of human emotions and motivation, and point to the ethical and practical problems 
of pursuing such knowledge.  In this way, these authors’ “ethics of interpretation” 
resembles Freud’s formulation of the unconscious, which posits the existence of 
knowledge and psychic content that remains necessarily unknown to the subject.  In 
Freud’s formulation of the unconscious, which Lacan expanded upon, the subject’s status 
as divided, which places him or her perpetually in pursuit of content that cannot be 
known or represented, provides a motor for life; thus, to attain full knowledge of such 
content would essentially be fatal to the subject.  One finds a correlate for these stakes in 
the work of Woolf, Forster, Mansfield, and Sayers, all of whom mediate upon the 
devastating consequences of pursuing only hard truths and facts with respect to human 
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relationships.  These authors suggest that implementing an “ethics of interpretation” in 
one’s dealings with others represents a powerful means of fostering connections and 
sympathy among individuals; in fact, it may be our only hope for survival.
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